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Abstract
This thesis aims to examine the impact of internationalising corporations of peripheral nation­
states on their strategic rivalries. Although corporations from an increasing number of peripheral 
countries have internationalised their operations in the last fifteen years, the implications of this 
process for their interstate relations and -in particular- their relations with their strategic rivals, 
have yet to be systematically addressed. The thesis’s hypothesis is that in the context of such 
corporate internationalisation for a state in the semi-periphery, the large-scale acquisition by a 
domestic firm of a foreign enterprise, reconfigures conceptions of economic nationalism. This is 
especially the case where the enterprise acquired is located in a state with which there is a long­
term and significant foreign policy rivalry. The interests and strategies of key domestic 
socioeconomic actors are reconfigured within the new nationalism, with incentives to support 
and sustain such corporate internationalization.
This thesis will review the scholarship on New Economic Nationalism which provides the most 
suitable analytical perspective to evaluate the impact of corporate internationalisation on 
strategic rivalries. It will also identify the corporate internationalisation process and those of its 
features that are particular to peripheral countries. It will also examine the challenges posed to its 
hypothesis by the scholarly debates which liberal institutionalism, realism and Europeanization, 
have generated.
The thesis’s hypothesis will be tested through the country case of Greece, and its strategic rivalry 
with Turkey. The thesis will examine the wider role of Greek corporations prior to their 
internationalisation in Southeastern Europe, and at the height of Greece’s strategic rivalry with 
Turkey. It will then access the prominence that Greek corporations achieved due to their 
internationalisation and the conflation, by Greek policy makers and governing parties, of the 
corporate internationalisation process with national prestige and prowess. By scrutinising a 
particular FDI transaction, the acquisition of a major Turkish bank by Greece’s leading bank, the 
thesis will evaluate whether corporate internationalisation, by redefining economic nationalism, 
can indeed have an significant impact on Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Although corporations from an increasing number of peripheral countries have internationalised 
their operations in the last fifteen years or so, the implications of this process, for their interstate 
relations, and in particular their relations with their strategic rivals, have yet to be systematically 
addressed, to our knowledge. The thesis’s hypothesis is that such corporate internationalisation 
creates or aligns powerful socioeconomic groups and actors with a reconfigured conception of 
economic nationalism in peripheral nation-states. By doing so corporate internationalisation 
attenuates the strategic rivalries of these peripheral countries.
In the first section of this introductory chapter we will identify the corporate internationalisation 
process as it emanates from peripheral countries. Subsequently we will pose our research 
question and hypothesis and introduce the concept of strategic rivalries. We will then address the 
methodological issues that arise from our research question and hypothesis, as they apply in our 
country case. We will do so by suggesting how an examination of state-society relations can 
provide sufficient traction for addressing how corporate internationalisation, from countries of 
the European and global periphery, can alter their strategic rivalries.
In the second section we relate the choice of our country-case, Greece, to some salient elements 
of its status as a strategic rival to Turkey and of the corporate internationalisation process which 
has been emitted by its economy. We will also briefly review the range of explanations which 
Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey has generated.
In the third section, we will briefly review scholarship on New Economic Nationalism which we 
hypothesize provides the most suitable analytical perspective from which to evaluate the impact 
of corporate internationalisation on strategic rivalries. We will then highlight the challenges 
posed to our hypothesis by the scholarly debates which Liberal Institutionalism, Realism and 
Europeanization, have generated.
We will conclude with an outline of the thesis’s chapters to follow.
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Corporate Internationalisation and Strategic Rivalries 
l.Identifying the Corporate Internationalisation Process
Traditional recipients of advanced capital and know-how, embedded in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and imported products and services, have in the last decade or so, and for their 
first time in their histories, become significant producers of the same. These countries tend to 
originate from the global periphery: from Europe and Asia (Greece, Turkey, India, China), to 
Africa and Latin America (South Africa, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico).
Corporate internationalisation, in these countries, has been widely perceived as a process of 
historic magnitude by governments, domestic and international media, market actors and indeed 
populaces.
Initially, in the early 1980’s these countries were seen in the framework of reintegration in the 
world economy -  thus the term ‘emerging markets’ -  whereby peripheral economies could 
access capital flows from abroad in the context of liberalised home capital markets and would 
become increasingly important importers and exporters of goods and services. Particular focus 
was placed on the larger of these emerging markets, the so-called Ten Big, the BRIC’s, and 
N i l ’s, as potential linchpins of the world economy and powerful stakeholders of the 
international order (Garten, 1996; O’Neil et al., 2003; O’Neil et al., 2004).
Subsequently, emphasis was given to a particular element of these emerging economies, both as 
indicative of their rise to prominence and worthy of attention on its own right: namely their 
cohort of internationalising corporations which not only defend their home turf but also present a 
competitive threat to well-established, western multinationals. Concepts invented and 
popularised by market actors and commentators, such as the New Challengers (Aguiar, et al.,
2006), the Emerging Market Century (Van Agtmael, 2007), Reverse Colonisation (Fortune,
2007), are all anchored in the theme that such corporate performance signals a rebalancing of the 
established world economic order.
In this regard, corporate internationalisation has been informed, by those same nation-states of 
the periphery, the corporations of which now undertake it themselves, by their historically 
subordinate status in the international order. This status manifested itself through their often
9
unwilling acceptance of free trade, their military inferiority leading either to their hard or soft 
colonisation and their ‘great divergence’ in income and productivity terms, from the developed 
West. The concept of periphery, employed henceforth, was established on the basis of this 
reality which held dominant from the late 18th century to the early 20th century (Findlay and 
O’Rourke, 2007, p.366).
Indeed, hard power and multinational activity were initially coterminous, beginning with the 
Dutch VOC and continuing with the East Indian Company, both establishing by the force of 
arms profitable monopsonies and monopolies in Asia. Subsequently, capitulatory regimes, 
imposed after military defeat, pried open the markets of China and of the Ottoman Empire, while 
India was de-industrialised as a colony of the British Empire, its artisanal textile manufacturing 
decimated by exports from Lancashire’s textile mills (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, p.400). 
Following the reintegration of the world economy after the end of WW II, this time around the 
empire and the emporium were conflated in the persona of the United States (De Grazia, 2006). 
Patterns of consumption and collective aspirations were mediated through US branded goods and 
marketing structures. Consequently, whether in a causal or correlative manner, those 
peripheral nations and/or their nation-states, have always seen international commerce and 
investment through the lenses of the prevailing international order and hierarchy. They have also 
filtered their understanding of their international position through prevailing patterns of 
international trade and investment: their status as objects not as subjects of history determined 
by the nature of their subordinate economic specialisation (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007, p.388).
So we have a widespread phenomenon of corporate internationalisation by peripheral nation­
states; this phenomenon is perceived as heralding a new world order, and widely advertised as 
such, within and outside these peripheral nation-states; nation-states which, furthermore, have 
historically experienced corporate internationalisation as coterminous with their subordinate 
status -  political and economic - in the international system. The issue that arises then is whether 
corporate internationalisation in peripheral nation-states cannot but have a substantial impact in 
the way these states perceive and comport themselves in the international system and in 
particular in their relationships with their main strategic rivals.
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2.Research Question & Hypothesis and the concept of the Strategic Rivalry
Our Research Question then becomes the following:
How does corporate internationalisation, undertaken from the economies of nation-states at the 
European and global periphery, ameliorate their long-standing strategic rivalries? The case of the 
Greek strategic rivalry with Turkey.
Our resulting Hypothesis will posit that:
For a state in the semi-periphery, the large-scale acquisition by a domestic firm of a foreign 
enterprise, reconfigures conceptions of economic nationalism. This is especially the case where 
the enterprise acquired is located in a state with which there is a long-term and significant 
foreign policy rivalry. The interests and strategies of key domestic socioeconomic actors are 
reconfigured within the new nationalism, with incentives to support and sustain such corporate 
internationalization.
In the formulation of the thesis’s research question we seek to identify this sub-category of 
peripheral nation-states which do not only feature substantial corporate internationalisation but 
also well-entrenched, friction-laden relationships with other nation-states: nation-states that have 
strategic rivals.
Strategic rivalries are defined as “relationships in which decision-makers have singled out other 
states as distinctive competitors and enemies posing some actual or potential military 
threat...[Strategic] Rivalry requires the combination of competition and the perception of threat 
from an enemy”1. Such rivalries are historically informed, often by the manner in which 
particular nation-states have been brought into being, and by the very conflicts which they have 
generated, as the latter shape self-fulfilling expectations. They involve seemingly irreconcilable 
goals between nation-states which originate in territorial, positional and ideological contests. 
Due to their long duration, strategic rivalries also generate powerful domestic constituencies 
vested in their continuation and become an integral part of the relevant national identities.
1 Colaresi, M.P. Raster, K. & Thompson W.R., 2007. Strategic Rivalries in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p.3
11
We deem it desirable to examine the impact of corporate internationalisation through the prism 
of strategic rivalries for three main reasons.
First, if indeed internationalising corporations can have an impact on those hard cases which 
exhibit the most enduring and intractably conflictive relationships, then our research acquires 
wider relevance: it is of consequence to the large category of peripheral nation-states, and of 
their process of integration in the international system, whether their interstate relations also 
feature strategic rivalries or not.
Second, such conflictive, interstate relationships offer researchable opportunities in which to 
evaluate the impact of internationalising corporations onto the domain of interstate relations of 
peripheral nation-states.
Third, by examining the impact of corporate internationalisation on peripheral nation-states 
through the prism of strategic rivalries we also give to the thesis its paradox: that it is a new 
variant of nationalism, this time grounded in corporate internationalisation, that can actually be 
effective in combating this most well-recognised variant of nationalism: irreconcilable, 
implacable enmity to the historical ‘other’, namely the strategic rival.
By selecting such hard cases we also connect our investigation with that strand of the scholarly 
debate that hypothesizes that the benefits of economic interdependence can overcome the 
imperatives of international conflict, particularly so in peripheral countries that have been 
bedevilled by sustained interstate conflict or friction. Starting with early modernisation theory on 
foreign policy (Morse, 1970) and moving on to the debate on economic interdependence versus 
international conflict (Rosecrance, 1986, 1996; Solingen, 1998; Brooks, 1999) it has been 
presumed that the rising benefits of economic exchange, combined with the declining benefits of 
territorial conquest, will make themselves felt, marginalising a more traditional ‘high politics’ 
focus’ of such peripheral nation-states; states grounded in national ‘myths’ and identities and 
outdated notions of the value of territory for national power, development and prestige.
It will be argued that indeed the material benefits accruing through economic interdependence, 
seen through corporate internationalisation, do have their assumed impact on foreign policy 
conduct, even in these hard cases, namely peripheral nation-states involved in strategic rivalries;
12
not least, however, through the very capacity of corporate internationalisation to appropriate and 
be conflated with the national project. In that respect the thesis’s aim is not falsifying existing 
theory, on economic interdependence and international conflict, but rather, due to its negative 
case characteristics -  grounded in the additional, previously unaccounted for, variable of a 
reconfigured economic nationalism - it is to expand it (Emich, 1997, p. 654).
This focus of the single case characteristics of our own case study under examination is justified 
by the widespread but still novel and under-explored phenomenon that corporate 
internationalization from the periphery has become. As Emich notes, the focus on the single 
case is justified by the ever present need to develop theoretical content (1997, p. 657). This need 
becomes most pressing, we would argue, when a novel phenomenon emerges. While in due 
course it must surely be subjected at comparative study of ever wider range -  indeed as wide as it 
is its occurrence -  it does make sense to commence with the single case focus that can generate 
the perspectives and nuances that can then be applied to the totality of the group that the single 
case belongs.
Moving to the issue of generalised applicability, our single case has the added benefit of 
materializing over a discreet time frame which it shares with the wider group of cases which it 
belongs too, namely internationalizing corporations from the periphery. Thus we can address the 
requirement that a case study is “an independent study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units”2. The thesis in that regard will not only establish 
the particular time frame under which its case study becomes actualized but will also make 
extensive reference to the theoretical perspectives, and actual processes, that it shares with the 
larger class of cases to which it belongs. These features of the thesis will incorporate the 
transformed relationship between internationalizing corporations and domestic and international 
stakeholders, including states, publics, employees and other domestic and international 
stakeholders. In other words, while the novel subject of the impact of internationalizing 
corporations from the periphery on strategic rivalries is the subject of the thesis, the nature of
2 Gerring, J., 2004. What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?. American Political Science Review, 98(2), 
p.342
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ours single case selected is such that it allows for concrete theoretical and other linkages to be 
established, such that it can facilitate further research on a wider sample of similar cases.
Indicatively, our case study, National Bank of Greece (NBG) has been found, in a period which 
is almost coterminous with that of our study, from 1997 to 2007, to be a high performing 
corporation, one of 200 word-wide, selected from a wider group of 2,000 leading corporations, 
both from core and peripheral markets (Hansen, M.T., Ibarra, H., Peyer, U., 2010, p. 109). The 
criteria according to which NBG has thus been selected by this study, industry-adjusted 
shareholder returns, country-adjusted shareholder returns and change in market capitalization, 
are also relevant to the wider processes which will examine below, both normative and material, 
which bear upon a reconfigured conception of economic nationalism. NBG, in other words, 
and as we will seek to further establish, is an emblematic, rather than a sui generis case of a 
corporation from the periphery in the period under examination, in the way it has interacted with 
its domestic and international envirponment.
3.Methodology
In terms of the research methodology employed in the testing of this hypothesis what will be 
utilised is a combination of (i) establishing that altered state-society links, under corporate 
internationalisation, can produce an alternative understanding of the place and mission of the 
nation in the international domain (ii) implementing a process tracing approach which will 
illuminate the hypothesized effect of this understanding -  our independent variable - in a 
discrete, identifiable event involving Greece and its strategic rival, Turkey; an event which has 
challenged key elements of its strategic rivalry -  our dependent variable - namely the acquisition 
by National Bank of Greece, Greece’s leading commercial bank, of Finansbank, Turkey’s fourth 
largest, privately-owned bank.
The emphasis on state-society links is necessitated by our choice to examine internationalising 
corporations. The assumption that socio-economic actors can affect the priorities and conduct of 
this nominal preserve of state action, the relationship with a strategic rival, requires specificity on 
state-society relations.
In that respect we will apply the perspective of scholars such as Hill (2003, pp. 107-8), who, in
addressing how certain issues in foreign policy are organised ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the realm of
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plausible action, refers to underlying political and social structures which have a decisive impact. 
On this basis he criticises theories of bureaucratic autonomy, which assume that administrative 
elites can remain impervious to evolving collective understandings. He reinforces this view by 
making the point that informal networks in government and the state can make an elite cohere 
around a perspective which, for example, can supersede, if it will not eliminate, the established 
view of a ministry of defense or of foreign affairs.
The pertinence of this discussion will be evaluated in our examination of how the Greek 
Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs have responded to the increasing saliency of the 
corporate internationalization process in Greece. Both policy action and the strategies of the 
politicians in charge of these ministries will be taken into account in order to arrive at a 
considered judgment on the nature of the alignment of the Greek political and policy making 
apparatus with corporate internationalization.
Additionally, we will strive in our examination of Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey, to 
answer Simmons’ call, to the effect that “Studies of interdependence cry out for an explicit 
consideration of the links that bind a state to its society”3. For Simmons, absent such links 
“What do societal preferences and activities in the commercial area ultimately have to do with 
the way the state formulates and pursues its foreign policy objectives?”4 In this respect we will 
need to be able to identify particular state-society links, their capacity to act as transmission 
mechanisms of influence and the unique normative weight that gives heft to their influence.
Tian (2006), in his analysis of the politics of interdependence between Taiwan and China, 
focuses on how distinct business, state and labour coalitions in Taiwan compete against each 
other, in order to establish their policy preference, with regard to how the Taiwanese state should 
treat Taiwanese FDI in the Chinese mainland. That level of specificity will be necessary for our 
investigation. In particular in Greece we will assess how the internationalization imperative for 
state owned enterprises and state controlled banks (SOE’s and SCB’s) aligned their trade unions 
with the Greek social democratic party, PASOK, under the ‘national champion’ norm. In our
3 Simmons, B. 2006. Pax Mercatoria and the Theory of the State. In E.D. Mansfield & B.M. Pollins eds. Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, p.32
4Ibid, p.32
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case study we will be evaluating the assumed as singular capacity of corporate 
internationalisation to transmute socioeconomic actors as effective agents of a particular 
variant of economic nationalism; a variant capable of having a significant impact on the 
strategic rivalries of their nation-states.
We will thus trace the evolution of such socioeconomic groups and actors, before and under 
corporate internationalization, and assess their influence -  or previous absence -  on Greece’s 
strategic rivalry with Turkey. We will examine their strategies and motives, under corporate 
internationalization, in aligning themselves with a reconfigured national project as well as their 
capabilities in making a distinctive contribution to such a project. These capabilities will be 
evaluated both in terms of corporate internationalization proper -  e.g. the regional preeminence 
of the Greek SOE’s and SCB’s in the Balkans, -  and of their unique linkages and influence to 
the political process itself -  e.g. the integral connections of banking trade unions with PASOK. 
We will also assess whether and if so how the distinctive nationalisms of ruling parties, such 
as PASOK and ND in Greece, coalesced with corporate internationalization undertaken by 
SOE’s and SCB’s.
The causal sequence that will be examined -  the ‘how’ of our research question -  will unfold as 
follows:
(i) Locate the material and normative resources that corporate internationalization confers to our 
selected socioeconomic groups and political actors. We will seek to establish the importance of 
the internationalizing process in our country case in terms of FDI volumes and regional 
leadership in the relevant business sectors. We will also relate these material facts to the 
dominant paradigm of globalization and their twin adoption by ruling parties and policy makers, 
as these might be evident in their policy making and their projection of the role of the Greek 
nation-state internationally.
(ii) Assess how ruling parties and political decision-makers incorporate these resources in their
own strategizing and their domestic political positioning. We will examine how ruling parties in
Greece integrate corporate internationalization programmatically, by integrating it to their
evolving conception of nationalism and the common good, in the context of domestic political
contestation. Indicatively, for both PASOK and ND, their take on corporate internationalization
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has been a defining feature of their electoral campaigns and their positioning vis a vis rival 
political parties.
(iii) Evaluate, through the examination of our selected incident, the impact of this incorporation 
on the status of the strategic rivalry in question. Here we will engage in a process tracing 
approach, buttressed by interviews with key decision makers, in the incident that we believe can 
provide an adequate test of our hypothesis on corporate internationalisation’s ameliorating 
influence on Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey: the acquisition of the Turkish Finansbank by 
National Bank of Greece. Particular focus will be placed on the capacity of corporate 
internationalization to create specific foreign policy opportunities and neutralise foreign policy 
threats.
The Greek Case
l.Why Choose Greece?
We have chosen the case of Greece as we believe it satisfies our single case requirements both 
on strategic rivalry and corporate intemationalisation-from-the-periphery grounds.
Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey is considered to be archetypical (see Colaresi, Rasler and 
Thompson, 2007, pp.6-9; Blum, 2007, pp.53-58). Greece’s rivalry with Turkey originates in the 
manner of its creation and evolution as a nation-state, making Greece an exemplar of those 
countries for which their “sovereignty came with rivalry strings attached”5.
Greek nation-building evolved in opposition to the Ottoman Empire, the successor state of which 
is Turkey, through a succession of wars from the early 19th century to the early 20th. Greece’s 
present territorial disputes, with Turkey, originate in the manner of its foundation and the 
perceptions which have been shaped henceforth: most prominently in the disputes surrounding 
Cyprus & Aegean. Wars and/or recurrent militarised incidents, between Greece and Turkey, 
have sustained and informed their ongoing rivalry, Greece’s primary disputes with Turkey have 
remained unresolved and the focus of Greece’s foreign policy and security establishments has
5 Colaresi, M.P. Rasler, K. & Thompson W.R., 2007. Strategic Rivalries in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp.83-4.
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unceasingly been maintained on Turkey. Furthermore, Greece’s overall relationship with the 
international system has also been shaped by its strategic rivalry. Greek policy elites and its 
public have determined in the past that Turkey has been preferentially treated by the United 
States for geostrategic reasons; as a result of which generalised mistrust towards the Western 
international order in toto has been engendered in Greece’s political culture (Couloumbis, 1993; 
Coufoudakis, 1993; Iatrides, 1993).
Greece by expending scarce diplomatic and other resources, and shaping its relationships with 
great powers and international alliances, almost to the exclusion of any other priorities, through 
the prism of its antagonism with Turkey, has suffered marginalisation in the international system. 
For the Greek public and Greek policy makers such a costly commitment to confronting Turkey 
has been well justified as Turkey is seen, through its national security and foreign policy, as 
determined and capable of compromising the major national goal of sovereignty and the integrity 
of Hellenism: for instance the undisputed command over Greece’s air space and territorial 
waters; enjoyment of natural resources that might lie in Greece’s continental self; the denial of 
the reunification of Cyprus, which would enable the repatriation of the Greek-Cypriot refugees, 
and their families, to their lands from which they were alienated from, due to the Turkish 
invasion of the island in 1974 (Dokos and Tsakonas, 2005, pp.100-101).
Domestically, for Greece, its ability to defend itself against the much larger Turkey, the 
successor state of the Ottoman Empire to which Greeks were subjects for four centuries, has 
been a proxy indicator for the capacity of this small country to consolidate its sovereignty; as 
such it has animated an inward looking, defensive orientation, which has undermined its 
integration within the EU and its ability to converge with more successful member-states 
(Pagoulatos, 2004).
In short, for Greece its strategic rivalry with Turkey has been constitutive, to an extreme degree, 
both of its identity in the international domain and of its domestic collective self-understanding.
As importantly, Greece shares, with other peripheral states, processes of corporate
internationalisation, which are, in domestic terms, of comparable visibility and perceived
importance in the time frame under consideration. Greece’s corporate internationalisation has led
to Greece becoming one of the leading investors in its surrounding region of South East Europe.
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It has thus grounded Greek claims to being an increasingly sequential as well as forward looking, 
benign regional actor.
In terms of the compatibility of our Greek case with the time frame chosen, its corporate 
internationalisations exemplifies the wider phenomenon of corporate internationalisation, 
undertaken from previously peripheral nation-states, under globalisation. In Greece we observe 
(i) the opening up of regional markets due to the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe (ii) the accessing of global capital flows to finance Greek corporate internationalisation 
in South Eastern Europe (iii) the ideological retreat within Greece of ‘tiers mondiste’ political 
approaches following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the increasing legitimacy of the 
market and market actors.
In particular, it will be examined whether a ‘strong’ and ‘extrovert’ Greece, the redefined 
understanding within which ruling parties in Greece have framed their strategies, has recast 
Greece’s relationship with its strategic rival, Turkey. Strong in relation to what? Extrovert to 
where and to what purpose? Answers to such questions should be answers to our hypothesis. To 
be, for the shake of example, more specific: is an ‘extrovert’ Greece one that looks at the seventy 
million consumers in Turkey rather than, or at a minimum, not only at, the largest armed force in 
the region, which Turkey’s population makes possible? Does such a concept enable Greek FDI 
in Turkey, helping to overcome the severe political contestation that such FDI creates (due, of 
course, to Turkey’s status as Greece’s strategic rival). As it has been written of the battle for free 
trade in early 20th century Britain “The inquiry, then, must look beyond material interests to the 
collective meanings...that helped translate individual interests into a broader conception of 
political economy”6.
Appropriately for our case study, which is well-established within the strategic rivalry paradigm, 
it provides a substantial evidentiary record, within our timeframe under consideration, from 
which answers to the above questions can be sought. In Greece, in 2006, the Greek state acceded 
to the acquisition by the country’s largest financial institution, National Bank of Greece, of the
6 Trentmann, F., 1998. Political Culture and political economy: interest, ideology and free trade. Review of 
International Political Economy, 5(2), p.223.
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fourth largest Turkish bank, Finansbank. Prior to the acquisition the Greek financial sector had 
acquired a leading position in South East Europe, consolidating claims of the country’s regional 
commercial prominence. This event will be evaluated in order to test the thesis’s hypothesis on 
the impact of corporate internationalisation on strategic rivalries.
2. Accounting for Greece’s Strategic Rivalry with Turkey
While in the following section we will present New Economic Nationalism and the alternative, 
competing explanations to it, in terms of corporate internationalisation’s purported impact on 
Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey, the discussion which is unique to this strategic rivalry 
must also be taken into account. In this subsection, we will briefly review the debate on the 
rivalry, focusing mainly on interpretations, centred on Greece, which analyse what drives the 
rivalry between the countries.
Not surprisingly, for a strategic rivalry of such duration and intensity, there are diverse, 
conflicting as well as overlapping, accounts of its origins and dynamics.
According to several accounts, Greek national identity, forged through revolution, war and 
uprooting, and substantiated through competitive domestic politics, has shaped present-day 
Greek antagonism towards Turkey. The imperatives of seeking support for the national struggle 
against the Ottoman Empire, together with Europe’s identification with the ‘glory that was 
Greece’, led Greek nation-builders to denigrate the backwardness of the Ottoman Empire and 
posit a claim for a modem nation-state of their own (Ozkirimli and Sofos, 2008, p.23). 
Furthermore the traumatic exchange of populations of 1922, between Greece and Turkey, has 
been transmuted as collective enmity towards Turkey, by the Greek state and domestic groups 
within it, in order to achieve mobilisation for state and/or group ends, within an almost, since 
1922, mono-ethnic Greek nation-state. Consequently, a historical narrative driven by the twin 
chariots of separateness from the Turkish people and demonization of Turkey has achieved 
prominence, within Greece, erasing from the Greek collective memory centuries-long 
coexistence and interdependence. Once this narrative became dominant, it also erased from 
collective memory, and public debate, the highly contingent nature of Greek nation-state 
building, and the outcomes of such contingency, articulated through the alternatives of various 
forms of co-existence that Greek nationalists themselves had entertained, other than a
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homogeneous state of their own (e.g. a Balkan commonwealth, a redefined Ottoman Empire 
ruled by both Turks and Greeks etc), not least so that these more capacious alternatives could 
accommodate the geographically spread Greek Diaspora, (Veremis, 1989, pp. 143-144; 
Hirschon, 2009; Ozkirimli and Sofos, 2008, pp.18-19). In a vicious circle this antagonistic 
outlook has helped induce inter-state conflict while inter-state conflict has renewed prejudice and 
enmity between the two countries (Skouroliakou, 2005, pp. 10-11; Hirschon, 2009).
It is important, for our purposes, to note the economic subtext of this violent separation. The 
exchange of populations of 1922, subsequent to the conclusion of the Greek-Turkish war of 
1918-1922, resulted in the pauperization of millions of Greeks residing in Asia Minor, who were 
alienated from their real estate, commercial and agricultural assets. This experience of the 
destruction of Greek wealth was, albeit on a smaller scale, enacted in slower motion from the 
early 1940’s to the mid 1960’s, due to the discriminatory treatment, ranging from pogroms to 
punitive tax measures, meted out by the Turkish authorities and the Turkish people, to the 
surviving Istanbul Greek minority. The common thread linking these events was the 
determination of the Turkish authorities to eliminate any residual influence of the Greek element 
in Turkish economic life (Alexandris, 1992, p.219). Aftershocks of this attitude included the 
expropriation, by the Turkish state, well into the 1980’ and 1990’s, of real estate assets belonging 
to the charitable organizations of the dwindling Istanbul Greek minority of 2,000-3,000 people. 
So the prevalence of this interpretation of the past, that posited that peaceful co-existence 
between the two peoples was untenable, was also informed by this seemingly definitive 
foreclosure of the possibility that Greeks will ever again be allowed to play an economic role 
within Turkey’s borders.
Other authors have sought, within this grand narrative of implacable enmity, to identify pressure 
groups and political party strategies and dynamics as they bear on particular instances of Greek 
foreign policy conduct.
The Greek Church, Church affiliated organisations, professional associations and associations of 
Greek refugees, almost immediately after the end of World War II, adopted Cyprus’s cause in 
order to increase their leverage with the Greek state and raise their societal prominence 
(Stefanidis, 2007, pp.55-76). Ambitious up-and-coming politicians also engaged in one-
upmanship, on the Cyprus issue, and its corollary anti-Americanism, in order to outflank their 
senior competitors, as in the case of the future Greek prime minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis 
who thus outflanked his senior and patron Sophocles Venizelos (Stefanidis, 2007, pp.205-6). 
The Greek left grabbed the mantle of nationalism from the rightist authoritarian, pro-American 
regime, for the first time since its defeat in the civil war of 1945-49, by arguing that the latter is 
giving up on the national cause of Cyprus in order to accommodate its foreign patrons 
(Stefanifidis, 2007, pp.91-93). Stefanidis (2007, pp.278-79) has argued that the appropriation in 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, of Greece’s irredentist tradition, by these diverse groups and political 
personalities spanning the political divide, limited the Greek government’s room of manoeuvre 
in negotiating a viable solution to the Cyprus crisis.
Another author (Mitsotakis, 2006) has engaged in a forensic analysis of the Greek socialist 
party’s, PASOK, domestic political strategy and its negotiations, from 1981 to 1983, with the US 
on the retention or not, and under what conditions, of US military bases on Greek territory. With 
Cyprus establishing a politically unbreakable chain of causation between national defeat by the 
arch enemy, Turkey, and US involvement in Greek affairs, PASOK utilised the threat of kicking 
out the US bases to outflank its ND opponent both as opposition and subsequently as 
government. While discontinuing the presence of the bases was never really an option -  
Greece’s dependence on US military aid was too great -  the threat of doing so and the protracted 
negotiations under this, in retrospect, false pretence, was instrumentalised by PASOK. This 
domestic imperative, for Mitsotakis (2006, pp. 184-5), shaped the Greek government’s 
negotiating tactics, which could not pursue quid pro quos, in compensation for the bases 
retention, as that would have given away, by relativising, the exercise’s foundational premise: 
the presumed as absolute, non-negotiable quest for national independence.
Several scholars (Ioakimidis, 1999; Dokos and Tsakonas, 2005; Blavoukos, 2007) have also 
emphasized how lack of institutionalisation in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, certainly 
throughout the post World War II period, has undermined the conduct of foreign policy making 
by making it either idiosyncratic and personalistic and / or beholden to public opinion. On the 
basis of this analysis the lack of depth of technical and planning expertise in the Ministry is a 
contributing factor to making foreign policy conduct subject to emotionalism and to the
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perpetuation of policy stances informed by a nationalistically grounded as much as widely held 
sense of national ‘rights’. This under-institutionalisation has undermined the pursuit of 
pragmatic solutions, that could be achieved through bargaining and compromise, and which 
could very well accommodate Greek interests, particularly those relating to Turkey.
Authors have also addressed the impact of low politics and in particular economic 
interdependence, on the Greek Turkish relationship, whether through bilateral agreements that 
have a bearing on such interdependence, or through trade and investment activities proper. In 
doing so they would point to (i) the decision by foreign policy makers, starting with the decision 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Papandreou and Cem reached in 1999 , to reach agreement on 
low politics issues as a means to an end, whereby such initiatives would ease the way towards 
agreement on the high politics disagreements that structure and mediate the Greek Turkish 
rivalry (Dokos, 2004, p. 124; Aybet, 2009) (ii) cross-border initiatives by NGO’s and 
professional and business associations and municipalities, encouraged by the same policy 
makers, as an adjunct to the same effort to improve the overall climate and strengthen societal 
support in both countries towards an attenuation of the strategic rivalry (iii) the possibility that, 
in due course, the level of commercial exchange, between the two countries would acquire such 
magnitude that would generate prohibitive costs, on either or both countries, were they to engage 
in military conflict (Keridis, 2001, p. 17; Heraclidis, 2004, p.80).
It is important to note that these authors, whereas they might disagree on the effects of low 
politics on the strategic rivalry (Aydin, 2004, pp. 24-25; Kerr-Lindsay, 2007, p. 103 ), they still 
predominantly see low politics and economic interdependence as a means to an end and not an 
end in and by itself: both in terms of how and why policymakers have made use of low politics 
initiatives, albeit with willing social actors and allies, and in the normative sense, of how these 
aspects of the bilateral relationship should be seen, in terms of Greek national interest (Ifantis, 
2004, pp. 260-261; Ker-Lindsay, 2007, pp.50-53). Thus social actors, as bearers and advocates 
of economic interdependence, have not been seen as having an independent effect, or 
constituting a goal in their own right, in relation to Greek foreign policy conduct with Turkey.
Other authors have posited the existence of rising, and even hegemonic social forces vested in a 
rapprochement with Turkey. Keridis (2001, pp.8-9), has identified the rivalry with Turkey as the
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demarcation line dividing Greece’s two main and opposing socioeconomic elements, and 
crossing party lines, the first seeing, in a closer and more effective relationship with the EU, and 
more open and competitive markets, an opportunity rather than a threat and the second 
occupying the opposite ground. The strategic rivalry with Turkey, for the latter group, 
legitimates a suspicious attitude towards Greece’s international interlocutors, historically 
perceived as having benefited Turkey to the disadvantage of Greece, as well as a statist economy 
that provides succour and protection from competitive market forces. ND’s and PASOK’s 
smaller party spinoffs, namely the now defunct Political Spring and DIKKI respectively, which 
have been constituted along these bases, bear evidence to this bifurcation. Unlike the previous 
authors, however there has not been an effort undertaken to trace the causal chain under which 
these socioeconomic groups, and their strategic interests, whether domestic or international, have 
actually brought to bear their impact on the strategic rivalry with Turkey.
Alternatively Greek foreign policy analysts and policy makers have posited that Turkey’s greater 
size and stronger armed forces, together with its regime characteristics, namely its politically 
influential armed forces, propel this country to a revisionist stance vis a vis Greece and its 
sovereignty. According to these accounts (see Dokos and Tsakonas, 2005, pp. 100-101 and 
Triantafyllou, 2001, pp.57-58, for a precis of that outlook inhering among segments of the Greek 
public and policy makers) Turkey’s long standing objective is to ‘Finlandise’ Greece whereby a 
cowed Greece would accept to dilute its sovereign rights to the benefit of Turkey’s geopolitical 
ambitions.
On the basis of this assumption, of revisionist Turkish intentions and capabilities, opinions differ 
on how Greece should confront Turkey. On the softer end of the spectrum, the argument is that 
Greece should utilise Turkey’s European ambitions, which would compel Turkey to contain its 
ambitions, and moderate its behaviour towards Greece, due to EU-imposed conditionality. At 
the harder end, what is advocated is an implacable stance of vigilance, of adequately equipped 
and trained armed forces and the shunning of any policy choices -  Turkey’s EU accession 
included -  which by strengthening Turkey would actually make her an even more formidable an 
opponent to Greece (see Ifantis, 2004, p.262, for a precis of this point of view).The benign 
effects of the accession process being discounted in view of the essentialist conviction of the
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incorrigible character of the Turkish regime and its geopolitical ambitions. Crucially this latter 
constituency of policy makers and analysts see with a jaundiced eye any sort of 
interdependencies that might make Greece subject to Turkish blackmail, as in the case of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and the now tiny Greek minority, while also dismissing the possibility 
that inter-cultural dialogue, commerce and even popular sentiment, as evinced after the two 
earthquakes which hit first Istanbul and then Athens in 1999, might effect a rapprochement 
between the two countries. At best, they view these elements as irrelevant to the rivalry with 
Turkey at worst as factors that might legitimise a lowering of Greece’s guard or an attitude of 
appeasement towards Turkey which would pose an existential threat to Greece.
More moderate analysts argue that the two countries bilateral relations are simply captive to a 
classic security dilemma (Aydin and Ifantis, 2004, p.3). Turkey’s quest for security, due to its 
greater size and the multiple security threats that it faces across all the regions with which it 
shares borders, are bound to induce Greek insecurity, and thus engender a friction-laden 
relationship. In the context of an anarchic international order, that leaves Greece with no other 
option but to hope for the best but also prepare for the worst by maintaining its military 
preparedness -  not least because the relationship with the US, which considers Turkey a pivotal 
state in the region, will ultimately be proven to be much more of a mainstay than Turkey’s 
accession process in the EU (Ifantis, 2004, p.256).
Last but not least, most authors who look at the strategic rivalry from a regional perspective, 
which is to say the interaction between Greek foreign policy, developments in the Balkan 
region, and perceptions of Turkish intentions in the region, agree that whereas Turkey might 
affect how Greece relates to the Balkans, the reverse is mostly not the case. Post-1974, after the 
collapse of the Greek junta, the first centre-right democratically elected party to rule Greece, 
initiated a policy of improving Balkan relations in an attempt to counterbalance what it saw as 
Turkish aggression (Larrabbee, 1999, p.315). This policy was also pursued by the succeeding 
PASOK party as it chimed with its ideological antecedents, in the pro-junta period, when the 
Greek left argued vociferously in favour of a neutralist, and friendly to the Soviet Union and 
other communist countries, Greek foreign policy, portraying membership in a NATO alliance as
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inimical to Greek interests and supportive of Turkey (Larrabbee, 1999, p.315; Stefanidis, 2007, 
p.230).
Subsequently in the 1990’s, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and instability in Yugoslavia 
encouraged a more capacious Turkish foreign policy, branded as neo-Ottomanist, particularly as 
it related to Turkish attempts to exert influence in Central Asia but also to provide succour to 
Muslim populations in the Balkans. A number of authors have pointed out that this further 
exacerbated Greek insecurities, which were encapsulated in the so-called Muslim Arc thesis, 
whereby Turkey would sponsor emergent states and ethnic communities with secessionist or at 
least hostile intent towards Greece, contributing to Greece’s alignment with the repressive 
Milosevic regime as well as to the country’s intransigence with regard to the Republic of 
Macedonia (Ioakimidis, 1999, p. 172; Gundogdou, 2001, p.3; Anastasakis, 2004, p.53; Houliaras 
and Tsardanidis, 2006, pp. 468-472; Larrabbee, 1999, p.333). In due course these fears were 
attenuated and Greece and Turkey came to participate in joint NATO stabilisation operations in 
Kosovo. Still, in the considered judgment of two of these authors, Greece’s rivalry with Turkey 
is so all-encompassing that whereas it has proved the ability to colour Greek attitudes and 
responses to the Balkans the reverse cannot be the case, i.e., events in the Balkans cannot have a 
significant impact on the nature and dynamics of the Greek-Turkish bilateral relation (Larrabbee, 
1999, pp. 332-333; Anastasakis, 2004, p.58).
New Economic Nationalism and Alternative Explanations
We now move from the discussion which is specific to Greece to the wider perspectives relevant 
to the thesis. We believe that the main school of thought within which we must seek 
confirmation of the thesis’s hypothesis is the one that has examined the integration of a variety of 
nation-states, including those in the periphery, in the present liberal, global economic order, 
through a reconfigured nationalism. This school of thought is New Economic Nationalism 
(NEN). We will subject our application of NEN to our research question and hypothesis to three 
alternative explanations, corresponding to the Liberal Institutionalist, Realist and Europenisation 
theoretical understandings.
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l.NEN
The key point that the scholars of NEN make is that focusing on nationalism and national 
identity is analytically indispensable to grasping collective choices at the economic level and 
vice versa: not only is it in nationalism and national identity that collective economic
preferences are formed, and become sustainable, but it is also in economic experience that 
national identities can be formed. Consequently, legitimacy, notions of social equity and national 
purpose, are all uniquely tied up with specific societies and nations and as such are inseparably 
connected with the nature of their economic life. It is on this basis that it is argued (Pickel, 
2003, pp. 122-123) that economic nationalism cannot be identified with a particular economic 
doctrine such as statism or mercantilism, or indeed market liberalism, as it is an outcome of 
contexts which pertain to unique historical, political and cultural circumstances of the nation­
states and their societies that produce them.
Scholars of NEN, as we will examine more thoroughly subsequently, take this insight to make a 
variety of claims such as that perceived security needs, tied to a national identity forged by 
historical experience (e.g. colonisation or subordination by a foreign power), can orient strategic 
economic choices and alignments in a particular direction (Abdelal, 2001, pp. 38-39, 42); that 
relational comparison through the lenses of economic processes such as industrialisation and 
rates of economic growth can help define the nation vis a vis other nations and the international 
order (Crane, 1999, p.217); that distinction in a particular service or industrial sector can 
legitimise national engagement with the international economic order by privileging a particular 
quality that the nation is assumed to possess (Fougner, 2006, pp. 197-198); and that, crucially, 
nationalism is composed of several goals which might well conflict with each other (Shulman, 
2000, pp. 373-374) such as (i) autonomy, which can be averse to economic interdependence, 
with other nation-states and the international order at large, and (ii) wealth and status, which may 
only be procured through such interdependence. A systematic exploration, however, of how 
evolving variants of economic nationalism can affect strategic rivalries has not been conducted 
for our group of states, undergoing corporate internationalisation, at this particular juncture, to 
the best of the author’s knowledge.
By implementing the perspectives of scholars of NEN we seek to address the following
subsidiary questions to our main research question:
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• No matter how market liberalisation, and its subsidiary process of corporate 
internationalisation is effected, and by whom, will it involve a substantial redefinition or 
at least the reworking of national purpose and identity?
• Will, within any nation-state that undergoes a significant transition in the organisation of 
its economic life, and of its corporate life in particular, the central battleground ultimately 
be the definition of national purpose and of national identity?
• Will the outcome of this transition be both contingent and analytically graspable through 
the contestation of national purpose and national identity?
• Does that mean that that we must help locate the corporate internationalisation process 
within this battleground, for national purpose and identity, and evaluate its impact on the 
outcome?
As these questions that originate from NEN perspectives are not applied in a vacuum, from our 
perspective, but rather to the process of corporate internationalisation, we will assess the 
possibility of whether collective understandings about the national identity and the national 
project (i) must inhere or become adopted by institutions and organisations if they are to acquire 
voice and suasion in the public domain and that (ii) such ideas must bear correspondence with 
the operational reality and material existence of these organisations and institutions -  in our case 
internationalising corporations.
Specifically to our country case we will subject to scrutiny the interaction between corporate 
internationalisation and the characteristics of the Greek nation and its nationalism. Has the 
regional primacy of the Greek financial sector had a bearing that is inextricably tied to the Greek 
past and thus to a politically plausible and resonant future? has such a bearing been mediated, 
through corporate internationalisation, by social and political actors -  trade unions and political 
parties -  which have also been decisive in anchoring and shaping particular ideas of the nation in 
the past, a capacity that they have retained?
Such questions will also be posed in relation to particular perspectives of the NEN debate to the 
effect that nations and societal orderings, their inequalities and diversity notwithstanding, can
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and do cohere around common, if contested and unstable, understandings of past experience and 
future prospects. They can do so, even when processes such as the one of corporate 
internationalisation that we hypothesize as having such a cohering effect, might not have a direct 
and positive material impact on the totality of a nation’s constituent socioeconomic and other 
groupings (Crane, 1999; Abdelal, 2001).
2.Liberal Institutionalism
Milner (1988) has raised the bar, in terms of the capacity of corporations to aggregate their 
interests, through her examination of firms’ trade preferences, in the US and France, during the 
1920’s and the 1970’s. Specifically, she has found that such preferences are firm-, not sector- 
specific, as within sectors different firms exhibit widely diverging capabilities and incentives 
with relation to a protected versus a substantially open economy. Furthermore she presents 
evidence according to which only firms with a substantial degree of multinationality (i.e., 
operations in third countries) and/or sustainable export performance prove to be solid supporters 
of a non-protectionist trade regime.
What distinguishes the two periods that she is examining is not in the diversity of firms’ 
incentives -  both periods exhibit diverse and conflicting firm interests between and within 
sectors -  but rather the greater number of larger firms, in the latter period, in the 1970’s, in 
contrast to the 1920’s, that exhibit sufficiently robust multinationality and export performance. 
Structural reasons, such as advances in technology and the fall in transport and communication 
costs, have made a greater number of firms reliant on third markets, whether due to growing 
backward and forward production linkages or growing demand for their exports. Structure, in 
other words, has expanded free trade incentives and these incentives have translated in a greater 
number of firms being pro-free trade. This in turn has tilted the balance for governments, 
making them more resistant to clamour, by other domestic firms and constituencies, to raise trade 
barriers either through tariffs and/or subsidy.
Subsequent accounts have impressed the importance of domestic institutions in how, and to what 
extent, firm preferences such as the ones Milner has explicated, are translated into policy 
(Keohane and Milner, 1996, pp. 21-22). Greater benefits conferred by internationalisation to 
firms and socioeconomic groups are not presumed to automatically be transformed into policies
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that facilitate their materialisation. Domestic institutions can obstruct the signals of an 
internationalised market and domestic coalitions, which stand to lose from internationalisation, 
can make sure that such institutions remain intact. In a feedback loop, lack of institutional 
change preserves the coalitions that are based on institutional immobility, as the benefits that 
would enlarge a pro-institutional change coalition do not materialise.
Still, pressures can make themselves felt even in the most cloistered of economies. As other 
economies internationalise, the opportunity costs of not doing so become more and more 
obvious, generating increasing internal pressure for institutional change (Frieden and Rogowski, 
1996, p.32). Additionally, the costs of keeping an economy close, a policy of essentially 
supporting the non-tradables sector, gradually undercuts the ability of the state to support its core 
support groups, due to declining macroeconomic performance (Garett and Lange, 1996, p.70). 
A closed economy, in due course, cannot generate the resources needed to maintain in power 
even those who want to keep it closed.
At all times socioeconomic and political actors are assumed to be rational maximisers, although 
in the context of incentives shaped by domestic institutions and internationally available 
conditions, as in world or regional economic trends, which can either lessen or enlarge the 
benefits of internationalisation.
Assuming that all these observations hold, the question that is raised is what additional 
explanatory power can the thesis’s account provide? From the perspective of this question, we 
can view strategic rivalries as they are managed by the relevant ministries and agencies, such as 
that of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and supported by protectionist-inclined socioeconomic 
groups, as processes tasked with the objective of delaying market openness though regional 
instability. By virtue of its powers of disruption and ability to destabilise a reformist 
government, a strategic rivalry is a powerful, ongoing process in the hands of supporters of a 
closed economy. Skilfully managed it can produce the obstacles needed which can block the 
transmission of incentives that the international economy is emitting. National security crises, 
originating in strategic rivalries, can close-off promising markets, disrupt capital flows which are 
instrumental to corporate internationalisation, and destabilise or even unseat governments that 
are committed to market openness and the reforms that the latter necessitate.
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Still, a polity might very well have the institutional and socioeconomic wherewithal to benefit 
from internationalisation and set aside such obstacles. It should be able to so, if those who stand 
for internationalisation are strong enough and/or even the supporters of a closed economy can no 
longer be catered by a macro-economically underperforming state. If it takes an invocation of 
another version of nationalism to do so, then this might very well be the ‘best nationalism that 
money can buy’ -  an artefact rendered politically dominant by powerful corporate interests as 
opposed to a dispensation which is genuinely optimal to national welfare and national interest. 
Kirshner (2007, pp.96-97) has shown how the Banque de France mobilised opposition in France 
(and bought it by bribing the press) in the interwar years against a military confrontation with 
Germany, due to the budgetary and monetary implications of such a national security policy. In 
our Greek country case too we will also observe the powerful core banking -  investment 
preference, that Kirshner has identified, and its negative disposition towards conflict with 
Turkey (in a period of growing capital markets we might as well paraphrase his book title from 
‘Appeasing Bankers’ to ‘Appeasing Bankers and Stock Brokers’).
We can assume, in other words, Milner’s position, for the corporate cohorts that we examine, 
namely that market liberalisation and globalisation have so altered incentives that the latter have 
in turn affected a decisive a shift towards market openness -  for instance, the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc has undeniably accelerated the multinationality of large corporations in Greece. 
Furthermore, this shift, a Liberal Institutionalist account could argue, has been translated in the 
wider capacity to remove obstacles, including strategic rivalries managed by obstreperous 
foreign and national security ministries and agencies, and underwritten by powerful domestic 
groups hostile to a market friendly policy regime.
The question that ultimately arises for the thesis is what additional or distinctive explanatory 
power can it provide, that the Liberal Institutionalist account cannot (additional that is to 
providing merely greater specificity to the Liberal Institutionalist account). This question is 
addressed both to the nature of interest aggregation, by large listed corporations, and to the way 
in which their interests are brought to bear on the distinct domain of strategic rivalries.
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3.Realism
The fundamental Realist assertion that bears on the thesis is of state autonomy on issues of 
foreign and national security policy. For Realists the state is the major actor in international 
affairs and the overwhelming purpose of its primacy is to guarantee its security and autonomy 
vis-a-vis other states. The state is also a positional actor not an individualistic one 
(Grieco,1993a, p.128), which means that it evaluates the gains and losses accruing by 
cooperation, with other states, not through the prism of absolute but of relative gains.
What is most important is not that cooperation procures gains for all parties involved in it, from a 
comparative advantage perspective, but rather that it does not produce greater gains to other 
states. Were that to happen, this would increase the relative power of other states and thus 
decrease the inherent ability of the positional, realist state to defend itself against a military threat 
or militarily-induced subordination and exaction. In all fairness this position is not absolute. 
Grieco (1993b, p.325) for instance introduces a number of criteria under which a state’s 
tolerance to relative gains might increase (e.g. the need to counter a greater state threat, leading a 
state to accept the relative gains that would strengthen an ally, or whether the other state is an 
adversary or a fellow member of a security community).
The challenge that the thesis must meet in this case is not to dispute Grieco’s qualifications, in 
terms of, say, why a state would tolerate relative gains from another state. Rather it is to 
establish that it has done so in the context of its interaction with other non-state, domestic actors 
and that its determination of the gravity of such relative gains has been a highly subjective 
exercise involving not only state deliberation but state-society interactions, as we have outlined 
them earlier in this chapter.
Gilpin’s (2001) starting point is also state primacy and autonomy. What is most relevant in 
Gilpin (2001, p. 106), for the thesis, is his keenness to challenge neoclassical and liberal 
economic thinking by incorporating strands of economic thought, such as new endogenous 
growth theory and new strategic trade theory, that make the following important claim: state 
action, as well as economic processes in general, can contribute to increasing returns and thus to 
the creation of disequilibria that would enhance the strength of a national economy relative to 
others.
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The implications of this claim, for a Realist, are twofold: the state is not only willing, due to its 
ultimate concern with relative gains and security, to undertake action in the economic field 
towards such ends; it is also capable of producing the economic effects that would serve such 
ends (as opposed to producing rents for the sake of domestic interests to which it has fallen 
captive to, as Rational Choice Theorists would have it). Conversely, the state is obliged, in its 
international interactions, to take this capability of other states into account and pre-empt it, at 
least to the extent that it judges to produce inimical results to its relative strength, through its 
foreign economic policy (as in refusing the transfer of technology that would allow another state 
to kick start the development of high-technology, strategic sectors). By thus enlisting economic 
thinking, Gilpin renews the relevance of the Realist state in international economic interactions, 
particularly so at a period when such interactions have been increasingly assumed to become all 
important.
What the thesis needs to establish with regard to Gilpin is not so much the importance of relative 
gains, as such. Actually, we will hypothesize that one of the main reasons that internationalising 
corporations are so effective politically, and in the traditional preserve of the state, foreign and 
national security policy as they pertain to strategic rivalries, is because they represent nationally 
conceived relative gains through their performance: they do produce those scarce, on occasion 
zero-sum gains that Realism has rightly given emphasis to, such as power relative to neighbours, 
prestige regionally and internationally and so on. Rather it needs to make the case that Gilpin 
cannot have the relative gains that intense society-state interactions produce -  in terms of 
strategic industry development, co-determined provision of factors such as education and skills, 
maintenance of headquarters and RD functions within the national territory -  and then determine 
the implications of such gains for the country’s international position in an autonomous fashion.
The last Realist thinker that we will examine is Nayar (2005) as he examines the peripheral, 
Realist state under globalisation, the category to which our country case belongs. Nayar judges 
market opening as not driven by socioeconomic actors but by state concerns. These concerns 
have been activated, under globalisation, by the decline in the state’s relative position compared 
to other potential or actual antagonistic states that have opened up their economies to a greater 
degree. Importantly, from a corporate internationalisation perspective Goldstein (2007) supports
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Nayar’s argument, as he argues that the countries which liberalise their home economies first are 
also the ones that first acquire a cohort of internationalising corporations. For Nayar, increasing 
plenty under globalisation will still acquire increasing power, as antagonistic states will have the 
resources with which to promote their interests, provided to them by a growing and increasingly 
technologically advanced, because open, economy (he argues that, for India, China’s economic 
liberalisation has had this salutary, Realist effect, see Nayar, 2005, pp. 235-236). As with Gilpin 
we must go beyond characterising an observed amelioration in strategic rivalries. Is it a Realist 
one? Or Liberal Institutionalist? Rather, accepting Nayar’s Realist position for developing states, 
we must establish that the process of corporate internationalisation, even if initiated by the state, 
does set in process state-society interactions that make the claim that the state determines how to 
manage its strategic rivalries in an autonomous fashion an untenable one.
4.Europeanisation
Tonra (2001) in his examination of EU’s smaller member-states, has argued that there is a 
tangible effect of EU membership, on their foreign policy conduct. In the past, when these states 
would assert principle in the international domain they were limited to essentially gesture 
politics, primarily in the context of their UN membership. Now they can forge a consensus with 
the other member states that can have a material impact on how their principles materialize.
Importantly both domestic and external constituencies demand that they do so. For example, the 
leader of the African National Congress, Nelson Mandela, wanted the EU to maintain its 
sanctions to South Africa, while Danish voters, on this same issue, likewise wanted to see their 
government use its power of EU membership to effect in the context of the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Consequently the Danish government would insist that the 
EU maintains a common front, in terms of its established sanctions policy on South Africa.
Alternatively, conflicting goals would be synthesized in favor of the institutionalization of EU’s 
foreign policy conduct. As increased political cooperation emerged in the EC, and later in the 
EU, the government of Holland, as a small member-state, historically suspicious of large 
European countries such as Germany, would strive to ensure that it is adequately institutionalized 
and that it goes beyond its initial intergovernmental remit -  despite its initial reservations that 
such an institutionalised EU foreign policy would undermine Europe’s Atlanticist orientation.
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Three of the main themes that emerge on the impact of Europeanisation on smaller member 
states’ foreign policies are as follows:
1. Their inherent interest in a rules-based regime, which mitigates the smallness of their 
size, makes them, despite initial reservations, active participants in the domain of CFSP.
2. Their penchant to associate themselves with principles in the international arena, also a 
function of their size, draws them further into CFSP.
3. CFSP, partly because of 1 and 2, confronts them with contradictions inherent in the 
forces that drive their foreign policy conduct, while also causing the latter to evolve.
Size and influence feature as prominently in a case of a large member-country as in that of the 
smaller ones (Wong, 2006 ), further substantiating the claim that one of the main drivers of 
Europeanisation in foreign policy conduct is the very obvious benefits of exerting greater 
influence through the EU, rather than having marginal impact, through ones own exertions. 
France, according to this account, discovered that the EU is much more capable of shaping the 
structure of a trade and investment relationship that is beneficial to her, with such countries such 
Japan and China, than if it were to attempt this on her own. Wong makes an additional point 
relevant to our purposes. Crosspollination, with other member-states, alters France’s relationship 
with Japan and even contributes to a shift in its political economy paradigm. As Britain and 
Holland abandon their earlier protectionist stance towards Japan and welcome Japanese FDI that 
puts a question mark on France’s own preference to respond to Japan purely through 
protectionist measures.
Finally, the discussion of the impact of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA’s), of which the EU 
is the most institutionalized, on interstate conflict, has emerged with some key conclusion 
relevant to our case study (Mansfield, Pevehouse, Bearce, 2005, p.93). PTA’s are found to 
dampen conflictive inter-state relations by providing an organized forum for resolution of 
bilateral disputes as well as putting a ceiling on the expectations of the escalatory potential of 
disputes between PTA members, both factors limiting the political risks attendant to commercial 
interdependence. PTA’s are also assumed to be capable of creating such expectations of 
economic gain that they would dampen the appetite for military conflict (which, one assumes,
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also affects positively the perception of political risk by the economic actors who are actually the 
ones to generate these gains).
The implications for our case study are twofold. First, Turkey’s accession process means that 
the bilateral relationship with Turkey becomes constituted through the norms and rules attendant 
to this process. Greece, as it would be expected by the hypothesized behavior of the smaller EU 
member-states, has been an important contributor to this process, by acceding to Turkey 
becoming an EU accession country. By extension, Greek corporations investing in Turkey are 
afforded the same protection to that of other EU-domiciled corporate peers to have established a 
presence there. As such, they are private actors that take advantage of the stability of relations 
induced by Turkey’s accession EU process, which has been approved by all member countries, 
Greece included. Furthermore, Greece’s overall relationship with Turkey is also ensconced in the 
latter’s accession process, limiting appreciably the risk that a Greek corporation would suffer 
collateral damage in Turkey were there to be a significant deterioration in this relationship. The 
risk of such deterioration is not only mitigated in terms of Turkey’s conduct, but also of 
Greece’s, as its imperative to use the EU as a lever in its relationship with Turkey would also 
weaken its own propensity to relate to Turkey in a way that would not be conformable with the 
norms and practices shared with its fellow EU members.
Second, Turkey’s accession process by accelerating investment from other EU member-countries 
in Turkey, and by enlisting support for that reason by the governments of these member- 
countries, would tend to influence the Greek government in the same direction, of visualizing the 
relationship of this candidate country in the context of a beneficial and growing commercial 
interdependence.
What we need to do is to identify whether these factors were indeed present and relevant to the 
decision of NBG to acquire Finansbank. Having done so, we would need to examine whether 
Europeanisation provides sufficient explanation both for this unprecedented creation of 
economic interdependence between Greece and Turkey and for shifting the normative 
underpinnings that shape the bilateral relationship from an unadulterated strategic rivalry to one 
informed, to a substantial degree, by the logic of growing economic interdependence.
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Thesis Outline
In chapter two we will first review the debate on NEN, in greater depth, as it might inform 
corporate internationalisation’s impact on strategic rivalries. We will then trace the evolving 
state-corporate relations in peripheral countries, from our perspective of state-society links, from 
the developmentalist to the market liberalisation eras. Subsequently we will examine in greater 
detail the process of corporate internationalisation in general, and its particular characteristics in 
peripheral economies. We will conclude with a review of the debate on the impact of domestic 
groups and coalitions, constituted by key socioeconomic groups, on a nation-state’s foreign and 
national security policy.
In chapter three firstly, we will review the precedent, to corporate internationalisation, 
interactions between leading SOE’s and SCB’s and the Greek state. Subsequently we will 
examine the wider context, in terms of market reforms and their legitimation, in which corporate 
internationalisation has been effected in Greece. By setting such a context we will seek to 
evaluate whether and how such market reforms, in the way they have been contextualised by the 
corporate internationalisation which they have spawned, have created a salient variant of 
economic nationalism. We will conclude with an examination of how corporate 
internationalisation, through its increasing materiality and normative content, has become 
enmeshed with the policy and politics of the Greek Ministry of Finance and of Foreign Affairs.
In chapter four we will subject the hypothesis of the thesis to its test by engaging in a process 
tracing approach to see how the Greek government opted for economic interdependence with 
Greece’s strategic rival, Turkey, by consenting to the largest ever acquisition in Greek corporate 
history, by a Greek state-controlled financial institution, NBG, of a major Turkish financial 
institution, Finansbank. We will delineate the presence of economic nationalism, reconfigured 
by corporate internationalisation, across the tenures of the PASOK and ND administrations. We 
will also assess whether the acquisition, (i) by incorporating Turkey in the notion of a periphery, 
where Greece can demonstrate its commercial leadership, bears evidence of a state-society 
interaction which is constitutive of a transformation in foreign policy goals and (ii) by 
neutralising fears on Greece’s Finlandisation by Turkey has also effected a transformation of 
Greece’s perception of foreign policy threats.
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In chapter five we will relate the acquisition to the debate on strategic rivalries in general and to 
what we already know, from the relevant country-specific literature on Greece’s strategic rivalry 
with Turkey. We will then relate our findings to our research question and hypothesis as well as 
to the posited alternative explanations.
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Chapter 2 
Introduction
We will begin, in our first section, with a review of scholarship of New Economic Nationalism 
which seeks to systematically address how the objects of the study of nationalism and the 
political economy of globalization relate to each other. We will present this view, which holds 
that around the idea of the nation a great variety of economic policy regimes and collective 
choices can be anchored. Nationalism and national identities substantially influence economic 
policies and processes, and they can at times reinforce and at times undermine economic 
globalisation. What cannot be gainsaid, for scholars of New Economic Nationalism (NEN), is 
that a transition to a different economic regime, within a nation-state, will have to be compatible 
with a prevailing, even if reconfigured, notion of the national project.
In the second section we will examine the two main phases, which have framed the role of major 
corporations in peripheral nation-states, first the state-led developmental project which most Less 
Developed Countries (LDC’s) undertook particularly after the end of World War II and second 
the market opening that has become as ubiquitous in the last twenty years or so.
Initially, economic development, in those LDC’s which were mixed economies, was dominated 
by political and bureaucratic elites while incorporating a growing swathe of ascendant socio­
economic groups. Large corporate entities were one of the critical institutional vehicles through 
which this developmental process was effected and, as employers of choice, the organisational 
loci of this alliance between elites and publics in peripheral nation-states. When these 
corporations also happened to be expropriated by their original foreign owners, this process of 
expropriation, together with the international friction that it created, further cemented the links 
between the developmental, peripheral nation-state and the public. Thus large corporations 
emerge as one of the strategic terrains of economic nationalism for the peripheral, developmental 
state.
Subsequently, these large corporations went through a market-led transformation, whereby they 
became listed in national stock exchanges, they attracted a growing volume of portfolio investors 
in their shares and their managers acquired increasing autonomy by the state. However, due to 
their embeddednes in their home economies, rooted in their past performance as agents of
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developmentalism, these corporations have retained their capability of defining and aggregating 
the material and ideational perspectives of essentially national stakeholders.
In our third section, we will visit those features of corporate internationalisation process in 
general, and of peripheral nation-states in particular, that further entrench the national 
significance of corporations from the periphery under market liberalisation. These features 
include the material importance of the process itself, which make it a natural priority of national 
policy making and those elements of the process that facilitate instead of undermining national 
control of these corporations. Subsequently we will access whether the nature of the international 
operations of these corporations is such that it can generate shifts, actual and perceived, on the 
position in the international hierarchy of their home nation-states. We will conclude this section 
by looking at global liquidity, in the period under consideration, and its impact on the reach and 
magnitude of the corporate internationalisation emanating from peripheral nation-states.
In our fourth section we will review the discussion on the impact of domestic groups and 
coalitions on foreign and national security policy. Particular attention will be paid to accounts on 
the creation, under globalisation, of two competing coalitions, the internationalist and the 
backlash one respectively, for which foreign and national security policy is critical to the 
outcome of their contest. Subsequently, and because of its relevance to the evidentiary record, 
through which we will examine our Greek case, we will look at the interaction between domestic 
groups and coalitions and the conduct of economic statecraft, the latter being a sub-branch of 
foreign policy making. The purpose of this final section is twofold. First, to place our 
internationalising corporations as domestic actors in the relevant context, in terms of domestic 
politics which have a bearing on foreign policy conduct. Second, to examine that particular 
domain of foreign policy, economic statecraft, that is most relevant to our case study, as the 
acquisition of Finansbank by NBG represents, among other things, state-enabled 
interdependence with a strategic rival.
New Economic Nationalism
l.Nationalism and the Economy: Historical Background
Scholars of New Economic Nationalism have been very upfront in their purpose of re-examining
established scholarly opinion on the historical interaction between nationalism and the economy.
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Such opinion, they argue, not only has obscured the understanding of societal mobilisation and 
policy preference in the past. It is also obscuring, by unreflective prejudice, the role of 
nationalism and collective economic choice in the present.
Harlen (1999, pp.739-740) has pointed out how two of the most notable economic nationalists of 
the 19th century, Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton, considered their advocacy for import 
tariffs and infant industry protection, as a pragmatic, interim measure. This preference was, 
furthermore, partly generated, before the repeal of the Com Laws in Great Britain, by restrictions 
on the less-industrialised nations’ ability to progress economically by the unhindered export of 
commodities -  i.e. by making full use of their comparative advantage. Helleiner (2002, 
pp.313-314) also has underlined that List’s dynamic perspective on national economic 
development underlain his faith in internationalism. List argued that such measures should be 
undertaken, as with the protection of infant industries behind traffic walls, until the nation can 
enter the international economy from a position of parity. Thus, protection, by accelerating 
industrial parity between nation-states, would end up facilitating international exchange and 
comity in the long term, not undermine it. Where both List and Hamilton were in agreement was 
in their belief that the nation and its progress is the proper object and priority of national 
economic policy rather than individual and/or commercial interests which would maximise their 
utility under this or that system of economic exchange.
Equally, for Helleiner (2002, pp. 320-321), free trade, and its monetary underpinning, the gold 
standard, have also been embraced in the 19th century by nationalists. Latin American 
nationalists, which resented Spanish colonial rule, saw in unhindered trade the possibility of 
developing their countries through their use of comparative advantage in commodities. They 
also conflated Great Britain’s economic order with its liberal constitutionalism, the political 
order that they promoted in their attempt to win independence from Spain. Furthermore the gold 
standard, by underpinning stable national currencies, also became a symbol of national cohesion 
and modernisation in many countries, an attractive alternative to debased national currencies that 
attracted within the national territory exchange through foreign currencies.
Trentmann (1998) has explored how in late Victorian and Edwardian Great Britain a diverse 
coalition, composed of both commercial interests and the working classes, supported the
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maintenance of free trade. Trentmann bases the mobilisational effectiveness of this coalition 
on free trade’s status as a symbol of effective popular mobilisation (harking back to the repeal of 
the Com Laws) in a society with still limited political representation, whereby the citizen was 
constituted through his right for consumption not burdened by tariffs. The identification of 
protection with the national ‘other’, Germany, considered as authoritarian and regressive, and 
accused of pauperising its people because of its protectionism, was another rhetorical and 
mobilisational pillar of the Free Trade Coalition -  despite the fact that, during that period, 
Germany enjoyed a low tariff regime, compared to republican France and the United States, and 
increasing incomes for its populace.
But it is not only constructivists that have illuminated the eclectic relationship between 
nationalism and economic choice. Realists and Marxists have done so as well. Classic 19th 
century liberalism has been interpreted as the economic doctrine of an industrially advanced 
Great Britain. Liberalism was thus the doctrine of a powerful nation, well-ahead of any potential 
competitors, and with a formal and informal empire that underpinned, militarily and 
institutionally, its economic comparative advantage. Classical liberals, like Cobden 
(Economides and Wilson,2001, p.43), who first used the language of free trade and comparative 
advantage, took it for granted, at the time, that their nation would very much occupy the peak of 
the implied international dispensation. Presciently, from the perspective of this thesis, Marxists 
critics argued that nationalism has also aided the international economic integration of the less 
developed countries in the post World War II era (Economides and Wilson, 2001, p.111). 
According to these critics, the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) regime associated with 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO), aiming at the escape of the less developed 
economies from their subordinate position in the international economy, served a so-called 
‘bourgeois nationalism’. As such ISI, legitimated by nationalism, only set the stage for the 
eventual reinsertion of these economies in the internationalist capitalist order.
In sum, for constructivist and other thinkers, nationalism and nationalist economic doctrine and 
actors in the past have often been supportive of a liberal economic order. Even when they have 
not been unqualifiedly so, they have often envisaged protection as an interim stage, which would 
eventually facilitate liberal economic interaction. Often enough, nationalist social and political
42
movements have been aligned with economic preferences not for solely economic reasons, but 
because these preferences correlated with what they saw as the political imperatives of their 
nation. Last, but not least, the political efficacy and plausibility of the claims of these 
movements have been grounded both in past collective experience and in the contradistinction 
with what was seen, or could be convincingly portrayed as, the nationally-defined ‘other’ 
(whether the ‘other’ was a colonial master or an antagonistic nation and nation-state). As we 
will see below the argument that is being made is that all these three elements feature in present- 
day economic nationalism as well.
2.The Explanatory Force of the Nation and Nationalism
For scholars of New Economic Nationalism “whatever the specific concept of...[economic] 
policy doctrines, their conception and legitimation always (and in most cases primarily) occur in 
a national context”7. In that respect, the most important antecedent observation which 
characterises scholars of New Economic Nationalism is List’s emphasis on the ontology of the 
nation -  as the primary focus of collective loyalty and identity between the extremes of 
individualism and universal humanism or cosmopolitanism -  rather than on the range of policies, 
in the economic domain and elsewhere, than this ontology can give rise to8. Simply put, the 
nation cannot be indifferent, and national identity cannot be unrelated, to the nature of economic 
life and activity.
This is not a unidirectional movement. Crane (1998, pp. 68-69) emphasizes that, if the nation 
serves the need for collective identification, economic life, as such, structures and informs much 
of collective experience and the way it is processed through collective memory and political 
contestation. Examples abound of how totemic economic experience can be in shaping national 
consciousness and choice, for Crane: from Gandhi’s protest against the British salt monopoly to 
Chinese resentment of economic concessions given to foreign powers, in China’s entrepot 
coastal cities of the 19th century.
7 Picket, A., 2005. False Oppositions: Reconceptualising Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. In 
Helleiner, E. and Pickel, A., eds. Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. NY:Comell University Press, p.12.
8 Helleiner E.,2005. The Meaning and Contemporary Significance of Economic Nationalism. In Helleiner, E. and 
Pickel, A. eds. Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, p.222.
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The case specificity that scholars of New Economic Nationalism defend is further refined and 
grounded, when we consider that political legitimacy is established, more often than not, in a 
correlative, as opposed to causative, manner. Correlation integrates two key elements with 
claims to national legitimacy and national identity: an evocation and interpretation of the past 
and a definition of a national community against or in favour of other national communities and 
nation-states. If free trade is associated with colonisation or the centrally planned economy with 
subjugation, is there any chance that a political community will choose to maintain the economic 
regime of its oppressors in the aftermath of its emancipation?
For Abdelal (2001), in his examination of post-imperial states and those states that emerged after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, such correlation, in states which exhibited a cohesive national 
identity antagonistic to their past masters, explains their post-independence directionality in 
terms of collective economic choice. Other authors have produced similar explanations to 
account for collective economic choice. The correlation of imperialism with free trade 
substantiated the case for a close economy in India after 1945 (Kholi, 2004, p.264); the 
dominance of the minorities in the Ottoman Empire’s economic life made indigenisation of the 
national economy a key project of the Kemalist Republic, from 1922 onwards despite the 
tremendous welfare costs this resulted in (Keyder, 1987, p.62) and entrenched a policy bias 
against FDI in Turkey which lasted until the 2002; the 1974 Cyprus debacle in Greece sustained 
a ten year delay in adjustment of the Greek economy by legitimising political claims to Greek 
exceptionalism and fuelling anti-Westernism (Pagoulatos, 2004, pp.58-59).
Abdelal (2201, p. 199), also accounts for the impact of international conditions on such 
correlatively grounded preferences. In the interwar years, the response to the World Depression 
created diverse policy responses, giving greater leeway to specific nationalisms to identify with 
those policy regimes most compatible with their predilections. US and Soviet conduct during 
the Cold War, which was premised on two competing as well as distinct developmental 
paradigms (Westad, 2005, p.3), also provided alternatives in terms of nations-states’ ability to 
pursue that economic model which would best accommodate the legitimacy and consolidation 
imperatives of their nationalism.
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Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall the seeming prevalence of a single economic model 
means that national ambition cannot easily be imagined, let alone realised, in a distinct policy 
domain. This means that the nation will tend to pursue its future and progress within the 
orthodoxy of the liberal economic regime. Employing the perspective of scholars of New 
Economic Nationalism, in this context, we will be looking at two interdependent, mutually 
reinforcing, aspects. First, at the activities and actors that exemplify this regime internationally, 
namely corporate internationalisation and corporations themselves. Second, at how national 
identity and historically informed notions of the national project, can valorise, in nationalist 
terms internationalising corporations.
Corporations in the Periphery
l.The Peripheral State and the Corporation
thThe classic interaction that underpinned free trade in the 19 century free trade era, of export of 
commodity products to colonial metropolises and import of manufactured goods by them in the 
underdeveloped world, was done for by the end of the Second World War.
Already, during the interwar years, the world depression combined with the protectionism and 
falling commodity prices that it induced, undermined the position of commercial elites in the less 
developed world. Ascendant national independence movements associated this specialisation 
with colonial dependency and looked favourably to national self-development, undertaken by the 
Soviet Union and European fascism, under varying degrees of autarky (Frieden, 2006, p.223).
Importantly, the United States, as patron of the mixed economies that emerged after World War 
W II, were not averse to state-led developmental efforts. The US was keen to provide an 
alternative model of national development, as appealing as that offered by the Soviet Union 
(Westad, 2005, p.32) and was correspondingly averse to associating itself with the legacy of 
European colonialism, the global influence of which it was determined to replace. Having said 
that, US support also encouraged political authoritarianism. US internationalists in Congress had 
to conflate market openness and reconstruction with the international anti-communist effort so as 
to win over their right wing nationalist peers. They in turn, strongly biased US foreign policy in 
favour of regime stability and conservative political forces in dependent states (Frieden, 2006, 
pp.266-67).
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Commercial elites in the LDC’s, of the post World War II era, had neither the capital nor the 
motive necessary to overcome a commodity-based comparative advantage and instead 
implement the vital national goal of industrialisation. National savings were neither enough on 
their own nor would the banking sector, left to its own devices, have directed them to 
industrialisation. The state had to come in and both identify industrial development as a 
priority for directed lending and suppress consumption, through authoritarian measures, so that 
adequate national resources could be marshalled. Funding from abroad, first through US aid and 
subsequently through the World Bank, was also by its very nature channelled in national 
economies through state institutions, most prominently dedicated industrial development banks 
that disbursed a mixture of domestic and internationally sourced financial resources. The ends 
willed the means: it was state bureaucracies and government elites that dominated the direction 
of economic life in LDC’s. The nascent business sectors were either extension of the state 
themselves -  state-owned industrial enterprises, utilities and banks -  or subordinated private 
actors who owed their existence to their being selected by the state as vehicles of national 
development. The state and its leaders were the heroes in the ensuing narrative of national 
development.
This state-led developmental process had important as well as interconnected international and 
domestic implications, mediated through the transformation of the control of major peripheral 
corporations.
As Lipson (1985) in his historical account of the evolution of property rights in the periphery 
points out, the corporation of the peripheral nation-state, in the inter-war and post World War II 
eras, became a critical terrain for the interstate relations between core and periphery. As the 
peripheral nation-state emerged, emancipated from formal or informal colonial rule, it became 
keen to challenge property rights, particularly in terms of the protection offered to FDI 
emanating from the countries of the metropolitan West. Considering that peripheral economies 
up to then were dominated by colonial and/or non-indigenous (or non-majority) capital, the new 
peripheral nation-state was keen to transfer key assets either to itself or to indigenous 
entrepreneurs, in order to assert its newly-found sovereignty, consolidate its legitimacy, and to 
acquire the tools necessary to fulfill its developmentalist mission (Lispon, 1985, pp.73, 102.
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These goals were interconnected. A large and dominant non-indigenous business class was 
synonymous with subordination and seen as a Trojan Horse of colonial interference; its 
freedom to invest according to its own commercial considerations was seen as responsible for 
keeping the nation locked in the cul de sac of Ricardian comparative advantage.
For Lipson (2001, pp. 122-123) the more these reinforcing goals became entrenched within 
peripheral nation states and the more the latter enhanced their administrative and mobilisational 
capacity to pursue them, the more anachronistic and counterproductive became classic tools of 
the protection of FDI such as military intervention and sanctions. In the end developed country 
corporations that undertook FDI and their national sponsors, such as the US, were compelled to 
seek an accommodation with this societally embedded economic ordering and seek solutions 
within it rather than against it. Importantly, the emerging middle classes of the periphery 
ascended through indigenized corporate assets -  banks, utilities, transport companies -  whether 
these were owned by the state or its favoured native sons. For Abdelal(2001, p.200), this transfer 
of assets suggests that peripheral, post-imperial states were not only involved in state-building 
but also in nation-building as the new citizens of these new nation-states were themselves 
acculturated into their nationalism through increasing participation in their national economy. It 
was within these large corporations that nationalism was conflated with modernity as their 
increasingly industrialised economies grew under national, whether state or private, ownership of 
large corporate entities. It was this set of policy choices and confrontations with foreign states, 
and their corporations or indigenous commercial elites, seen as collusive with them, that 
propelled the socioeconomic ascend of the rapidly urbanizing society of the periphery. 
Furthermore this transfer of assets from foreign owners to national ones exhibited formidable 
political effectiveness as it combined the provision of a general public good, the psychic income 
of the general population of the peripheral national society, resentful of its history of 
subordination to the West, with the alliance between the rulers of the peripheral nation-state and 
those of the ruled who were to manage and be employed in these corporations (Johnson, 1965, 
p. 177).
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2.Marketised but not De-nationalised
By the end of the 1970’s middling LDC performers such as Turkey and Mexico did acquire an 
export orientation that they previously did not enjoy but at the cost of growing indebtedness to 
international commercial banks. By that time US aid had declined significantly and 
multilateral finance was insufficient to support increasingly growing, complex economies, while 
Western commercial banks were under tremendous pressure to recycle the petrodollars which 
their own economies could not absorb in the stagflation that characterised the period. Whether 
because of misallocation of that lending, of endurable weaknesses of the business sectors in the 
countries concerned and the finance of domestic consumption, export performance could not 
service increasingly onerous commercial bank debt. Their vulnerability, sometimes leading to 
sovereign default, led them to accept restructuring of their debt obligations conditional upon 
accelerated market opening and revenue raising through state asset disposals. State-ownership, 
where prevalent, was also discredited due to the inevitable shortcomings that it revealed as a 
dominant paradigm of economic organisation. The transfer of assets from foreign to national 
owners retreated, as a policy instrument in LDC’s, from the 1980’s onwards (Minor, 1994, 
pp. 179-181), and indeed so did national ownership itself.
Illuminatingly, the World Bank and its subsidiary IFC, its lending arm to the private sector of 
developing countries, led the way in dismantling the model that they themselves were 
instrumental in constructing from the 1950’s onwards. Instead of directed lending by state banks 
that they had helped establish, financed and were even shareholders to, the World Bank and the 
IFC proposed and provided technical assistance for the establishment of country-specific equity 
funds, thus spurring the development of local capital markets. By doing so, private and state 
corporations were enabled to source funding from international and domestic private investors, a 
process in which the state would be absent, in terms of providing finance to activities of its own 
choosing (Lavelle, 2000, pp.208-210).
We find Lavelle’s subsequent account (2004) of the development of equity finance in peripheral 
economies particularly useful in analysing this transition in the status of the peripheral 
corporation. It both parallels that of Lipson while also picking up the baton where he left it, at the 
point when market liberalization in the periphery accelerates. She describes the process whereby
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capital markets fell into disfavor in peripheral states and colonies -  now known as emerging 
markets - as they were a mechanism for the channeling of private capital flows from the 
metropolis to the formal or informal empire. Post-independence nation-states were not inclined 
to let private, foreign investors exercise control over these assets which were, at any rate, put to 
work in the service of national, developmentalist goals in a way that was not conformable to 
private shareholder motives. Lavelle’s key mission is to illuminate the process of transition -  
mostly under duress, after the 1970’s debt crisis -  of these assets to a regime whereby they 
would be managed with less or no interference by the state and act as repositories once again of 
private, foreign capital flows.
Did this shift in a liberal, open market economy and the greater participation of foreign capital in 
these large corporations mean the disappearance of the nation in the economy, whether in terms 
of widely-held expectations of corporate purpose or of the state’s responsibility to upheld such 
purpose? For Lavelle, in an analysis which fits well into the new economic nationalism canon, 
although not declared as such, most emphatically not. Rather it facilitated the redefinition of 
national purpose as it inheres in large corporations.
Lavelle (2004, pp.4-5) defines in this transition company stock, particularly of state-owned 
enterprises (SOE’s) that are floated in national capital markets and part-privatised, as a political 
instrument whereby governments seek to maximise access to international capital inflows, at a 
minimum cost in terms of loss of control of the companies under question. For Lavelle that 
makes the evolution of capital markets, and the corporate governance structures that inhere in 
them, unique to the states in question, their leverage over external actors and their own national 
priorities and political exigencies. This specificity is reinforced by the fact that the control or 
influence of part-privatised SOE’s, due to their size and centrality in national economies, 
continues to be a salient issue to political leaderships, stakeholders, actual or potential, and 
publics at large. Indeed their past role, for Lavelle, in the pre-market reform era carries with it 
expectations that they will continue to fulfill a larger mission, beyond and above that of 
satisfying shareholders expectations, in terms of capital gains and dividends. Such expectations 
certainly incorporate widely held, if evolving assumptions, of the developmental priorities of the 
national economy in which they occupy such a leadership position. They are also grounded by
49
important domestic interests, and in particular national business elites and employee 
organizations, that would want to ensure that the transition in the status of these corporations 
would, at a minimum, not hurt their position and, at maximum, improve it.
Gourevich and Shinn (2005, p.3) make a substantially similar point to Lavelle in their study of 
corporate governance patterns under a variety of political regimes at different stages of 
development. They call corporate governance the authority structure that determines who has 
claims on the cash flows, strategies, and allocation of resources of corporations. The 
determination of this authority structure is thus inherently a political process and is determined 
by contests which are political in nature, expressing the interests and preferences of particular 
actors. Interests are aggregated into institutions and they in turn produce policy outcomes. 
However, as our examination of the control of major corporate assets in peripheral nation-states, 
before and after market liberalisation suggests, widely-held societal preferences can also be prior 
and formative of these interests and their aggregation.
We will examine below how corporate action, undertaken either on the initiative of governments 
and/or management and key shareholders, (IPO’s, secondary offerings, privatization to strategic 
investors and the like) which affects the control of these corporations interacts with societal 
preferences. Such action by producing contestation, which draws in political parties, managers 
and workers, shareholders and the general public, also generates normative content, in terms of 
evolving expectations of the contribution, to the nation, of large corporations. Our job would be 
to evaluate the nationalist character of this normative content and the degree of influence that it 
exerts both on the corporation itself and the socio-political order that envelops it.
Although Lavelle’s perspective, and ours, through our Greek case study, is anchored in the 
experience of SOE’s or ex-state controlled enterprises, analytically it incorporates also those 
privately-owned corporations and conglomerates that have been built in the post-World War II 
period within high protective walls, in peripheral nation-states. Despite the fact that these 
corporations were not state-owned, the policy regime that shaped their evolution and growth 
reflected national will and/or consensus, at the political elite level, and even mass level, that their 
home nations-states would henceforth base their national independence on an indigenously
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owned business class and industrial capacity. While this policy regime has since then retreated, 
the linkage between national capital and national power and independence still attaches, we 
would argue, to these privately-owned corporations, shaping their effectiveness and influence on 
multiple policy domains.
Corporate Internationalisation
1.Embeddedness
There is a complex of reasons why market actors, even in advanced Western political economies 
where market liberalisation has taken root, continue to be well-entrenched, embedded, in their 
national political economies. For Rhodes and Appledoom (1998, p.418), these reasons pertain to 
the desire of local elites not to lose power, to the unique competitive advantages that national 
conditions can still confer to major firms, and the political imperative to ground any major 
change, in the relationship between states, firms and social partners, in agreements that enjoy 
wider social and political consensus.
Sally (1994, p. 172) further specifies the durability of embeddedness by examining the 
relationship between multinationals and their home countries. Internationalisation intensifies 
state-firm relationships as it reconfigures them. In order to succeed internationally, home 
corporations place new demands on the state to enhance factors of production and other features 
of the national economy that bear on their international operations. To the extent that an 
increasing share of national wealth is procured outside national borders, and through 
multinational operations, international economic competition is conducted not solely through 
firms but rather through a set of redefined state-firm relationships. States, in other words, are 
driven to facilitate the international competitiveness of their major national corporations. Their 
capacity for such facilitation, in turn, enables political actors and other stakeholders to exercise 
substantial leverage in determining the conditions under which their national corporations 
internationalise.
Particularly with regard to the large listed corporations that we are examining, from previously
peripheral economies, also known as emerging market economies, internationalising operations
involves a double move. Antecedent state-enacted market liberalisation compels corporate
internationalisation while internationalisation consists, in large measure, of those competitive
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advantages build by the liberalisation process itself. As Goldstein (2007, pp.67-73) notes, one of 
the major competitive advantage of emerging market multinationals is their experience of being 
transfigured from protected state monopolies, or local firms which have matured under high 
tariff walls, to corporations which: (i) face competition at home from third country 
multinationals (ii) renew their managerial ranks in order to adapt to changing home market 
conditions (iii) need to master the ability to raise capital from international investors and not just 
from home banks or governments. It is the cumulative effect of adjusting to home liberalisation 
that gives them an edge, managerial and financial, in entering third country markets which are 
later followers on the market liberalisation path.
Goldstein (2007, p.95) also underlines that even under liberalization, governments of emerging 
market multinationals continue to extend to them support to compensate for their perceived 
weaknesses towards their longer established Western competitors: such assistance includes fiscal 
transfers, soft patent laws to facilitate technological upgrade through copycat production and of 
course investments in skill formation and the like, policies that are not unique to emerging 
market economies.
The analysis of Spanish multinationals and their expansion in Latin American markets (Guillen, 
2005; Martin and Toral, 2005), fuses the above perspectives: of a state, long in the European 
periphery, facilitating the internationalisation of its major corporations which have been 
transfigured by the Spanish liberalisation process; and of a society that confers acceptance to 
these state-society links as it recognises in them legitimate and indeed desirable considerations of 
national welfare and prestige.
Guillen (2005, p.68) argues that the Spanish state and regulatory authorities encouraged the 
internationalisation of Spain’s main oligopolistic and monopolistic corporations, in banking, 
telecommunications and water and energy utilities. The Spanish state supported 
internationalisation partly so that these corporations would acquire such a size that they would 
not end up being acquired by competitors from Western Europe (the fate that befell Spain’s 
major manufacturers, subsequent to Spain’s accession to the European Community). Their 
subsequent expansion, by making them even more central to the Spanish economy and the 
international status of the Spanish state, has produced significant support through a set of
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regulatory and fiscal measures (leading the Financial Times9 to call Spanish multinationals in 
one of its editorials as the ‘tax conquistadores’ because of the favourable tax treatment of their 
international acquisitions). Concurrently, their growth through internationalisation has made 
them, as multinationals, ever more important to Spain’s socioeconomic groups, from the 
expanding ranks of a managerial cadre that oversees and manages this process, to the exposure of 
Spanish capital holders in Spain’s stock exchange which has become increasingly sensitive to 
developments in Latin America.
Another author (Martin, 2005, p.265) claims that in an open and democratic society such as the 
Spanish one, internationalisation by Spanish firms in Latin America could have been undertaken 
only if it had enjoyed wide popular support. In particular, the rising risks to the Spanish 
economy due to this process, the effective subsidy by the Spanish state of this 
internationalisation and the transformation of the image of Spain, from a model of 
democratisation in Latin America, to an aggressive capitalist state, connoted through the 
historicised formulation of the ‘conquistadores’ and the ‘Spanish armada’, all these elements 
could have only come into being through public acceptance and indeed support. Indeed 
majorities polled in Spain, by this author (Martin, 2005, pp.270-72), understand Spanish FDI in 
Latin America as (i) driven by competition with the US for influence in Latin America, by Spain
(ii) realised by close coordination between politicians and corporate decision-makers while also
(iii) expressing satisfaction or even pride in this Spanish leadership in FDI rankings in Latin 
America.
2.Corporate Internationalisation and the International Hierarchy
For our purposes, internationalisation of large corporations, from our mid-tier economies and 
nation-states that we are examining, is particularly important in the way it impinges on 
collectively and elite held notions of the evolving international hierarchy.
Corporate internationalisation, as has been noted above, is shaped by sequentiality. In the case 
of market liberalisation, those countries that undertake it first, proceed to export it, though their 
multinationals, to other countries down the line. Alternatively, manufacturing countries that
9 Editorial, 2007. Tax Conquistadores. Financial Times. 11 October.
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are no longer labour cost competitive, due to their early success as exporters, internationalise 
their labour intensive activities to countries at a lower stage of development -  the flying geese 
pattern that has been observed in Asia. In financial services it has been found that most FDI is 
undertaken by banks that are one step above, in terms of institutional development. Banks that 
are domiciled in high income countries would invest in middle income countries and banks that 
are domiciled in middle income countries would invest in low income countries (Van Horen, 
2006). In most cases such sequentiality unfolds within regions and countries that are 
geographically and / or culturally proximate (Aykut and Ratha, 2003, p. 158; Aykut and 
Goldstein, 2006, p. 16). These are of course the regions and countries where the most critical 
inter-state relationships reside, including the strategic rivalries that are the object of our study. 
Cultural and geographical proximity obtaining between national collectivities is historically 
grounded and history entails competition, friction, war and even conquest.
Alternatively, corporations from previously peripheral economies and nation states, seek to 
accelerate their growth by acquisitions of developed countries’ peers that possess superior 
brands, know-how and distribution networks -  or seek to develop, on their own, brands and 
proprietary technologies that will ensure them greater profit margins and protection from the 
competition of even lower-cost competitors (Goldstein, 2007, p. 17; Van Agtmael, 2007, pp.45- 
46; Aguiar, et al., 2007, p. 12). This might involve Indian, Taiwanese or Turkish corporations 
acquiring capital and knowledge intensive firms in Western Europe and North America and/or 
successfully exporting high value-added, branded products to the developed markets of Western 
Europe and North America.
This aspect of corporate internationalisation does not only give expression to an intense 
nationalist feeling, by an elite group of managers and owners in peripheral nation-states, to 
avenge past commercial relationships of subordination and inferiority (Van Agtmael, 2007, 
p.30); it also gives expression to this sentiment held at the collective level and reflecting past 
experience of politico-economic subordination. The case of the Indian conglomerate TATA is 
typical in this respect. Two acquisitions have underlined TATA’s status as an apostle of 
internationalisation for the Indian economy. The first one is that of Anglo-Dutch steel maker 
Corns and the second of the auto marques Jaguar and Land Rover from Ford Motor Company.
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These acquisitions in the UK by TATA, where presently the Holding derives a greater share of 
its revenues than from any other market, India included, generated nationalist euphoria in India, 
encapsulated in the mantra of ‘reverse colonialism’10.
Last but not least, scholars of internationalisation from corporations from peripheral states, have 
noted how socio-cultural resources which are unique to them -  and in particular Diasporic 
networks - facilitate internationalisation (Kapur, 2002, pp. 100-102; Golsdstein, 2007, pp. 117- 
119). This is due to the fact, that once such states open up their economies, they acquire 
privileged access to native pools of capital and expertise which have accumulated over time 
abroad. Greece and India, among peripheral nation-states, possess arguably the most notable 
examples of this process. The opening up of their economies has facilitated the repatriation 
(Greece) or led to the creation (India) of literally global leadership in two key economic sectors, 
namely shipping (NBG, Economic and Market Analysis, 2005-6, p.2) and IT outsourcing (in 
both these cases, services provided internationally are managed from the home country). Such 
repatriated Diasporic networks are particularly important because they produce global leadership 
within a recognisably national character, rendering popularly credible beliefs on the particular 
qualities of the nation.
What needs to investigated is whether, such distinct modes of corporate internationalisation 
emanating from peripheral nation-states, by altering collective conceptions of the position, and 
indeed identity of the nation in the international hierarchy, have also altered, or constitute 
themselves, patterns of behaviour which substantially affect inter-state relationships, including 
strategic rivalries.
3.Global Liquidity and Corporate Internationalisation
Global liquidity flows directed to corporations from peripheral markets, during the period under 
examination, constitute the capstone of the corporate internationalisation process. Their impact 
is important in commensurately material and symbolic terms. By expanding the remit of the 
internationalisation process, they have enhanced its distributional capabilities as much as they 
have fuelled claims to national commercial primacy in the international domain. Both these
10 Leahy, J., 2007. Indian passions stirred by a symbolic shift in industrial fortunes, Financial Times, 2 February; 
Leahy, J.& Yee, A., 2008. Motoring along road of reverse colonialism, Financial Times, 27 March.
55
effects have been maximised by the fact that major corporations are listed entities and that their 
major strategic actions have been financed by powerful international investment banks and 
portfolio investors and validated by the international business press.
The internationalisation of corporations from peripheral economies, accelerated throughout the 
2000’s, with a commensurate increase in the channelling to this process of global liquidity flows 
reaching its peak in 2005-7(World Bank, 2006, pp.2-3; Stendevad, Simonetti and Singh, 2007, 
p.6; Aguiar, et al., 2007, pp. 16-17). Facilitated by the provision of seemingly limitless liquidity, 
corporations from peripheral countries executed strategies of ever widening scope, attaining in 
several instances global leadership. Indicatively, CEMEX, the Mexican cement manufacturer, 
at the peak of global liquidity, in 2007, acquired for 15 billion $ the Australian Rinker, a 
company which had 80 % of its sales in the US market. This last major acquisition catapulted 
CEMEX to the top rank of cement producers worldwide, becoming the third biggest, after the 
European Lafarge and Holcim11. The internationalisation of TATA, the Indian conglomerate, has 
also been financed by liquid global and money capital markets, by institutional investors and 
banks such as Citi and JP Morgan. TATA’s acquisition of the Anglo-Dutch Corns, 
implemented in 2007, still at the peak of the global liquidity cycle, was the largest ever in Indian 
corporate history. Again as with CEMEX, the acquisition of Corns catapulted TATA to global 
leadership, making its subsidiary, TATA Steel, the fifth largest steel processing concern 
worldwide.
As it was mentioned above, nationalist euphoria greeted TATA’s steel and car acquisitions in the 
ex-colonial metropolis, the UK, with the TATA chairman admitting the high price paid for these 
acquisitions and partly justifying them by acknowledging how national sentiment has been 
identified with this manifestation of Indian resurgence which he did not want to disappoint by 
letting the acquisition opportunity pass, due to its high price12. The impact of global liquidity, 
effectuated through the aggrandizing strategies of home corporations, on national esteem, has 
been observed not only on economies of the periphery but also very wealthy but small European
11 Thomson, A. & Minder, R., 2007. Cemex 14.2 bn Rinker takeover, Financial Times, 7 June.
12 Leahy, J.,2007. Indian pride fuelled Tata’s push for Corns, Financial Times, 2 February and Leahy, J., 2007. 
Indian passions stirred by a symbolic shift in industrial fortunes, Financial Times, 2 February.
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states. Post mortems of the collapse of Belgium’s and Iceland’s financial sectors, all highlight 
the extent to which their internationalisation came to represent supposedly national character and 
identity, carrying along with them both elites and publics13. The aggressive internationalisation 
strategies of these two small nation-states gave the impression that they can escape the confines 
of their small size, just as peripheral nation-states seemed to escape their history of subordination 
to the nation-states of the Western core, through corporate performance, and punch well above 
their historically defined weight.
Foreign Policy and Domestic Actors
1. Domestic Coalitions
Large, internationalising corporations, from peripheral nation-states, or any other category of 
nation-state for that matter, must be presumed both as subject and an object of group interests 
and domestic coalitions that strive to fashion a foreign policy compatible with their perceived 
interests. In the discussion that follows we will review several perspectives which address this 
twin capacity of large internationalising corporations.
In terms of group interests and foreign and national security conduct, the discussion has been 
substantially initiated by the seminal work of Snyder (1993) from the perspective of threat 
exaggeration, as opposed to minimisation, justifying societal exaction for the sake of ever more 
powerful armed forces and bellicose military strategies. Contrary to Realist arguments, Snyder 
forcefully argues how spurious can those threat assessments be, on the basis of which means and 
goals are decided upon in the domains of national security and foreign policy. The determining 
factor, other than an, as objective as possible, evaluation of the security environment facing a 
nation-state, is the ability of bureaucratic, military and business cartels to align with larger 
societal groups, under propagated ‘myths of empire’ that justify their interests. The 
counterproductive effects of such domestic alignments, when leading to national defeat and even
13 Indicatively, Pignal, S., 2009. The Chastening of Belgian Finance. Financial Times, 12 March; Jackson, R., 2008. 
Letter from Iceland. Financial Times, 14 November, Forelle, Ch., 2008. The Isle that Rattled the world, Wall Street 
Journal, 27 December; Parker, I., 2009. Lost-After financial disaster Icelanders reassess their identity, The New 
Yorker, 9 March; Lewis, M., 2009.Wall Street on the Tundra, Vanity Fair, April; Stanage, N., 2009. Reality caught 
up with Iceland’s boom, Guardian, 8 April.
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the elimination of those groups that sponsored them in the first place, are produced by two 
elements: first the needs of cartels to logroll, so that they can effectively cohere, which causes 
an incremental but ultimately unsustainable strategy of military expansion. Second, the tendency 
of the broader social groups with which military, bureaucratic and business elites have aligned 
themselves, to overbid on these myths and ride the tiger of nationalism and territorial expansion 
in order to advance socio-politically and even overtake their original, more conservative and 
better entrenched, sponsors.
Another author (Narizny, 2007) contends that foreign policy is essentially the outcome of interest 
group aggregation, and their direct accommodation by the external environment (rather than a 
means to exaction of domestic socioeconomic resources), and as such liable to shift not because 
of changes in the international environment that would affect the security imperatives of a 
nation-state, but rather due to changes in the ruling coalition and the domestic interests that it 
represents. Narizny’s level of analysis, in that respect is not class, but rather sectoral interest, 
either economic or bureaucratic (or more often a coalitional combination of both) favouring, as 
in the case of Great Britain in the 19th and 20th centuries, either an imperial strategy in favour of 
the periphery or a more rules-based one, in favour of core Western countries. Periphery and core 
are assumed to accommodate distinctive and conflicting coalitions of manufacturing and service 
industries as well as their administrative counterparts and political allies -  the former, in the case 
of Great Britain, financiers and uncompetitive manufacturers, imperial administrators and 
military officials, and the latter efficient manufacturers capable of exporting in the markets of the 
core countries.
Drawn from a recent case study, Taiwan, Tian (2006) assumes a level of analysis similar to 
Narizny’s but places his emphasis elsewhere, namely in security conscious governmental 
agencies which utilise strong state-society links in order to inhibit economic interdependence. 
In particular, SOE’s and SCB’s toe the government of Taiwan’s policy of restricted engagement 
with China while privately-owned corporations, of smaller size, substantially ignore it. This 
causes the ire of those state agencies for which security and independence for China is of the 
utmost importance, a sentiment echoed by less privileged Taiwanese who do not benefit from 
globalisation and engagement with China, a coalition that accuses investors in China as
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unpatriotic. Concurrently, however, this policy of limiting interaction threatens the ‘Taiwan 
First’ effort whereby Taiwan pursues the objective of becoming a leading regional economic 
hub. It also undermines linkages between Taiwan’s vibrant private sector and the SOE’s and 
SCB’s whose relationship with the former is essentially symbiotic as providers of commoditised 
inputs and financial services in the Taiwanese economy. The result is policy vacillation as 
economic relationships with China are constrained and subsequently loosened only to be 
constrained again.
Other scholars with a focus in the globalisation era (Solingen, 1998; Ben Porat, 2006), possibly 
in response to the more triumphant, ‘end of history’ claims of globalisation, have renewed the 
traction of Karl Polyani’s (2001) seminal concept of the double movement, within the conflict 
and interdependence literature. Polyani asserted that the functioning of the market by its sheer 
impact on societal arrangements is bound to generate mitigating societal responses, either 
restricting its operations (as in labour legislation) or through the manipulation of market 
operations themselves (as in monetary management). This double movement can also shape, for 
Polyani, foreign policy responses ranging from the renewal of colonialism in the late 19th 
century, in search of an expanded home market that can accommodate the socio-economic needs 
of the metropolis no longer addressed by free markets, or by externalising sheer reaction to the 
consequences of the market, as fascism did, in World War II.
According to these scholars market liberalisation, by its very nature, reanimates or creates a 
backlash coalition -  an agglomeration of socioeconomic forces which are threatened with the 
diminution of their standing by globalisation. For instance Ben-Porat (2006, pp. 187-188), in his 
examination of the case of Israel, posits this dichotomy between de-territorialised elites 
advocating for a peace settlement with the Palestinians, and a territorialised coalition of groups 
unattached to Israel’s international economy, rooted in national myths, strongly religious, and 
frustrated by its loss of status and de-validation, produced by Israel’s increasingly modem and 
outward looking economy and society.
This backlash coalition can, and does, through the exploitation of latent or present international 
conflict, destabilise materially and symbolically market openness within a nation-state. It 
consequently has a significant bearing on the evolution of international conflict and disputes,
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with which the nation-state is engaged in. By the same token there is a coalition of pro­
liberalisation forces, the internationalist coalition, which is biased in favour of amelioration, if 
not elimination, of these same disputes and/or conflicts: both for important external reasons, as 
in the maintenance of uninterrupted capital inflows, and for reasons of domestic legitimacy, 
which is necessary to consolidate market opening.
As a result of this cleavage the internationalist coalition has the motive to present the concerns of 
the backlash coalition in the international domain as retrograde, irrelevant, and potentially 
harmful, considering the promising vistas that have opened up by the new brave world of a 
globalised economy. By doing so it can dent the capacity of the backlash coalition to push 
towards the kind of international friction that would negate such claims. The internationalist 
coalition has the ability to do so, to the extent that market opening produces tangible benefits to 
an increasing number of economic actors and creates plausible expectations that such benefits 
will be shared even more widely in the future14. The backlash coalition, conversely, by 
presenting a world at odds with the one projected by the internationalist coalition, can cast 
doubts on the latter’s claims, discredit its associated expectations, and, in extremis, derail market 
opening by generating a destabilising international crisis15. It has the motive to do so, because 
market opening threatens the material preferences of its constituent members as well as their 
social status and even sense of identity. It has the ability to do so, due to the fact that it can, 
under propitious circumstances, make national ‘myths’, those subjective interpretations of past 
collective experience, work for it by virtue of their unique mobilisation potential16.
2. Economic Statecraft and Domestic Coalitions
As we will examine the acquisition of Finansbank by NBG, which required a positive decision 
by the Greek government, a decisive step towards economic interdependence with a strategic 
rival, it also behoves us to briefly review the scholarly discussion on economic statecraft. The 
definition that we will employ of economic statecraft is “the use of policy instruments to satisfy 
the core objectives of nation-states in the international system...[such use] involves the
14Solingen, E., 1998. Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.32.
15 Ibid., p.72
16 Ibid., pp. 36-37
60
application and interplay of multiple instruments -  military, economic, diplomatic and 
informational -  to achieve the multiple objectives of states, including national security, economic 
prosperity and political prestige and influence”17.
In examining economic statecraft, the relevant scholarship is highly attuned both to its properties 
as they become realised in an international context and, simultaneously, in a domestic context.
For Baldwin, a seminal author on the subject, “Economic statecraft does not restrict the range of 
goals that may be sought by economic means. It makes it conceptually possible to describe the 
empirically undeniable fact that policymakers sometimes use economic means to pursue a wide 
variety of noneconomic ends”18. Complementarily, for Baldwin (1985, p. 15), economic 
statecraft should also be judged not in isolation but in view of the alternatives: for instance do 
policymakers deem it wise to, in case of confrontation, engage in military action or, for a variety 
of reasons would they prefer a less costly and risky option of economic sanctions?
Baldwin’s key insight (1985, p. 108) is that for both domestic and international constituencies, 
be they allies, adversaries or bystanders, state-sponsored commercial intercourse is seen as 
accepting of the other party to it. Thus commercial intercourse is not compatible with, or will 
undermine the cohesion and mobilisation, domestic and international, necessary to sustain a 
relationship which policymakers judge that it should be adversarial. Importantly, from a 
domestic context, the purpose of economic statecraft, and of its intended consequences, must be 
seen through the prism of the values that inform the policy priorities of the nation-state that 
exercises it.
Skalnes (2000) and Mastanduno (1998, p.3) link economic statecraft with the intensity of a 
nation-state’s security needs. A nation-state faced with a threatening adversary would tend to 
integrate the economic tools at its disposal, and indeed subordinate international economic 
exchange, which can one way or another control, to its security needs. Only absent, or in the 
process of being attenuated, such a major security threat, will foreign economic policy enjoy an 
independent existence mostly structured by domestic welfare, whether general or sectoral,
17 Mastanduno, M., 1998. Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship, International Organization 52(4), 
1998, p.826
18 Baldwin, D.A., 1985. Economic Statecraft, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.40.
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considerations. Crucially, for Skalnes (2000, p. 196), economic interdependence is not created 
only by social actors but can also be, considering the state imperative for security, increased or 
decreased by state policy, at will, to serve such wider security purposes.
Skalnes, although he bases his premise on the capacity of states to arrive at such a determination 
through a strategic assessment undiluted by non-security concerns, admits that such dilution is 
possible. On particular occasions, this security assessment can be compromised by domestic 
economic groups in favour -  or against -  international commercial exchange, regardless of 
whether this is advisable on security grounds (Skalnes, 2000, pp.20-21). Papaioannou (1996, pp. 
55-56) also finds that growing economic links between powerful economic groups in a status quo 
country, with the economy of revisionist nation-state, would induce reticence in forcefully 
deterring the revisionist state’s foreign policy designs. This effect would be correspondingly 
more pronounced if the institutional structure is such that it affords access to these economic 
groups to the decision makers of the status quo state. Skalnes also accepts that evolving state- 
society links, particularly in the direction of deepening democratisation, affect a nation-state’s 
ability to use foreign economic policy for national security purposes. This is due not only 
because domestic interests will make themselves felt with greater efficacy but also because the 
nature of either positive or negative economic sanctions would affect public sentiment, 
favourably or negatively, towards particular nation-states (Skalnes, 2000, p. 159).
Mastanduno more explicitly (1991) introduces, in the examination of economic statecraft in the 
case of the US and Japan, domestic institutions and party-specific ideologies. Mastanduno looks 
at the inability of the Bush Administration to argue for an industrial policy to High Definition 
TV, to respond to Japan’s lead in this technology. Such a policy would, despite the seeming 
merits of the case at the time, legitimise a philosophy of government intervention which 
President Bush himself had repudiated electorally and which his Democratic opponents had 
endorsed. He also points out the divergent perspectives of the Departments of State and Defence 
and those of Commerce, the former not wishing to upset a long-standing security-driven policy 
for reasons of industrial competition and the latter advocating a more restrictive policy stance 
towards the transfer of key aerospace technologies in Japan that would, in due course, make 
Japan a competitor in sectors where the US enjoyed a technological edge.
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Finally Steil and Litan (2007, pp. 141-142) in their focus on financial statecraft apprise us, in a 
period of rising capital flows, of the exceptional importance that finance has in affecting the 
stability of economies of nation-states, whether allies or adversaries and, from a prescriptive 
point of view, of the need of foreign policy and economic policy makers to integrate their 
particular perspectives in order for policy at large to achieve coherence.
As we will examine in our two subsequent chapters all of these elements, that economic 
statecraft apprises us of, have a bearing on the creation of economic interdependence through 
state assent: The inherent ability of a nation-state to induce or discourage economic
interdependence with another nation-state; the need of interdependency to conform with the 
predominant ideological dispensation at home and to sent a message abroad compatible with the 
overall international orientation of a nation-state; the relativity of security assessments, in view 
of which interdependency is being created, and the importance of access to policy making and 
policy makers of those corporate entities which actually create such interdependence.
Conclusion
Scholars of New Economic Nationalism assert that no matter how market liberalisation is 
effected and by whom, it is certain to involve a redefinition or at least the reworking of national 
purpose and identity. For scholars of New Economic Nationalism, within any nation-state that 
undergoes a significant transition in the organisation of its economic life, the central battleground 
will ultimately be the definition of national purpose and of national identity. This makes the 
outcome of this transition both contingent and analytically graspable through the examination of 
national purpose and national identity.
Large corporations in peripheral nation-states have been a decisive objective in this battleground. 
Their size and their past contribution in the developmental project of the peripheral nation-state 
ensure that this will be the case. National stakeholders, such as capital holders and employees, 
as well as publics, have a stake in the outcome of the market-led transformation of these 
corporations, as much as political parties and leaderships, which rise or fall by the nature of their 
relationship with these constituencies.
The internationalisation of these corporations further raises the stakes of their transformation, for
all parties concerned, as it adds to their material significance, affects the critical issue of their
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control and confers national prestige generally and in relation to other nation-states, the relations 
with which has been constitutive, one way or another, of the peripheral nations-state’s 
international orientation.
Concurrently with their market-led transformation and internationalisation, large corporations 
from the periphery inhabit a domestic context where the direction of the foreign policy of their 
home states is contested by opposing coalitions. For these coalitions, the international 
environment, suitably shaped by their foreign policy of choice, can either inhibit or advance their 
quest of domestic dominance. For the internationalist coalition, a foreign policy that contains or 
eliminates international friction can maintain international investment flows, help maintain the 
domestic stability that a market-friendly dispensation needs and maximise the opportunities to be 
had from economic interdependence with the economies of other nation-states. The benefits 
accruing to internationalising corporations from the periphery, in the period under consideration, 
of their home internationalist coalition being capable of pursuing its foreign policy of choice are 
obvious. The contribution of the corporations to such an outcome is less so, and this will be the 
subject matter of our investigations of the Greek case in the chapters to follow.
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CHAPTER 3 
Introduction
In this chapter we will focus on the role of state owned enterprises (SOE’s) and state-controlled 
banks (SCB’s) in Greece19 in the country’s evolving economic nationalism and their influence on 
Greece’s foreign policy role and posture.
In the first section we will examine the critical role that SOE’s and SCB’s played, subsequent to 
the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974, in the Greek socialist party’s (Pan-Hellenic Socialist 
Movement -PASOK) mobilisation strategy. SOE’s and SCB’s, we will argue, as vehicles of 
redistribution in the context of a statist-populist policy preference, became indispensable pillars 
of PASOK’s backlash coalition. This coalition was, moreover, conceived and articulated on the 
basis of opposition to an international order which was seen as having betrayed Greek national 
interests and democratic aspirations.
In the second section, we will look at how the imperatives of EMU accession, led to the 
equitisations and/or privatisations, through listings at the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), of these 
same SOE’s and SCB’s. Although this process was driven by PASOK’s EMU strategy, it 
attached normative value on corporate efficiency and profitability, which went well beyond the 
marketisation policy’s pragmatic, fiscally-driven, original intentions. Additionally, the 
subsequent internationalisation in the emerging markets of the Balkans of SOE’s, SCB’s and 
privately-owned corporations, was largely an outcome of Greece’s market status and of Greece 
having undergone market reforms earlier than the transition countries. This process of corporate 
internationalisation was sponsored by the Ministry of Finance (MF) which lent credence to the 
notion of an ever expanding regional economic space where Greek corporations had assumed a 
leading role.
19 Initially entities like OTE, the telecoms monopoly and DEI, the energy monopoly, were not even incorporated as 
listed companies, the shares of which could be traded. State-controlled banks, were listed in the Athens Stock 
Exchange, and the state would exercise effective control either through its direct shareholdings or the holdings of 
pension and insurance funds, under the control of the Ministry of Finance. Subsequently, DEI and OTE, through 
their stock exchange listings, became state-controlled as opposed to state-owned corporations. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, we will refer, from now on, to all non-financial corporations as SOE’s and financial 
corporations as SCB’s, to the extent that the Greek state has retained a controlling stake in either.
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In the third section we will examine how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs position (MFA), 
evolved in relation to corporate internationalisation. We will argue that bureaucratic 
competition, between the MFA and the MF, for the promotion of Greece’s commercial interests 
in the region both underlined the increasing saliency of corporate internationalisation in Greek 
society and powerfully embedded it in Greece’s policy making and institutional structure. The 
outcome of this competition -  the MFA won the mandate to undertake foreign economic policy 
in the region -  actually reflected the MF’s stronger role as a trustee of key SOE’s and SCB’s, 
and ultimately the capital markets (i.e. it was a battle that the MF could well afford to lose) while 
also enabling the MFA, and its successive political leaderships, to identity with Greece’s rising 
economic role in the region, encapsulated and actualised by its leading corporations. We will 
conclude this section by accessing how the positioning between key actors around corporate 
internationalisation -  politicians and parties, the corporations themselves -  was mediated in the 
public domain and produced a historisation of the corporate internationalisation process, further 
entrenching its legitimation.
Constructing a Backlash Coalition
l.PASOK’s Hegemony
As Pagoulatos (2004) argues, what differentiated Greece from the other post-authoritarian 
European countries, namely Spain and Portugal, was that military defeat in Cyprus, in 1974, for 
which the US was presumed to be culpable, fuelled a generalised anti-Westernism which 
significantly delayed the adoption of Western European policy paradigms. In effect, the trauma 
of Cyprus both drove and facilitated PASOK’s polemical relationship with the European 
Community, which Greece was to join in 1981, and facilitated a populism based on the promise 
of societal & national emancipation.
Diamandouros (1994, p.33) and Voulgaris (2001, p.88) further specify how the foreign policy 
positions of PASOK at the period, whether in opposition or in government, were indispensable to 
the political economy that it chose to adopt. They note the special contribution that the Cyprus 
debacle, and its corollary volatile and friction-laden bilateral relationships with Turkey, made to 
PASOK’s foreign policy. The Cyprus debacle, and by extension Turkey, allowed for a synthesis 
and a subsequently an elision: From the dependency-theory intellectual framework of many of
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PASOK’s leading political figures (often expatriates from the US and with an affinity to Latin 
America) to the more popularly held assumptions on Turkey as Greece’s major threat, with the 
United States as its Great Power enabler. Friction with Turkey, by keeping the US at the 
forefront of attention by policy makers, media and the public, enabled PASOK to continue 
devaluing European social democratic countries as supplicants to the US. The focus on the US 
and its assumed bias in favour of Turkey, in the context of the two countries’ bilateral disputes, 
also sustained an absolutist emphasis on national sovereignty, and a suspicion of outsiders, ill- 
suited to an EC member country.
In turn this confrontational foreign policy stance towards the presumed ‘centre’ justified and 
grounded policies of boosting domestic demand and avoiding painful restructuring efforts that 
would have improved the international competitiveness of Greek firms. PASOK thus located 
Greece in the periphery, rather than as a, lagging to be sure, but still a European country and a 
member of the EEC, well on its way to join the core (Voulgaris, 2001, p.74).
Ironically it was EC transfers, until the late 1980’s unconditional, that helped sustain PASOK’s 
mobilisation strategies, framed by its nationalism, by enabling redistribution in the absence of 
adjustment (Alogoskoufis, 1995, p. 173). In their absence, the PASOK government of the time 
would have probably been compelled to seek IMF assistance, undergoing structural reform under 
the auspices of an international actor much more closely associated with the US and therefore 
even less legitimate than the EC.
2.The Role of the SOE’s and SCB’s
PASOK, once in power, instead of learning from European social democracy the moderated 
adjustment that was necessitated by the market (Lavdas, 2005, pp. 311-312) it turned the 
radicalisation of its supporters against such a settlement - and in an assault on market actors and 
the financial sector without regard to consequences in terms of corporate performance. This 
preference assuaged the longing of trade unions and employees to acquire voice and 
participation, suppressed under Greece’s authoritarian state that lasted from the end of World 
War II up until the collapse of the dictatorship in 1974. Command of the Greek economy’s key 
assets, by a nationalist-populist government, also underlined popular sovereignty, seen as
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suborned by the collusion between the external factor and its favoured local elites (Lyrintzis, 
1987). It also gave, as we will see below, critical distributional means to PASOK governments.
With the above in mind, we can identify two categories of large corporations in this period, 
lasting from 1981 to 1996. First, those corporations which grew to significant size in the post­
war era under the high growth rates of Greece’s economy, under post World War II 
reconstruction, but fell in distress from the 1970’s onwards. Second, the SOE’s and SCB’s, 
which became firmly subordinated to PASOK’s distributional imperatives.
Firms belonging to the first category were completely discredited, due to their privileged links 
within the political economy of authoritarian Greece and their inability to respond to the less 
favourable macro conditions, obtaining in Greece from the mid-1970’s onwards. Not only did 
they lack the leverage to advocate for a policy regime that would allow them to restructure in this 
period; the weaker among them also fell victim to the policy of PASOK’s first government, to 
encourage SCBs to convert their loans into equity and thus to become indirectly nationalised. In 
this new guise they essentially became vehicles of patronage and recyclers of government and/or 
bank cash injections.
SOE’s and SCB’s, our second category, were also completely subordinated to PASOK’s 
distributional and patronage imperatives. PASOK’s treatment of large SOE’s and SCB’s 
represented a qualitative leap in Greek clientelism. Both in terms of its magnitude and 
operationalisation, it acquired bureaucratic characteristics (Mavrokordatos, 1997, pp.17-18). It 
involved, in PASOK’s first term of 1983-89, employee growth of 30-50 %, in such key 
corporations as NBG, Greece’s leading commercial bank, and DEI, the electricity utility, and an 
overall expansion of the wider public sector from 500,000 in 1980 to 900,000 in 1989 (Kalyvas, 
1997). This bureaucratic clientelism was operationalised mostly through the suspension of 
competitive entrance examinations and the parcelling out of clintelistic hirings between the party 
organisation, PASOK’s members of parliament and PASKE, PASOK’s trade union organisation 
(PASKE represents the PASOK affiliated factions in Greece’s major trade unions where 
competing tickets, in trade union elections, come with party affiliations). It was no surprise that 
89 % of those who joined PASOK since 1981, when PASOK was first elected government, were 
employed by the state sector (Kalyvas, 1997).
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The mobilisation through systematised, bureaucratic clientelism was ensconced in PASOK’s 
world view. It was legitimised by the widespread perception of decades-long socio-economic 
exclusion of the left from the authoritarian governments of the right. It spoke, in the case of 
strategic SOE’s, of serving the ‘the national interest and the social whole’ (Papoulias and 
Lioukas, 1995, p.278), integrating SOE’s in the wider struggle against Greece’s domestic 
political and economic elite and its Western patrons.
Trade unionists, and in general employees in SOE’s and SCB’s, were natural subscribers to 
PASOK’s world view. PASOK’s stand-offish attitude towards the EC and the soft budget 
constraints that it legitimised accommodated their own claims on the public purse. Anti- 
Americanism, mediated through friction with Turkey, gave to their political patron, PASOK, the 
advantage over the ND party, still burdened by association with the dictatorship’s disastrous 
tenure (Voulgaris, 2001). Furthermore, within the trade union movement, this world view was 
also historically informed, as the previous battles for associational rights were stymied by 
Greece’s US-sponsored, post World War II circumscribed democracy and subsequently by the 
dictatorship. In the 1950’s and the 1960’s legitimate trade union demands, particularly in the 
state-owned utilities and the banks, were met, by Greece’s authoritarian right wing governments, 
with repression and the charge of communist incitement. Consequently, trade unionists, 
radicalised, channelled their specific grievances and expectations to the wider opposition to the 
post World War II authoritarian state, adding their voices to the demand for democratisation and 
the abolition of the Greek monarchy. Thus, when the dictatorship fell in 1974, the trade union 
movement was already inculcated to align its associational advocacy with the world view that 
had historically legitimated and enabled the exercise of this advocacy (Seferiadis, 1998, pp.25- 
27).
Political clients, also needed this world view themselves to justify and exalt their client status 
(Diamanturos, 1994, pp.39-40; Pantazopoulos, 2001). As redress for past injustices, inflicted by 
a suborned by foreigners oligarchy, as the long-delayed ownership of the country and its key 
assets by its own majority, this world view justified opposition to a series of measures ranging 
from fiscal stabilisation to depoliticised meritocracy, and indeed technocracy, in the 
management of SOE’s and SCB’s.
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Not surprisingly trade unions at SOE’s and SCB’s took the lead in breaking PASOK’s first 
stabilisation program by the party’s leading pro-European politician, the then minister of 
National Economy, Costas Simitis in 1988. They then contributed to the shortening of the ND 
tenure, in 1991-1993, under the reaction that the latter’s effort to privatise OTE, the telecom 
monopoly, caused. In the OTE case, the threat of trade union rights were conflated with the 
compromise of national interest, were OTE to fall under foreign ownership, encapsulating the 
consensus that PASOK had forged with nationally-defined social actors. Such actions escaped 
the confines of the economic domain and postponed Greece’s evolution as an orthodox 
participant in Europe and in wider internationalisation processes. Essentially trade unions at 
SOE’s and SCB’s, by forming a large part of the socioeconomic backbone of the so-called 
‘patriotic PASOK’, not only transmitted their material-distributionist preferences to the party’s 
leadership; they also helped keep alive the ideational framework that legitimised these 
preferences and informed Greece’s comportment as an international actor.
3.1mpact on Foreign Policy
Foreign policy and defence analysts (Couloumbis, 1993; Coufoudakis,1993; Iatrides, 1993) have 
noted that PASOK’s first nine years in power (1981-1989) did not essentially overturn Greece’s 
commitments and priorities set before its ascend to rule by the first democratic government, after 
1974, of the centre-right New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia-ND). Greece, after all, under 
PASOK, remained a member of NATO and the EC and followed a policy of deterrence vis a vis 
Turkey while avoiding outright military conflict.
Nonetheless, the conduct of the two first PASOK governments internationally, even at the 
rhetorical and declaratory level, had real and substantive enough effects. It delayed 
familiarisation of the party and state policy apparatus with the EC and potentially like-minded 
European political forces (Vemey, 1993). Indicatively, the first PASOK government officially 
confirmed that Greece will, after all, remain in the EC only at the end of its first tenure, in 1985 
(PASOK had opposed the ND-led accession of Greece to the EC while in opposition). PASOK 
itself joined the Confederation of Socialist Parties at the end of its second tenure, in 1989, and 
only applied to join the Socialist International the same year.
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Furthermore, it can be argued that the country’s spoiler role in NATO, and insufficient 
socialisation and limited credibility within the EU, entrenched by this backlash coalition, and 
serving its own strategic interests, domestically, further exacerbated the country’s response to the 
momentous events which followed in the wake of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989. 
Greece dealt with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the resulting creation of an independent 
Republic of Macedonia, distrustful of its key allies. Greece, not only did it overreact, but it 
lacked the depth of policy linkages, and ideological affinity, with leading actors in Europe -  and 
those actors, in turn, lacked legitimacy within Greece -so that it could negotiate a reasonably 
smooth and rapid climb-down from the impossible position it got itself in, in its relationship with 
the Republic of Macedonia. Last but not least, this position not only damaged its international 
prestige but also its own supreme goal of regional stability.
The Internationalist Coalition ’s Nationalism
l.EMU and SOE’s & SCB’s
Pagoulatos (2004, pp.65-66) has analysed how by the late 1980’s PASOK’s exceptionalism came 
to be eroded by a confluence of factors. EU conditionality, in its transfer of funds, was being 
strengthened while the promise that PASOK introduced in the public domain was increasingly 
tarnished by corruption scandals and the general underperformance of its policy choices, be they 
industrial enterprises controlled by the state, state-owned banks or agricultural cooperatives set 
up to compete with private commodity merchants. Anti-westemism was also an increasingly 
spent force. Fifteen years after the fall of the dictatorship, ten years after joining the EU and 
being the beneficiaries of its largesse, and sustained exposure of Greece’s policy and political 
elites to Brussels neutralised the hostility of earlier years.
The arrival of the EMU project thus found the country ready to renew its vows with Europe. 
Fiscal adjustment would have to be undertaken regardless of Greece’s perilous macroeconomic 
imbalances. Paradoxically the country’s weakness strengthened its need to secure its European 
vocation precisely at a time when this vocation acquired, through the EMU process, an altogether 
much greater scope. EU membership had now become such a constant that relegation to a 
second tier, which would have been made brutally clear by failure to enter into the EMU, became 
intolerable (Karzis, 2006, pp.88-89). And the process and costs of adjustment, necessary for
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EMU accession, came with the promise of ‘convergence’ in the wider sense, of Greece coming 
closer to European levels of wealth and standards of living.
There is also a consensus, by Greek political economists, that the decision by the Greek 
government to pursue EMU entry was also spurred by wider foreign policy and security 
considerations as well as identity ones (Tsakalotos, 1998, p. 133; Kazakos, 2004, p.906). EMU 
accession was seen as a reaffirmation of the country’s standing as an EC member, itself a status 
associated with the need to counterbalance Turkey’s greater size and leverage vis a vis the 
United States.
In addition, entry into the EMU was seen as rendering credible, internally and externally, 
Greece’s status as a member of the EU in the wider region of the Balkans, after intractable 
disputes with neighbours such as the Republic of Macedonia: as ‘a European country in the 
Balkans rather than a Balkan country in Europe’ (Simitis, 2005, pp.34, 39-40).
Thus the EMU effort grounded PM Simitis’s formulation of a ‘strong Greece’, the formulation 
with which his tenure has been most strongly identified (and contested), on these multiple fronts, 
relating to economic, identity and security & international prestige issues (Spourdalakis and 
Tassis, 2006, p.504).
The most crucial and tangible corollary of the EMU entry process, for our purposes, was the 
need to raise revenue through the sale of state-owned participations in the capital markets and the 
concurrent decision to let go of state control, albeit gradually, of the banking sector. The then 
telecom monopoly’s, OTE, initial and secondary public offerings (IPO’s and SPO’S) provided 
depth to the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), generating interest in Greek equities from foreign 
portfolio investors and spreading share ownership in Greece itself (Spanos and Papoulias, 2005, 
p. 19). The management of NBG, appointed by PM Simitis, and mandated by him to restructure 
the bank, started disposing of its industrial participations and cleaned up its balance sheet, 
actions which signalled to domestic and international investors that the government will stick to 
its commitments (Pagoulatos, 2006).
The initial motive, behind the disposal of state assets or the sale of non-controlling shareholdings 
through IPO’s and SPO’s, was mainly the raising of revenue in the least painless way, in order to
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fulfill the EMU’s Maastricht criteria, the alternatives being the raising of taxes and/or cuts in 
expenditure (Pagoulatos, 2005, p.360). But such was the breadth and scope of the growth of the 
capital market that it ended up being core to the governing party’s strategy and its legitimation.
The recognition of the Government’s reform efforts by international investors, the inclusion of 
an ever wider swathe of Greece’s state owned and private corporations through capital markets, 
the generation of capital gains by an increasing number of Greek investors, led to the 
government’s incorporation of capital market growth in its overall normative framework: of a 
strong Greece, increasingly capable of converging with Europe, on its way to EMU accession. 
Indeed, international investors themselves directed flows to Greek equities on the basis of the so- 
called ‘convergence scenario’, of the Greek economy and its leading corporations achieving 
sustainable growth due to EMU-anchored policy framework.
Cumulatively this led to the stock exchange being the ‘pace setter of economic activity’20, 
replacing the preeminence enjoyed by the state, previously, by its direct credit and monetary 
actions. A growing ASE also created a decisive political constituency in favour of market 
liberalization, composed of capital holders and the well-educated and highly skilled, who could 
expect satisfactory returns from their investment in money and labor in Greece’s liberalized 
markets (Pagoulatos, 2003a). Thus corporate imperatives were aligned, through capital market 
growth, with national direction, as notions of profitability and shareholder value became 
incorporated in this wider EMU accession effort.
Once the internationalization of Greece’s major corporations gathered pace, as we will see 
below, this also meant that notions of national strength and purpose shifted from EU specific 
processes, premised on state policy, to market actors projecting their power in Greece’s 
surrounding region and further afield.
2. Corporate Restructuring and Internationalisation
Two of Greece’s largest state-controlled corporations, OTE and NBG, became leading investors 
in the regional markets of the Balkans. As per Goldstein’s (2007, pp. 67-73) sequential schema,
20 Pagoulatos, G., 2003a. Greece’s New Political Economy-State Finance and Growth from Post War to EMU. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 170.
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their market restructuring and /or equitisation facilitated the internationalization of their 
activities. Both NBG and OTE participated in privatizations undertaken by the transition states 
of the Balkans while also exporting in these countries the know-how acquired within their own 
home-based liberalized environment: most prominently mobile telephony in the case of OTE and 
retail banking in the case of NBG.
Importantly privately-owned corporations asserted themselves in regional markets, taking 
advantage of the same market liberalisation measures that benefited NBG and OTE and the 
capital market deepening that emerged due to the IPO’s and SPO’s initiated by the Greek state. 
Furthermore their capital market listings, their increasingly managerial culture and the widely- 
known brands that they had created, put them in the public domain, their corporate trajectories 
shared and acknowledged by an expanding circle of constituencies.
Greek FDI achieved second or third place in all key Balkan markets. This leadership has been 
mediated not only in the aggregate, in Greek public discourse, through quarterly, biannual and 
annual statistical results, but in almost daily announcements, in the Greek financial press, for 
over ten years, regarding FDI related decisions by Greek corporations (which must report them if 
they are listed at ASE). It has also been diffused in Greek society by the direct experiences, in 
the region, of thousands of Greek managers and entrepreneurs (approximately 10,000 managers 
have been estimated to be involved directly in operations of the more than 3,000 Greek firms 
active in the Balkans, most travelling and living there on a part times basis, out of which 3,000 
are permanently based21).
In the period under consideration, global capital flows, particularly in equity markets, also have 
been increasingly prominent, in the case of Greece. The ratio of foreign ownership to ASE’s 
total market capitalisation rose from 31.3 % in 2003 to 46.7 % in 2006, mostly concentrated at 
FT/ASE 20 shareholdings, Greece’s most significant corporations. Typically foreign 
institutional investors got to own more than 30 % of the stock of Greece’s big four banks, which
21 Pouleres, G.,2008. The 3,000 Greek managers in the Balkans, TA NEA, 6-7 September.
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is also indicative of their importance in their approval of the regional strategy of Greece’s 
financial sector.
In particular, from around 2001 onwards, the cumulative Greek FDI in the Balkans, together 
with the prospect of EU entry by the countries of the region, gave another strong reason for 
global investors to direct flows to Greece’s key corporations, and most prominently in Greek 
financial sector stocks. Greece’s four major banks, NBG, Eurobank, Alpha and Piraeus, had 
acquired, according to the international investment banks which would broker and promote these 
investment flows, sustainable market leadership in what was seen as a high-growth region 
(indicatively, O’Brien and Holle, 2004; Vinci, Santoni and Lanz, 2005; Tucker, 2006). In a 
feedback loop, the availability of capital, on the basis of sustainable profitability secured by 
regional expansion, further propelled Greek corporations to propagate and execute regional 
strategies of increasing magnitude and scope. Especially Greek banks communicated to the 
investment public in Greece and abroad, mostly in the City of London, business plans in 
unprecedented detail and ambitious scope, matching and reinforcing the expectations of global 
investors and international investment banks (see Alpha Bank, 2006; Eurobank, 2005; National 
Bank of Greece, 2005, 2007). The Greek business press has extensively reported both the 
articulation and implementation of these business strategies22 and the approval that they have 
received by international financial institutions and media, the latter also being advertised by the 
Greek banks themselves . Thus, this most stereotypical feature of globalization, international 
portfolio capital flows, both strengthened Greek corporate internationalization and provided 
external confirmation of its primacy in the region, particularly so in the case of Greek financial 
institutions.
22 The sampling of the following articles, and their titles, is indicative of the boosterism with which the Greek press 
has dealt with banks’ expansion in the Balkans: Liamis, L., 2005. Banking War...for the Balkans, Imerisia, 28 
April; Ziotis, Ch., 2005. Romanian Euphoria in Sophocleous, Eleftherotypia, 27 October; Papageorgiou, G.H.,
2005. New Field of Glory for the banks in North Africa and the Middle East, Eleftherotypia, 6 November; Ioannou, 
Ch., 2005. National: Balkan profits with Greek recipe! Eleftherotypia, 10 July; Konstas, Ch., 2006. Greek Banking 
sweeps the Balkans, O Kosmos tou Ependyti, 9-10 December; Pefanis, D. & Kanellopoulos, G, 2006. The Turkish 
Dream of the Greek bankers, TA NEA, 2 December.
23 euro2day, 2006. Support’ for Greek banks by Citigroup. 24 April; Imerisia, 2007. Dresdner:Greek banks are a 
’’Defensive, growth story’’. 6 September; euro2day, Businessweek: National represents value!, 18 July; Imerisia,
2006. A wave of reports for the banks. 2 March; euro2day, 2007. UBS: The prospects of Greek banks are brilliant. 
6 July.
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3. The Ministry of Finance and Corporate Internationalisation
As it was mentioned above the initial imperative of SOE and SCB modernisation was that of 
repairing Greece’s fiscal position, the latter goal becoming integral to Greece’s EMU accession 
strategy. This policy, first initiated by a weak ND government, in the early 1990’s, met 
significant constrains due to intra-govemmental opposition fuelled by the rising political costs of 
the exercise (Pagoulatos, 2002, p. 140). As the EMU accession process picked up speed, 
however, following the assumption of the premiership by Costas Simitis, in 1996, obstacles 
begun to fall by the wayside. The overwhelming legitimacy that this effort commanded made 
politically more acceptable, both to trade unions and ministers overseeing SOE’s and SCB’s, the 
privatisation and equitisations now undertaken by the PASOK government (Tsoukas and 
Papulias, 2005, p.86; Interview 5). The gradualist and pragmatic orientation of this approach -  
emphasizing retention of ultimate state control, or leaving the issue of control ambiguous, and 
underlining the continued strategic role of these enterprises, partly a code word for predictable 
relations between employees and other stakeholders -  enabled PASOK to proceed without 
rupturing its relations with the trade unions.
As importantly, the growth in capital markets that the government’s privatisation and 
equitisation programme facilitated, together with the societal legitimation that it engendered, 
increased the leverage of the MF over other Ministries, who were the direct ‘owners’ of these 
corporations and subsequently led them to share in the agenda of the MF.
While it has been noted above that the EMU factor has been decisive in reconciling trade unions
and government Ministers and ruling party factions, at PASOK, to redefined governance
arrangements at SOE’s and SCB’s this has not always been sufficient. Where market interest
was absent, for sector-specific reasons, as in the case of the Olympic Airlines, what has been
observed is governmental inability to impose corporate restructuring, unaltered industrial
relations and limited involvement of the MF in the related privatization efforts, led by the
Ministry of Transport -  and this despite the joint will of the European Commission and the
Greek Government to impose change at Olympic Airlines (Featherstone and Papadimitriou,
2007). A persistent loss maker, engaged in a much more problematic service sector than say
finance, or telecoms, the IPOs and SPOs of which launched ASE’s new era, Olympic Airlines
could not access funds from the capital markets and could only with difficulty attract strategic
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investors. As a result management and government lacked the material incentives to co-opt, 
cajole or marginalise recalcitrant trade unions. By means of contrast, the privatisation of Ionian 
Bank, in itself a catalyst for the Government’s privatisation program, and the ongoing 
restructuring of National Bank of Greece, were decisively helped by their growing share prices, 
as agreements had been struck for employees to acquire generous helpings of share options 
(Interviews 1,2,3 and 5). In effect, absent globalisation Greece failed to implement
Europeanisation, in terms of SOE restructuring.
In effect the Minister of Finance, by steering the restructuring of those SOE’s and SCB’s that 
could be transformed into profit-seeking market actors, presided over a transformed 
distributional model. His predecessors, as we mentioned above, and their Ministerial colleagues, 
with responsibilities over SOE’s and SCB’s, would, through directed lending to favourable 
constituencies and clientelistic hires, boost their personal powers of patronage and collectively 
those of their party. Subsequently, the Minister would give up on the power and tools of 
patronage so that emancipated managements, at SOE’s and SCB’s, could restructure corporate 
operations and clean up corporate balance sheets. In exchange, these efforts would sustain a 
capital markets boom which would both facilitate Greece’s EMU entry strategy, with enhanced 
fiscal proceeds, and expand the constituency of managers, capital holders but also employees, in 
favour of the government. Indicative of the distributional force of this model is that in 1985, at 
the height of PASOK’s statism and clientelistic populism, the capitalisation of ASE accounted 
only for 2 % of Greek GDP whereas by 2000 it had reached 85 % of Greek GDP.
The Minister of Finance, throughout the period under consideration, managed and negotiated the 
external restraints, as they related to corporate governance, on the premise of which portfolio 
inflows were generated (Pagoulatos, 2005, pp.365-366). This exercise was liable to get upset due 
to ongoing clientelistic pressures, overreach on the part of ambitious managements, with regard 
to how much change trade unions would tolerate, and factionalist battles, at the Cabinet level, for 
influence, spilling over onto the SOE and SCB domain. On the other hand, the Minister would 
have to take into account managerial imperatives, at key SOE’s and SCB’s, in terms of accessing 
the capital markets and formulating and executing corporate strategies, supported by the latter. 
His became a balancing act which at its most successful would synthesize the following roles: as
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the capital markets cheerleader, domestically and abroad, in effect the nearest government 
catalyst of capital inflows to an increasingly extrovert national economy, and as the lead 
manager, on behalf of the government, of the mutually reinforcing alliance between corporate 
chieftains, managers and capital holders, the business press and the ruling party (Karakousis, 
2006, pp.320-324). The only distinction, between the way this role was managed by PASOK 
Ministers and their ND successor, albeit an important one as we will see below, would be the one 
centred on the role of the trade unions.
More specifically, the Minister of Finance took the role of green-lighting both corporate 
consolidation and international expansion. This was a symbiotically concurrent step in terms of 
value creation that would benefit the Greek state, rising valuations of listed SOE and SCB stock 
which would benefit the government and continuous norm embeddedness that would consolidate 
the ruling party’s hegemony. It was also integral to the exercise of managerial autonomy 
particularly at the time when capital markets rewarded both consolidation and 
internationalisation with higher capitalisations at ASE.
Prominent examples of this function were NBG’s consolidation with its mortgage bank 
subsidiary, which spurred mortgage lending in Greece, the acquisition of Macedonian Thrace 
bank by Piraeus Bank, where NBG held a controlling stake, the acquisitions of the state-owned 
Bank of Crete and Ionian Bank by the privately controlled Piraeus and Eurobank respectively, 
the merger between the state-owned Hellenic Petroleum with the privately owned Petrola, the 
green-lighting of the merger between Alpha Bank with NBG (ultimately failed due to 
shareholding and management opposition) and the acquisition of the Turkish Finansbank by 
NBG (Pagoluatos, 205, pp. 374-375). These corporate transactions accompanied the tenure of 
three Ministers of Finance, namely Papantoniou, Hristodoulakis and Alogoskoufis, across a ten 
year period, during four electoral mandates, two for each of Greece’s ruling parties, PASOK and 
ND. Progressively the Minister of Finance’s role, as overseer of corporate consolidation and 
internationalisation, would assume ever greater material impact, as it would first encompass 
market leadership at the home market, and subsequently leadership within the ever expanding 
regional frontier where Greek corporations internationalised, reaching its peak point with the 
acquisition of Finansbank by NBG. Greek international expansion, as we will see in detail
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through the examination of NBG’s trajectory in the next chapter, together with consolidation, 
would boost the capitalisation of ASE listed firms, would strengthen them against foreign 
predation, liable to upset delicate relations between the government and trade unions, and would 
also enable the government to claim ‘ownership’ for a Greece that was increasingly influential 
internationally due to the leading position that its key corporations had assumed in the region.
Bureaucratic Competition and Historisation
1.MF and MFA: Bureaucratic Competition
The arrival of the Simitis government, infused by its strategic purpose for Greece to become a 
member of the eurozone, and to be rehabilitated as a constructive EU member country, in all its 
facets, and certainly in its foreign policy conduct, coincided with increasing awareness, within 
Greece itself, of the commercial prominence achieved by its business community in the Balkans. 
In fact even before Simitis’s arrival on the scene, Greece had initiated a policy of normalisation 
of relations in its surrounding region. The Interim Agreement with the Republic of Macedonia, 
which lifted the Greek trade embargo, in 1995, and the agreement to open an additional two 
border crossings with Bulgaria, in the same year, previously stalled for security reasons, both 
underlined this shift which was informed by the country’s beneficial economic interdependence 
with its neighbours (Walden, 1999, pp. 94-95, 115).
By the mid-1990’s the post-1989 transition dust had settled, Greece had become a leading 
exporter in the region while also starting to undertake meaningful FDI activities in the region. 
Sustained and rising export volumes impressed the fact that the Greek economic presence in the 
region was no flash in the pan and that Greece had much to gain economically by its growing 
internationalisation. This realisation, in turn, disseminated to the wider public the perception of 
the region as Greece’s long-lost and now recovered economic hinterland (Tsardaninis and 
Karafotakis, 2000, p.4; Tsardanidis and Houliaras, 2006, p.472) no doubt alerting policy makers 
to the growing political benefits, party and personal, of being seen to facilitate Greek commercial 
interests in the region.
Beginning in 1993, at the initiative of then Alternate Minister of the MF Papantoniou, the
Secretariat of International Relations, an MF division, started pondering initiatives that would
enable the MF and its political leadership to be seen to be supportive of Greek commercial
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interests abroad (Tsardanidis and Houliaras, 2005, p.36; Interview 7). Two years later, in 1995, 
and subsequent to a meeting between then Minister of the MFA Papoulias and Greek 
businessmen, hosted on the initiative of then Commercial Bank of Greece Chairman Poulis, the 
MFA commenced the organisational effort necessary to support the activities of the Greek 
business community in the region (Interview 6). The initial outcome of this effort was to 
delegate to Greek ambassadors responsibility, at their countries of residence, for the domains of 
infrastructure, energy, banking and telecommunications, to the extent that in these domains 
Greek corporations would be capable and interested in playing a role. Commercial attaches 
under that scheme were to be left to manage the ordinary, recurrent bilateral economic 
relationships, mostly trade related. Not surprisingly the MFA’s above mentioned initiative 
provoked the immediate reaction of the MF’s Secretariat of International Relations, as an 
unwelcome intrusion in a well-established MF policy domain (Interview 6).
Subsequently under Alternate Minister of the MFA G.A. Papandreou’s initiative, who subscribed 
to the notion that Greece should take an expanded perception of itself in the world and embrace 
its responsibilities, as a moderately affluent EU member country, Greece started developing its 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. By 1997 Greece, as a result of his efforts, 
committed to OECD to dedicate 0,1 of its GDP to international aid. In effect Greek regional 
economic performance both legitimised domestically the provision of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) while enabling the Greek government to present Greece, on the basis of both 
private entrepreneurship and ODA, as a force of stability and prosperity in regional affairs.
Indicatively the first ODA initiative, the rebuilding of a war damaged hospital in Sarajevo’s 
Muslim’s district, was chosen so as to underline that Greece would no longer be indentified with 
Serbia’s Milosevic regime in the region (interview 6). The Greek government also successfully 
lobbied for the location of the Organisation of Balkan Reconstruction to be located in 
Thessaloniki, Greece’s second largest city, which harboured ambitions of reanimating its 
commercial leadership of old in the Balkans. Cumulatively the newly bom Greek ODA and the 
hosting of EU-led reconstruction activities in the Western Balkans, aligned Greece with EU and 
NATO stabilisation and normalisation priorities in the region. These initiatives, undertaken 
under MFA leadership, bear evidence of the Greek government’s wider international strategic
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direction and, in particular, its determination to closely align itself with its key European 
partners.
The climactic battle between the MF and MFA entailed which one of the ministries would 
assume responsibility for the management of Greece’s reconstruction funds in the region, which 
were budgeted to be 550 million euros to be deployed from 2003-2007, according to the 
legislation that was eventually passed into law in 2002. The budgeted funds were allocated 
within the framework of ESOAV (which stands for the Hellenic Plan for the Reconstruction of 
the Balkans) which was actually designed by MF personnel on MF’s initiative. Ironically this 
MF initiative was not only hijacked by the MFA but it also became the Trojan horse through 
which the MFA acquired the network of commercial attaches from the MF, the argument being 
that a vertical chain of command that would incorporate both the Ambassador and the 
Commercial attache, under the ultimate supervision of the MFA, would provide for greater 
policy coherence and efficient implementation of the ESOAV (Interviews 5, 6, 7).
Ultimately this battle was decided on MFA’s favour with PM Simitis himself deciding that it 
should manage ESOAV and that, furthermore, commercial attaches up until then employed by 
the MF would be transferred to the MFA. Importantly then Minister of the MF Papantoniou did 
not actively engage in this battle but rather left his Deputy Minister to fight it on his own. The 
outcome, and this relative lack of engagement at the very top of the MF, is explained by the fact 
that the MF simply had more important fish to fry -  both in policy terms and in terms of the 
political priorities of its Ministerial head (Interview 5). As we described above the MF was 
deeply engaged, and exercised a formative influence over the substance of the process of 
corporate modernisation in Greece and subsequently corporate internationalisation. As such it 
was party to billions of euros of SPO’s and equitisations and mergers and acquisitions and to the 
ebbs and flows of international capital to Greece’s corporate sector through the capital market. 
In the end a half billion euro aid program, to be channelled through administrative measures to 
Greek corporations active in the Balkans, over a four year period, 2003-2007, was a rather 
insignificant activity from the MF, harking back to its pre-market liberalisation role as the 
distributor of subsidies to Greek firms. Indicatively, none of Mr Papantoniou’s successors at the
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MF, either at PASOK or at ND, sought to claw back or duplicate the policy domain that he so 
easily gave up.
For our purposes, what is of importance is that by 2001 the MFA had acquired, in the network 
of commercial attaches and in the management of ESOAV, an important institutional 
commitment to the advancement of Greek commercial interests in the region. It had also been 
associated, as a Ministry and through its Minister of the day, through these commitments, with 
particular perspective of Greek interests in the region, contoured by Greek commercial activity 
and Greek ODA.
2. MFA and MF: Conceptual Convergence around the Core & Periphery Axis
Already by 2000 not only Greek exports but also Greek FDI were increasingly assumed, by 
Greek observers, and the wider public, to have acquired a leading and sustainable position in the 
Balkans (Walden, 2004, p. 141). By 2004, when ND had won the general elections, Greece’s 
four major banks had acquired a leading presence in the Balkans and Greek FDI had reached top- 
5 rank in all the countries of the region. Furthermore, the global rise in the value of 
commodities and the growth of China, led Greek shipping in one of its most spectacular upward 
cycles. Thus it is not surprising that the ND government, while ridiculing PASOK’s claims of a 
‘powerful Greece’, by controversially casting doubt on Greek statistical and other 
macroeconomic reporting, that made possible Greece’s entry into the EMU, adopted the very 
similar theme of an ‘extrovert and gateway Greece’ (for a typical presentation of this 
proposition, on the notion of extroversion being core to Greece’s international identity see 
General Secretariat of Communication, 2006, and Livadas, 2007, while it is worth noting that 
G.A.Papandreou, his less Greek-centric approach on international aid notwithstanding, also 
presented Greece as an interface between global capital flows and the region, see Papandreou, 
2001).
Henceforth, both ND’s foreign and economic ministers would stress this ‘banks and ships’ motif, 
of an extrovert Greece, the economy of which is a global leader in maritime transport and a 
regional leader in finance. This outlook assumed by the ND government also bears testimony 
to the extension of the preferences, adopted by middle and upper income segments in favour of 
market liberalisation (Pagoulatos, 2003), to include this process’s international aspect. This
82
preference in effect anchored both PASOK and ND around the same outlook - indeed PASOK, 
while in opposition, as we will examine in greater detail in the following chapter, shared in the 
notion that Greek regional economic leadership is of strategic significance to Greece.
Minister of MFA Bakoyianni, a contender for the leadership of the governing ND party who 
assumed office at the MFA in 2006, has used the MFA economic diplomacy instruments, that we 
examined above, to connect herself to Greece’s business community. She would emphasize that 
as Minister of MFA she is not only dealing with issues of ‘national’ significance (i.e. high 
politics), but of distant importance to Greece’s business community, but rather she is an effective 
advocate of their objectives and that, in this capacity, her Ministry would now qualifies as a 
‘productive’ one (Bakoyianni, 2007a, in Greek political parlance a ‘paragogiko’ productive 
ministry means one with a role in economic life, such as that of MF, Ministry of Development 
etc). As a knowledgeable insider has noted Mrs Bakoyianni has been exceptional, in her 
Ministerial capacity, in her understanding both of the policy and the political importance of 
instruments of economic diplomacy (Interview 6).
Minister Bakoyianni has also further developed the policy instruments of economic diplomacy, 
for instance by deciding, in the revamped MFA personnel organisation structure that she 
introduced, that all newly hired diplomats must first serve under a commercial attache office, and 
has identified herself with the policy to an unprecedented degree (Bakoyianni, 2008). As we 
have noted above this approach of hers has been coterminous with what might be seen in 
retrospect as the apogee of Greek corporate internationalisation, and certainly during a period of 
continuous and frenetic corporate internationalisation (the 2008 worldwide financial crisis has 
negatively affected both Greek banking operations in the Balkans and Greek shipping).
It is also illuminating that while ODA remained as a policy of the MFA it was with economic 
diplomacy that Minister Bakoyianni has chosen to most closely associate herself. It is economic 
diplomacy that has been seen by the Greek press as her signature policy24 . Typically, the 
promotion of economic diplomacy, and through it of Minister Bakoyianni herself, has involved
24 Indicatively, Tsiodras, D., 2006. Minister of External Economy, Eleftherotypia, 19 March; Imerisia, Emphasis in 
Economic Diplomacy. 10 January; Bourdaras, G.S.,2007. The new goals of Economic Diplomacy, Kathimerini, 20 
January.
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high impact presentations in impressive venues in Athens and Thessaloniki with businessmen, 
ND MP’s and prefects, in attendance and in coordination with such leading employers 
associations as the Associations of Greek Industries or the Association of Greek exporters25.
This emphasis on the promotion of the more narrowly defined Greek commercial interests in the 
region, and by extension of Greek economic preponderance thereof, has also been noted by 
policy analysts and scholars. As an observer of Greek ODA has argued, the more Greek ODA 
becomes disengaged from the region where Greek economic interests have developed, not least 
due to the fact that Balkan countries no longer qualify for assistance due to their EU accession 
status, the less politically compelling ODA becomes for Greek policy makers (Gropas, 2008, 
p. 12). Additionally, it has been posited that Greek foreign economic policy in the region, in 
spirit and in content, actually (i) reflects and reproduces the notion of Greek economic primacy 
rather than incorporating a holistic, sophisticated perspective of the region’s needs and pursuing 
a set of policies of manifestly mutual benefit and (ii) has a commensurably bilateral focus rather 
than being informed by EU policies, such as those of the Lisbon Treaty, for which Greece could 
provide leadership (Monastiriotis and Tsamis, 2007, pp. 19-23).
These critical observations must be placed in the context of the convergence between the MF and 
MFA in their joint presentation of Greece, internally and externally, as an interface of an ever 
more ambitious, in geographic and population terms, domain. At both ministries the political 
leadership would ask Greece’s ambassadorial corps to disseminate this role of Greece to external 
audiences as a matter of official policy (see Alogoskoufis, 2006; Stylianidis, 2006) while also 
doing so themselves. The same policy makers would expand the limits of Greece’s core region, 
starting with a population of 70 million (Greece and the Balkans), moving to 120-160 million 
(Greece, the Balkans and Turkey, Alogoskoufis, 2005; Sakellaris, 2005) and ultimately resting at 
a 250 million-strong region (Greece, Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East)26.
Such claims might seem outlandish but they actually reflected, in the period under 
consideration, global liquidity conditions that underpinned Greek corporate internationalisation,
25 Palikaris, E.,2008. Demonstration of Political Power in Thessaloniki-Dora returns to ...Greece, Imerisia, 19-20 
April.
26 Kathimerini,2007. G. Alogoskoufis: “Greece is the economic and business centre of South East Europe”. 29 
January.
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with Greek corporations accessing first flows from the West (Europe and North America) and 
subsequently from the Middle East to finance their regional gambit. Indicatively NBG engaged 
in a capital raise of 3 billion euros, the largest ever for a Greek corporation, to complete its 
acquisition of Finansbank in Turkey, only to be overtaken by Marfin Group which completed a 
capital raise of 5.2 billion euros, mostly sourced from Middle Eastern investors and Greek ship­
owners, with the explicit mandate to acquire assets in Greece and the region, which it proceeded 
to do so27.
As we noted this periphery extension also included Turkey, as an economic entity equal to the 
rest of the Balkans and as a country which was increasingly becoming a recipient of Greek 
exports and FDI (Stylianidis, 2006; Skylakakis, 2006; Bakoyianni: 2007b). Minister 
Bakoyianni’s quick embrace of this position occurred despite the fact that the Finansbank 
acquisition was decided prior to her assumption of duties and without her knowledge and of 
course consent (Interviews 2, 6).
In sum, Greek policy makers, in the period under consideration, embraced a process of corporate 
internationalisation of significant scope, compatible with Greek comparative advantages in the 
region and financed, to a significant degree, by international providers of capital. Furthermore, 
this process was a hierarchical one in terms of Greece’s corporations substantiating a core 
periphery relationship. While the hierarchical nature of Greek corporate internationalisation was 
integrated by Greek policy makers as a positional good, in their interactions with domestic, 
international and regional constituencies (i.e. as a good possessed by Greece and not by its 
regional neighbours), this positional good also accepted and incorporated economic 
interdependence with Greece’s main strategic rival, Turkey. Last but not least, as the momentum 
of Greek corporate internationalisation accelerated, the MFA’s political leadership shifted its 
emphasis from ODA, and EU-led reconstruction efforts in the Western Balkans, to economic 
diplomacy, which allowed it to identify itself more visibly with Greek commercial leadership in 
the region.
27 Kerr, S., 2007. Gulf Money not only heading for UK, Financial Times, 21 May; Arnold M. & Hope, K., 2007, 
Marfin enters final stages of 5.2 bn euro share offering, Financial Times, 28 June.
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3. Historising Core Periphery Perspectives
The identification of Greek policy makers with Greek corporate internationalisation has run in 
tandem with the growing visibility of the latter both in actual fact and in public debate. It has 
also been refracted, from the very beginning, through the lenses of Hellenism’s past experience.
The collapse of Soviet Communism, arguably the single most important event that has given 
birth to the globalisation thesis, by opening up regional markets to Greek entrepreneurs and 
corporations, has also converted the Balkans from impenetrable borderlands to a Greek 
hinterland (Huliaras and Tsardanidis, 2006, pp.472-75; Rasku, 2007, p.88). The Balkans as 
hinterland, as a privileged domain for Greek action, is a concept which is naturally linked with 
Greek historicity and its commercial, intellectual and political referents. This historicity is 
informed by Hellenism’s commercial dominance in the Ottoman Empire, its role as a conduit of 
transfiguring concepts for the region such as nationalism, and its status as the first independent 
nation-state to emerge out of the Ottoman Empire under European Great Power sponsorship 
(Ioakimidis, 2007, pp. 17-21). It recognises the strategic role that Greece’s commercial 
Diaspora played in facilitating the ability of Greek political leadership to be attuned to and make 
use of international developments with a bearing in the region (Diamantouros, 1994, pp.25-26). 
It recovers past schemes to escape the conundrum of creating a nation-state smaller than the 
extended geographic space in which the Diaspora has thrived: multinational governance schemes 
ranging from the Balkan confederation hatched by the Greek intellectual and revolutionary Rigas 
Feraios (Ozkirimli and Sofos, 2008, pp. 18-19) to a reformed, democratised Ottoman Empire co­
managed by Greeks and Turks (Veremis, 1989, pp. 143-144).
Is this historisation a well-founded representation of long duree comparative advantages or the
reinvention of an ‘imagined past’? A seminal work on commerce in the Ottoman Empire has
noted how merchant communities of diverse ethnic origin appropriated Greek culture and
language as the most suitable medium of commercial exchange across the liberalised imperial
space (Stoinavovich, 1960, p.291). This appropriation was induced by the presence of the
Greek-speaking Ecumenical Patriarchate, which exercised both religious and part-civil authority
over the Empire’s Eastern Orthodox populations. For the ethnically diverse Orthodox
commercial elites, Hellenisation by providing access to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it enabled
them to advance their commercial interests via political means and ultimately exercise political
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and social power via this alignment. Additionally, Greece’s geography, and in particular its 
access to the sea, has conferred to it a durable advantage, compared to its neighbours, in relating 
and benefiting from economic internationalisation (see Dertilis, 2005, p. 196).
There are therefore, in the case of Greece, diverse ‘grand pasts’ (Rasku, 2007) which can render 
plausible a variety of perspectives in terms of Greece’s interaction with the region. In the case of 
corporate internationalisation the relevant past inheres in past schemes for Greek primacy in the 
region, in scholarly perspectives on Greek commercial primacy and in Greek elite and mass 
opinion which has assimilated this knowledge through inculcation and education. As 
importantly, this past has been transmitted directly, through family history and by living 
memory, as the Greek regional Diaspora was destroyed in the spate of 30-40 years, from the 
1920’s to the 1950’s. If we take the decision-making age cohort, of 40-60 years of age, a fifty 
year old man or woman might well have been raised by grandparents who became refugees in 
late childhood or adolescence and thus bearers of the family record of commercial life in four 
empires and their dependencies: The Hapsburg, the Ottoman, the Russian and the British.
Indicatively, Greece’s leading personalities in the financial sector have situated their own 
strategic choices in this past in all stages of Greek corporate internationalisation, at the initiation 
stage, at its culmination point and at amidst crisis threatening corporate internationalisation with 
retrenchment. The chairman of National Bank of Greece in advance of the implementation of 
the bank’s regional expansion (Karatzas, 1996); his successor while defending in Greek 
parliament his choice of acquiring Finansbank in Turkey (Arapoglou, 2006); and the chairman of 
Alpha Bank when underlying what is at stake, in terms of the maintenance of the Greek banking 
presence in the region, despite the global liquidity crisis that has threatened the viability of that 
presence28. The Greek press has echoed these themes linking the present Greek commercial 
leadership with the past and bringing back into circulation terms, such as that of the Great Idea
28 Kathimerini, 2008. Interview to Kostas Kallitsis-Alpha Bank will be the first to be included in the [bank 
recapitalisation ]  plan. 16 November.
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(i.e. of a Greater Greece, encompassing Asia Minor), that had been thought long buried, after 
Greek territorial expansionism met with military defeat by Kemal Ataturk in 192229.
As this historisation is framed by the assumption of Greek regional leadership it has 
strengthened, through its reanimation, the impression of superiority, even triumphalism over 
neighbours, so much so that Greek opinion makers as well as market actors, have been implored 
to eschew language that is humiliating to Greece’s surrounding nation-states, such as ‘economic 
penetration’; instead, it has been argued that they should see their present role as investors in the 
region as a transient one, ultimately leading to a relationship of political and economic equality, 
not least through accession to the EU of Greece’s neighbours (Valden, 2004, pp. 182-88).
From our perspective the issue at hand is not whether such prescriptive criticisms are valid or 
not. Rather, their significance lies in substantiating that in Greece corporate internationalisation 
has been perceived by a dominant array of groups in nationalist, even triumphantly so, terms. As 
importantly, as the internationalization of Greece’s major corporations gathered pace, this has 
also meant that notions of national strength and purpose have shifted from EU specific processes, 
premised on state policy, such as EMU-entry, and subsequently EU enlargement, to market 
actors projecting their power in Greece’s surrounding region and further afield. Furthermore 
these corporate actors have become historical signifiers that are unique to the Greek nation and 
long predate Greece’s relation with the European Union.
It would be an unrealistic observer who would disregard the influence of similarly historicised 
foreign policy disputes on public culture, and thus on the range of foreign policy choices 
available to policy makers, in any country, let alone Greece. But in the case of corporate 
internationalisation in the Balkans, it is not interstate friction that has been historicised in the 
Greek polity -  but rather regional economic integration and economic interdependence. This 
inherent ability of Greek corporate internationalisation to relate with Greek historicity has also 
made it that more attractive for Greek politicians and policy makers to identify with it.
29 Indicatively, Nikolaou, N., 2006. Hegemony in the Balkans, Kathimerini, 11 November; Giogezas, D., 2006. The 
Bankers and the vision of ‘Greater Greece’, AXIA, 9 December; Konstantaras, N.,2009. The Distant Horizons of the 
Greeks. Kathimerini, 12 April.
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Conclusion
A backlash coalition comprised by PASOK and trade unions in SOE’s and SCB’s ruled Greece 
in the 1980’s, its alliance legitimised by an anti-Westernism which itself was fuelled by defeat by 
Turkey in Cyprus.
The deteriorating credibility of that coalition together with the need for Greece not to undermine 
its increasingly attractive European vocation facilitated Greece’s EMU strategy. The 
implementation of this EMU strategy meant that, for primarily fiscal reasons, key SOE’s and 
SCB’s had to be restructured, listed in capital markets and have their managerial prerogatives 
restored.
The PASOK government that masterminded Greece’s EMU entry fell by accident in a new 
distributional and legitimation model, underwritten by improved corporate performance and the 
inflow of capital flows to the listed stocks of SOE’s, SCB’s and major private corporations. 
This model came to incorporate rising volumes of Greek FDI in the surrounding region, 
including Turkey.
The MF was the key facilitator of the process of corporate modernisation, consolidation and 
internationalization, initially due to its status as a pillar of its EMU strategy and subsequently in 
order to further associate the ruling PASOK party with a boisterous capital market and a 
confident and assertive business class with which a growing segment of Greeks could identify 
with. The MFA also identified with corporate internationalization, in order to underline, together 
with the newly adopted ODA policy, Greece’s constructive role in the stability in the region, and 
increasingly so that it could reinforce the links of its political leadership with Greece’s 
commercial pre-eminence in the region and those critical socio-economic constituencies and 
opinion shapers vested in it.
This elevation by these two key Ministries of corporate internationalization as a strategic goal for 
Greece was accelerated by the way corporate internationalisation has been disseminated in public 
debate and in particular through the incessant reporting of corporate action, especially of listed 
corporations. Furthermore it has been progressively enveloped by a reanimated version of 
Greek historicity that is based on the past commercial performance of Hellenism in the region 
which ended within living memory.
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CHAPTER 4
Introduction
In this chapter we will focus on a single corporation, NBG, and its representative status, as a 
leading corporate actor who has performed key tasks in the past, of wider national and socio­
economic relevance, and is called upon to do so again under a reconfigured Greek political 
economy.
First, we will trace the evolution of NBG’s emblematic status from the statist clientelist to the 
market liberalisation era. We will analyse how the transformation of NBG was based on a 
negotiated alliance between management and trade unionists, sustained by material and 
normative goods that NBG’s altered status, as a market actor, could provide to its employees. 
We will argue that this alliance sustained the links between NBG’s trade union leadership and 
the ruling PASOK party, further embedding PASOK’s shift towards market reforms. We will 
also explore the strategies of key actors -  NBG’s trade union and its management, ruling and 
opposition parties -  during the attempted merger between NBG and Alpha Bank at 2001, one of 
Greece’s leading privately-owned banks. Despite its failure, the merger, as we will see, became 
a template for the concept of the ‘national champion’, a template which framed the strategies and 
interests of important social and political actors. The aborted merger, in that capacity, also 
became the single most important event to signal a re-grounding of the national project, until 
then framed by PASOK’s EMU accession strategy, on Greek corporate internationalisation in the 
region.
Secondly, we will trace the continuities between PASOK and ND, the opposition centre right 
party, which succeeded PASOK in power in 2004, exhibited by the contestation that NBG’s, this 
time successful, acquisition of a Turkish bank, Finansbank, generated. We will establish the 
manner in which NBG’s corporate imperative for international expansion in Turkey was 
integrated in the positions of both the ND government and those of PASOK, aligning both 
Greece’s two major parties behind the resulting economic interdependence with Turkey.
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In the third and concluding section of this chapter, we will trace the extension of Greece’s 
corporate internationalisation from the Balkans to Turkey. We will then examine the credentials 
of the green lighting of the Finansbank acquisition as an inextricably foreign policy decision. 
We will conclude by relating the acquisition to threats and opportunities for Greek foreign policy 
in the region.
“To Change a Company You Need to Change a Country”
1.A State-Political Firm
NBG is Greece’s most historic financial institution, having been established in 1841, only twenty 
years after the break out of the Greek revolution in the Ottoman Empire. Both a commercial 
bank and the bank of issue until 1927, NBG has crystallised each succeeding phase of Greece’s 
political economy (Pagoulatos, 2006, p.482).
In the developmentalist phase of the 1950’s and 1960’s the bank directed lending to Greece’s 
nascent manufacturing sector and to key SOE’s, such as the telephone and energy monopoly, 
entrusted with the modernisation of Greece’s infrastructure. In the 1980’s the bank propped up 
declining enterprises in order to support the then PASOK’s government’s policy of maintaining 
employment at all costs, while also itself being a key agent of the party’s clientelism, through a 
significant expansion of its payroll (Pagoulatos, 2006, p.390). Up until 1995 NBG was also used 
explicitly as an adjunct to the government’s monetary policy, its chairman proudly extolling the 
bank’s role, in his letter to the shareholders, in defending the drachma through its own market 
operations. Throughout each succeeding phase NBG’s top management was politically well- 
connected, or even originated from the summit of the political world. Furthermore, it made use 
of the bank’s superior technical expertise and leadership continuity, relative to the state 
bureaucrats with which it would negotiate, to advance its positions as much as that would be 
possible (Pagoulatos, 2006, p i92)..
Importantly, during PASOK’s first phase, NBG’s trade union SYETE enjoyed symbiotic 
primacy with NBG itself, within PASOK’S statist, clientelist paradigm30. Ex-Presidents of
30 SYETE Presidents, who have run with a PASOK affiliated ticket, since the restoration of democracy in Greece in 
1974, have been mostly in office. From 1978 to 2009, PASOK affiliated tickets, led by 5 altogether individuals,
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SYETE would become Presidents of OTOE, the sectoral banking union and, in an economy 
dominated by small and medium enterprises, the most formidable sectoral trade union. 
Presidents of OTOE would then become PASOK MP’s and members of cabinet. SYETE’s 
bargaining with NBG would also set the tone for the collective bargaining between OTOE and 
the Hellenic Banks Associations and, by extension, have an impact on the government’s national 
incomes policy. NBG’s status, as an adjunct of the government’s monetary management and 
lender to Greece’s loss-making enterprises, was also endorsed by SYETE as NBG’s emblematic 
status justified commensurable claims of SYETE.
Tsoukas and Papoulias (2005) in their examination of the transformation of two Greek SOE’s, 
DEI and OTE, which they term ‘state-political firms’, encapsulate their analysis in the statement 
that to ‘change a company you need to change a country’31. It is a formulation that certainly 
suits NBG, as we have briefly portrayed it above. Corporations that are deserving of such 
description, previous to their transformation, exhibit characteristics such as: ‘closed systems’ 
whereby their employees and management are not accountable to external actors such as 
shareholders and customers; long-established social roles whereby profitability or even 
efficiency are of marginal or even no importance; heavy-handed patronage by the state and 
sustained exposure to clientelistic practices. Conversely, transforming such companies requires: 
extensive changes in their legal status, and in particular their conversion into PLC’s and 
shareholding entities; changes in the regulatory environment that governs their role as market 
actors or even the creation, ad nihilo, of a regulatory environment and, by extension, of a 
competitive market; meritocratic as opposed to politicised selection of personnel and exposure 
to such personnel to clients and their feedback; performance based compensation systems, 
negotiated with management, as opposed to compensation systems that bear greater relation to 
their leverage with the ruling party rather than the performance of the corporation in the market
have led SYETE for 22 out of 28 years. Out of these 5 PASOK affiliated SYETE Presidents: three have gone to 
become Presidents of OTOE, the umbrella union of all bank employees, one has become President of GSEE, the 
umbrella trade union of private sector employees, two have become PASOK MPs and one has also become a 
Minister in a PASOK government (source: SYETE).
31 Tsoukas, H. & Papoulias D.B.. 2005. Managing Third-Order Change: The Case of the Public Power Corporation 
in Greece, Long Range Planning, 38 (1), p. 82.
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place; the articulation of business plans by management, the execution through which the 
transformed company is held accountable to its shareholders.
Such corporate transformation opens up, for Tsoukas and Papulias, what they term as a 
discursive space where the new ‘template’ establishes itself and replaces the old. Such a 
discursive space is delineated by: the creation and/or development of capital markets as the 
EPO’s and SPO’s of these corporations are what deepen previously immature capital markets and 
at the same time reconfigure their status; the enunciation of business plans which define 
transformed corporate missions which are acceptable to a corporation’s shareholders and thus 
confirm the obsolescence of the previous mission; the undertaking of major corporate action, 
such as mergers and acquisitions, which are mediated through capital markets and which 
substantiate radically transformed priorities.
While we share the above insight on the nature of corporate transformation we also want to 
identify those elements that makes this process not only one of binary opposites but also of 
change effectuated through continuity. Lavelle (2004), as we have examined above, emphasised 
how the process of equitisation of SOE’s did not mean that these corporations were liberated 
from the entrenched societal and political assumption that they would continue to play a role of a 
wider import -  an assumption that led governments to continue to be active, albeit indirectly, in 
these corporations contribution to potentially altered but still socially and / or nationally defined 
goals.
What should be the role of the state shorn of direct control of such key corporations? How is the 
purpose of social democratic party as PASOK redefined when the country’s leading 
corporations, on PASOK’s own initiative no less, become accountable to market forces and 
actors? What is to guarantee to trade unions security of employment and adequate 
compensation, when they now have to negotiate with emancipated managements, accountable to 
profit-driven shareholders? How can the ongoing process of corporate transformation, with its 
inevitable impact on capital markets and the wider public, be integrated in PASOK’s own 
political strategy? Responses to these questions would affect the normative identity of a leading 
political party such as PASOK, its strategically significant relationship with trade unions and 
ultimately its viability as a ruling party. By the same token, these responses would also be
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integrated into the strategizing of the management of a corporation such as NBG. NBG 
management, or the management of any corporation like NBG, as it seeks to advance the 
transformed interests of a transformed corporation, would also seek to maintain in a healthy state 
its relationship with the government which appointed it and even seek to strengthen, by its 
actions, this government, the tenure of which is coterminous with its own.
As we saw in the previous chapter NBG together with other SOE’s and SCB’s was integral, from 
the mid-1990’s onwards, to PASOK’s reversal of direction towards market liberalisation, in 
terms of rationalising its group operations, cleaning up its balance sheet and being the flag ship 
of Greece’s resurgent capital markets. This transformation also facilitated NBG’s 
internationalisation in the region where it became the flagship of the Greek business community 
and financial sector. As such, NBG led the process whereby Greece became a constructive 
player in South East Europe and its international influence and prestige became vested in the 
commercial pre-eminence, achieved by key Greek corporations in the region. In the pages below 
we trace how this operational transformation of NBG grounded a redefinition of its nationally 
significant mission not least by carrying with it the bank’s political stakeholders and their 
relational underpinnings: PASOK, SYETE, and the alliance between PASOK and SOE and SCB 
trade unions.
2.Management and Unions under Corporate Restructuring at NBG
Participants agree that NBG’s management, appointed by Prime Minister Simitis almost 
immediately after the assumption of his duties in January 1996, devoted significant time and 
effort to securing peaceful industrial relations while engaging in the restructuring of the bank 
(Interviews 1, 2 and 3). This strategy incorporated in its execution the following: (i) being aware 
of NBG’s main trade union SYETE’s limits in what it could ‘sell’ to its membership and not 
exceeding these limits (ii) granting to SYETE representatives generous access, and the 
opportunity for feedback, to all major corporate restructuring and rationalisation efforts.
Important as this style and manner of management was, it was backed up by extensive benefits, 
material and social, conferred to SYETE’S membership, due to the transformation of NBG under 
benign market conditions. Cumulatively, these benefits actually increased the vote of SYETE’s
94
PASKE faction from 30-35 % to 50-53 % per cent during the tenure of the Karatzas 
administration (SYETE elections take place every three years).
First, NBG’s management granted to all personnel stock options which appreciated significantly 
in the period under consideration. According to SYETE’s ex-leader, the drachma devaluation of 
the PASOK government in 1998, ahead of the EMU entry, created despondency in his PASKE 
ticket, as it coincided with impending SYETE elections (devaluation being considered an anti- 
low and middle income measure due to its effect on consumer prices in a trade deficit country 
like Greece). However, such was the appreciation of NBG stock, that these fears were not only 
disproved but on the contrary, due to the effect of the NBG stock rise in the ‘pocket’ of NBG 
employees, the PASKE ticket actually increased its votes to 53 %. Additionally SYETE’s 
leadership effectively wagered on the stock’s rise by offering, with trade union funds, to buy the 
stock options of any NBG employee who wanted to sell them, thus obtaining massive capital 
gains to employee health and insurance funds -  further boosting the credibility of the leadership.
Secondly, the 35/58 measure (employees getting retired at age 58 after 35 years of service 
instead of age 63, as it was previously the case) backed up by a sweetener (the undertaking of a 
last entry exam, to the bank, open only to employee’s children) consolidated PASKE’s 
dominance in the increasing, numerically, younger cohort of NBG ranks, which saw their 
prospects for faster career advancement dramatically improve32. Not incidentally, this was the 
cohort that, in terms of market friendly ethos and skills, was to replace the politicised, low 
skilled appointees of PASOK’s earlier clientelistic period.
Thirdly, the restoration of NBG’s primacy in the Greek financial sector (from the previous 
decade, 1987-1996, when NBG was in constant retreat, in the face of competition from 
multiplying private sector, nimbler rivals), in a client-centric banking system, restored the 
employee’s esprit de corps, which also is judged to have reflected well on SYETE’S leadership 
and legitimised its conciliatory-minded bargaining with management (Interviews 1 and 2).
32SYETE, 2002. The Indispensable Role of SYETE in the developments that shape NBG, Announcement 84,18  
July. This text is the seal of approval of SYETE on the 35/58 agreement. The implications of this agreement for 
SYETE’s control by PASKE were pointed to me by its President at the time.
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It is impossible, we would argue, to disentangle these interactions that involve material benefits 
and their normative underpinnings, generational change and altered work experiences and social 
roles. They form a whole in shifting an alignment of a body of employees from one mode of 
governance to another. Furthermore, and looking beyond the individual attitudes that might 
inhere in anyone of the 15,000 employees of an organisation like NBG, once this whole is 
internalised and coheres within a trade union, it shapes the latter’s role and identity in the public 
domain. Outlook, and its articulation, acquires a particular institutional home which is denied to 
a competing worldview: a zero-sum gain whereby politico-institutional terrain is captured by a 
particular outlook and lost to its competitor.
3.An Aborted Merger
The proposed merger between NBG and Alpha, Greece’s most prestigious privately-owned 
bank, first announced at November 2001, met with the active support of NBG’s trade union, 
SYETE. This support represented the culmination of six years of consensual industrial relations 
at the Bank, which we examined above, led by PASOK- PM Simitis’s appointed Karatzas 
administration, (the tenure of the Karatzas administration, 1996-2004, was co-terminus with that 
of PM Simitis himself).
The proposed merger with Alpha Bank, Greece’s most prestigious privately-owned financial 
institution, was presented by NBG’s management as confirming NBG’s restored status, beyond 
any reasonable doubt, by reaffirming its leadership position within Greece, conferring to it a size 
commensurable to the financial sector consolidation taking place in the Eurozone, and making it 
a regional leader in the Balkans. It represented NBG’s management response to the challenges 
of consolidation and internationalisation in an increasingly open and competitive European 
market space as well as the desire to respond to these challenges in such a way as to secure 
managerial autonomy both from the Greek state and from a potential predator from abroad.
In very practical terms what led SYETE to support the merger was its belief that it would create 
a size for NBG that would make it resistant to predation from abroad thus securing its stable and
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predictable relationship with management33. It had the added benefit, in the event of PASOK’s 
losing power, of making NBG’s management more resistant to direct government intervention 
but still accountable to Greek pension and social insurance funds (Interviews 1 and 3) which 
would continue to be NBG’s key shareholders. Crucially, as we examined above, the merger 
was seen through the prism of a successful partnership between management and trade union, 
and in the context of an ongoing restructuring effort which had conferred significant benefits, at 
minimum cost, to NBG’s employees.
SYETE accepted the principle of competitive European markets within which NBG needed to 
survive and supported NBG’s accelerated regional expansion, not least through the merger with 
Alpha Bank. Alpha had a strong presence in Romania, whereas NBG was strong in Bulgaria, so 
their merger at the time would transform the merged entity into the leading financial institution 
in the region. Essentially, SYETE took the norms of efficiency, modernisation, market 
leadership and internationalisation and attached them to an argument on the enduring saliency of 
NBG’s contribution to national purpose34. It was precisely because NBG had so effectively 
changed in the market liberalisation era, and could become a regional market leader, that it had 
to remain the same, in its capacity as a corporation of wider social and economic significance 
which must remain under national control.
Interestingly enough NBG’s management carefully calibrated formulation, of one of the 
merger’s main goals, retaining the decision making centre in Athens (NBG and Alpha Bank, 
2001)- a formulation chosen so as not to provoke the European Commission’s competition action 
(Interview 2) - was replaced, in public debate, by the more resonant term of creating ‘a national 
champion’. Public debate, in that respect, underlined even more the legitimation imperatives of 
the key players than NBG’s own choice of words.
For the PASOK government, and its new post-EMU accession finance minister (Greece formally 
entered the EMU in 2001), the merger also commented itself. It could potentially revive 
sentiment in the ASE, badly mauled after the bursting of the stock market bubble which took
33SYETE, 2001.The securing of the rights of employees, prerequisite for the success of the merger, Announcement 
No59, 8 November. This text links NBG’s modernisation and leadership with the stability of employee management 
& relationships and its continued national control, facilitated by its greater size, an outcome of the proposed merger.
34 Ibid.
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place in 1999 (Interview 2). This was not a forlorn hope. NBG’s previous merger with its own 
subsidiary, National Mortgage Bank of Greece, in 1996, had led to the liberalisation of the 
mortgage market and spurred the consolidation of Greece’s financial sector, making a major 
contribution to the stock market boom of the 1990’s (Interview 4). NBG’s proposed merger with 
Alpha was now expected to accelerate both further financial sector consolidation and overall 
corporate internationalisation in the Balkans, generating positive expectations, at ASE, on the 
basis of the projected gains of these twin processes.
Much as with SYETE, the ruling party’s practical considerations carried normative baggage. 
Henceforth its theme of a ‘strong Greece’, would acquire a distinct corporate face, associated 
with such core market processes as corporate internationalisation. PASOK too, the more it 
changed the more it could argue that it stayed the same. As a social democratic party, and with 
one of its pillar constituencies being the SOE and SCB trade unions, PASOK could not simply 
accede to the primacy of market actors. Rather, it had to posit the premise that, under PASOK’s 
direction, leading market actors would lead the Greek business community and national 
economy to new directions beneficial for the nation’s welfare and prowess.
We must see SYETE’s and PASOK’s strategies as mutually reinforcing. The national 
championship thesis acted as a bridge facilitating PASOK’s transition, in material and 
ideological terms, to the market liberalisation era, not least by satisfying key demands and 
assuaging the fears of its social partners, trade unions in SOE’s and SCB’s such as NBG. The 
thesis and its corporate governance implications sustained the alliance between PASOK and its 
trade union supporters. It updated PASOK’s linkages with an increasingly liberalised Greek 
economy while maintaining a distinctive enough ideological profile vis a vis its political 
competitors35. It also boosted PASOK’s pro-market faction’s own nationalist credentials in its 
constant struggle with the still powerful, populist-nationalist faction, the so-called ‘patriotic 
PASOK’ of 1981-1989 vintage.
The merger itself failed essentially for market reasons. There was a shareholder and 
management revolt at Alpha Bank. Important Alpha shareholders thought than an auction
35 For a cogent articulation of PASOK’s motives and differentiation from ND on this issue see Hristodoulakis, N., 
2006. Why powerful Greek groups are needed, To Vima, 2 April.
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process, that would generate interest from other potential acquirers of Alpha Bank, from abroad 
as well, would help them realise greater capital gains than those promised by the exclusive 
merger negotiations with NBG. Alpha’s management team was also threatened by the loss of 
authority to NBG’s management entity in the merged entity. Less importantly, there was 
ferocious opposition by ND, nominally on competition grounds, but in reality because ND 
precisely feared what PASOK had hoped: the revival of the latter’s credibility as a steward of the 
Greek economy and the reinforcement of its links with the economically active middle-upper 
strata and the country’s corporate chieftains. NBG’s management survived the failed merger, 
not least due to SYETE’s organising a strong show of support, and continued to lead the bank 
until 2004 when a victorious ND appointed a new chief executive officer36.
From a Strong to an Extrovert Greece
l.Corporate Motivation and a Completed Acquisition
NBG’s new management, appointed by ND upon its assumption of power in 2004, did not 
follow the same consensual style of management with SYETE which it almost saw as 
tantamount to co-determination (Interview 2). Nonetheless, and on its own admission, it built 
on its predecessor’s strategy of emphasizing regional markets as the key to the bank’s future 
growth. In its business plan it stressed its strategy of exiting low-yield markets where NBG had 
a presence and reinforcing its operations in the high-yield, emerging markets of the Balkans 
(NBG, 2005a). NBG’s new management also parlayed the credibility build by its predecessors, 
with the bank’s shareholders, over previous bank acquisitions in the region, and in particular that 
of UBB in Bulgaria, to establish its fitness for undertaking this new significant commitment.
International portfolio investors, at a period of benign global liquidity conditions, were judged to 
have conferred an extra 20-30 % premium to the NBG stock on the promise of its further
36 Theodore Karatzas, the Governor of NBG, died one day before ND’s election victory. SYETE honoured him for 
‘respecting the character, history and special culture of the National Bank’ vowing to guard his inspiration for a ‘big, 
modem, competitive and regional bank’, a marker, even more than an obituary, for the trade union’s future stance 
with the new management which was to be appointed by the incoming ND government, SYETE, 2004. The 
Governor of NBG has died. Announcement 33, 3 March.
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dynamic expansion in the region37. Furthermore, the new chairman of NBG had made it a key 
plank of his strategy to increase the participation of foreign institutional investors to NBG’s 
shareholding, devoting skilful attention to explicating the bank’s strategy to them and securing 
their backing38. It also build on the previous management priority of making a high share price 
contingent on foreign institutional shareholders in order to deter unwanted interference to the 
bank’s management by the Greek state.
As we noted in the previous chapter, NBG was no exception, within the Greek financial sector 
and the larger Greek blue chip cohort, in courting foreign institutional investors and having its 
regional expansion strategy and related business plans validated by optimistic reports issued by 
international investment banks. These pressures has been captured most acutely, by one Greek 
reporter, at the point when global liquidity conditions worsened, from the mid-2007 onwards, 
and Greek financial institutions were caught between the rock of their previous commitments to 
growth, to international investors and shareholders, and the hard place of a rapidly transformed 
market sentiment which started punishing the strategies that only just recently it was rewarding39.
NBG’s decision, in the spring of 2006, to acquire Turkey’s fourth largest privately-owned bank, 
Finansbank, for the vertiginous sum, for Greek corporate standards, of 5 billion Euros, led to the 
highest ever capital raise at that time by a Greek corporation of 3 billion Euros and simply could 
not have been neither intelligible nor possible, absent the pressure and approval of the bank’s 
strategy, of international expansion, by its international shareholders.
With acquisition targets running out in Romania and Turkey40, and the only remaining regional 
market of note being the far away Russia, NBG management, by 2006, faced the prospect of
37 Based on an estimate by the then head of National Brokerage, NBG’s brokerage subsidiary, communicated to the 
author in the spring of 2006. National Brokerage is one of Greece’s largest stock brokers and intimately aware with 
the trends and pressures affecting its parent’s stock.
38 Ibid.
39 Dr Money, 2008. The new story that Sophocleous ‘wants’. euro2day, 1 July; Dr Money, 2008. Banks: The 
message that they do not receive. euro2day, 16 September; Dr Money, 2008. Banks: The threat of the Balkans, 
euro2day, 20 October.
40 NBG had considered acquiring a bank, Dis, half the size of Finans, in 2005, which was eventually acquired by the 
Belgian-Dutch Fortis. Subsequent to the acquisition of Finans, there was only one sizeable financial institution left, 
approximately the size of Dis Bank, which NBG could acquire, Deniz Bank which was acquired by Dexia. OYAK 
Bank, owned by the Turkish Armed Forces Pension Fund was sold to ING, but would never have been offered to a 
Greek financial institution. AK Bank, Turkey’s equivalent of NBG, sold 20 % of its shares to Citi Group. Because
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either a significant fall in its share price or a stock buy-back or extra dividend which it had 
promised to its shareholders41, both highly embarrassing options for the ND government. The 
NBG chairman was the personal choice of the Greek Minister of Finance, his appointment 
approved by the Prime Minister. His tenure was inevitably compared with that of his 
predecessor appointed by PASOK, Theodore Karatzas, and acknowledged as highly successful, 
particularly in having set the course of NBG’s regional primacy. The pressure was certainly 
there for NBG to do something significant, in terms of its regional strategy. Regardless of what 
the calculus of the ND Government ended up being, unfavourable comparisons between the 
NBG record during PASOK and NBG’s record during ND’s rule, were bound to be unfavourable 
comparisons between the two governments as well.
In sum, both NBG’s international investors and the ND government were biased in favour of 
NBG’s international expansion while the regional acquisitions of NBG, implemented prior to the 
appointment of its new management by ND, made Turkey the next logical step, and one of the 
few available countries, where this expansion could continue.
As we can see from the information provided in the tables below the acquisition of Finansbank 
has not led to foreign institutional investors abandoning the stock of NBG -  their participation at 
the end of 2009 stood higher than it did in 2005 -  while Finansbank’s contribution to NBG’s 
profitability steadily grew throughout the period. Indeed during the late 2009 - early 2010 
period, investment banking analysts have seen NBG, due to its Finansbank acquisition, as a rare 
bright spot in a Greek financial sector which has been ravaged by Greece’s sovereign credit 
crisis (indicatively, Luz, H., Vinci, D., Kalia, M., Cheung, J., 2010). This suggests that the 
acquisition has addressed NBG’s strategic needs, as the bank understood them, and the 
expectations of key players, such as international investors.
of its stature, it would also be highly unlikely that its parent, Sabanci Holding, would have partnered with a Greek 
financial institution.
41 National Bank of Greece, Business Plan 2005-2007, March 2005, p.33.
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National Bank of Greece Profile
Year of Foundation 1841
Ownership Composition end of 2005 
Ownership Composition end of 2009
International Ins./Rt. Investors 38.79 % 
Private. Domestic Investors 23.20% 
Other Domestic Institutionals 15.80% 
Pension Funds & Public Sector Entities 22.19% 
NBG Subsidiaries 0.02% 
International Institutionals and 47.72% 
Retail Investors
Domestic Retail Investors 23.41% 
Pension Funds supervised 12.31 % 
by the Greek State
Foundations, Legacies 4.13% 
Pension Funds not Supervised 4.18% 
by the Greek State
Domestic Institutional Investors 2.14% 
Church of Greece 1.56% 
Domestic Private Sector Companies 2.83% 
Other 1.73%
Management Board Composition Non-Executive Chairman of the Board: V.Rapanos 
Managing Director:A.Tamvakakis 
Non-Executive Members:I.Giannidis, A.Stavrou, 
LPamagopoulos (employee representative) 
Non-Executive Independent Members:
Metropolitan Theoklitos, S.Vavalidis, G.Zanias, 
V.Konstantakopoulos, A.Papalexopoulou-Benopoulou, 
P.Sabatakakis, M.Sklavenitou, A.Makridis
Market Capitalisation end of 2009 11,330 mn euro
Source: NBG
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Finansbank Profile
Year of Foundation 1987
Ownership Composition end of 2005 Fiba Holding A.Fi. 33,20%
Fina Holding 15,01%
Giriflim Factoring A.fi. 4.20%
Fiba Factoring Hizmetleri A.fi. 3.27%
Free Float 44.32%
Ownership Composition end of 2009 National Bank of Greece 77.22%
NBG Holdings 7.90%
International Finance Corp. 5.00%
NBG Finance 9.68%
Others 0,21%
Board of Directors Composition Chairman of the BoardiH.Ozyegin 
Vice Chairman and Group CEO:O.Aras 
Members of the Board of Directors:M.Aysan,
D.Lefakis, E.Nasim, A.Thomopoulos, P.Mylonas, 
D.Anagnostopoulos, Y.Dincem, S.Sahinbas,
Market Capitalisation end of 2009 4,447 mn euro
Source: Finansbank
National Bank 
of Greece key 
metrics 
(mn USD)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total Assets 82,067.15 103,547.24 124,399.14 139,290.45
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Net Income 720.61 1,093.93 1,803.60 1,078.69
Personnel 21,718 24,187 33,373 35,860
Borrowings 625mn USD,
1.367 mn USD 
(matures 2013),
1.367 mn USD 
(matures 2014)
2,050.58 mn 
USD
Source: NBG Group, Finansbank
Finansbank key 
metrics
(mn USD)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Assets 11,723.55 13,053.89 15,874.81 19,802.99
Net Income 276.62 214.86 400.61 311.75
Personnel 7,746 7,756 9,056 9,986
Borrowings 425 mn USD
Source: NBG Group, Finasbank
Just prior and subsequent to the announcement of the acquisition investment banks and 
brokerages, in this environment of ample global liquidity, took a charitable view in their 
analysis, on both the generic risk attendant to investing in Turkey and to the specific risk of 
NBG, as a Greek financial institution, entering the Turkish market42. The need of NBG to
42 Indicatively, Ghose R., Mukuru, K. & Dawes, G., 2006. National Bank of Greece-Turkish Delight? Citigroup, 13 
March; Vinci, D. & Lanz, G., 2006. National Bank of Greece-Breaking new ground. Goldman Sachs, April 4;
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expand was acknowledged, the prospects of growth of the Turkish market were seen as positive 
and NBG management assurances that the deal was devoid of substantial political risk were 
accepted. NBG’s past track record in the Balkans, and in Bulgaria in particular, where the bank 
had made its most successful acquisition in the region, was seen as auguring well for its 
acquisition of Finansbank.
This favourable outlook was critical both for the completion of the acquisition and for the 
subsequent capital raise that the acquisition necessitated. While many of these market actors had 
a vested interest in presenting the transaction in flattering terms -  acting as advisers to NBG and 
later as underwriters of its capital raise -  they could not have done so had an environment of 
gloom and doom prevailed in international markets. Emerging market equities, on the basis of 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index, where Turkey has a 
2 % weighting, appreciated more than 100 percent from mid-2003 to mid-2006, reflecting an 
accelerating trend of private capital flows to developing economies such as Turkey43.
In effect, so strong has been the global market sentiment, in the period under consideration, that 
it has enabled Turkey to be treated, by foreign investors, as a viable EU accession candidate 
despite accumulating evidence to the contrary. When NBG acquired Finansbank, in the summer 
of 2006, a year had already passed after the voting down by the Dutch and French electorates of 
the European constitution, a major setback for European enlargement in general and Turkey’s 
EU accession process in particular, the implications of which had been noted by market actors44. 
Turkey’s efforts to adjust to accession strictures had also visibly flagged since 2004, when it 
formally became an accession country45. To top it all, a majority of Greek Cypriots had voted
Tucker, P., 2006. Greeks Bearing Gifts. Merrill Lynch, 4 April; Haralabopoulos, D., 2006. National Bank of Greece 
- Gunaydin Turkey. Alpha Finance, 12 April.
43 World Bank, 2006. Global Development Finance-Development Potential of Surging Capital Flows.Washington 
DC.
44 Indicatively, Simsek, M., et al., 2005. Turkey-EU Update: France and Netherlands’ ‘No’, Votes Clouds Turkey’s 
EU Membership Prospects. Merrill Lynch, 2 June; Carkoglou, A. & O. Gokler, 2005. EU-Turkey Relations in the 
Aftermath of French and Dutch Referenda, Kocyatirim, 10 June; Kelezoglou H. & B. Candemir, 2005. “Nee, Non, 
Nee, Non...”. EFG Istanbul Securities, 10 June ; Robertson, Ch. and A. Urbanska, 2006. EU and Eurozone 
enlargement-A disappointing lack of vision. ING Wholesale Banking, 3 May.
45 Economist, 2006. Turkey-Flying in the wrong direction, May 6; Economist, 2006. Turkey's wobble-A crescent 
that could also wane. 1 April.
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down the Annan Plan, in 2004, for the re-unification of the island, on the instigation of their 
President Papadopoulos, a decision which set the stage for recurrent friction between the EU and 
Turkey, generated by demands of the Republic of Cyprus, in its capacity as a new member state. 
The rejection of the Annan Plan was also seen as a negative for Turkey’s EU membership 
negotiations, by market participants, both before and after it came to pass, let alone for Greek- 
Turkish bilateral relations46. These setbacks in its EU accession process notwithstanding, Turkey 
was increasingly seen and, indeed, became a compelling investment destination47.
2.Political Players and a Prevailing Template
The magnitude of NBG’s acquisition in Turkey, two years after ND’s rise to power, and 
conceived and executed by the management that it had appointed, confirmed ND’s fealty to its 
own ‘extrovert Greece’ thesis. Similarly, the initially positive response of PASOK’s leader to 
the announced acquisition illuminated the continued adherence of the opposition party to the 
‘strong Greece’ thesis - George Papandreou himself by leading, while in government, the 
rapprochement with Turkey, was also identified with this concept which was premised on 
Greece exerting its particular brand of strength in a pacific, friction-free regional environment48. 
SYETE also gave it its guarded approval, reaffirming the link between NBG’s regional position 
and its ‘character’, i.e., its continued link with the Greek state49.
Subsequently a series of events and motives resulted in the reversal of this positive response, by 
PASOK and SYETE. The general deterioration of relations between NBG’s management and 
the still PASKE-controlled SYETE engendered suspicion by the latter of management’s 
initiatives. Furthermore, the initial refusal of NBG’s chairman, subsequently reversed, not to
46 Candemir, B., 2003. Turkey’s EU trajectory crosses Cyprus, HC Istanbul, 14 November; Avci, H., 2004. 
Raymond James / Strateji /  GfK Referendum Survey Results, Raymond James Securities, 19 March; Elicin G.A.& 
Korean, O.B., 2005. Cyprus Election and Threreafter, Ekspres Invest, 14 February; Gulkan, M., 2004. Comments on 
the Cyprus Referendum Results, Bender, 26 April.
47 Global Business Policy Council, 2005. 2005 EDI Confidence Index, AT Kearney ; Kouyoumdjian M. & Volland 
E., 2005. Turkish Banking Sector Growth Potential Leads to Significant Foreign Investment from the West, 
Standard and Poor’s, 1 January; ATA Invest, 2006. Turkish Banking after 2005: “Too early or Too Late for Market 
Entry”, January; Altug, O., 2006. Watch Out!!! -  FDI avalanche.., Raymond James Securities ,7 April.
48 In April of 2006, and a few days after the announcement of the Finans acquisition, the Greek PM and George 
Papandreou gave, in a business conference, nearly identical endorsements of the Greek commercial pre-eminence 
abroad, see Nikolaou, N., 2006. National Strategy and petty party competition, Kathimerini, 7 April.
49SYETE, 2006. Speech of the President of SYETE Mr Stavros Kukos to the Annual General Meeting of NBG’s 
shareholders, Announcement, 26 April.
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appear in the Greek Parliament’s Economic Affairs Committee, to explain his decision to acquire 
Finansbank, on the grounds that he cannot disclose market sensitive information to any other 
body than NBG’s shareholders, severely insulted prevailing political ethos, and PASOK’s amour 
propre. PASOK strongly pushed PASKE-controlled SYETE to increase the pressure on NBG’s 
management (Interviews 1, 2 and 3). Consequently SYETE aggressively questioned the 
acquisition’s business premises and consequences, both with regard to NBG’s assumption of a 
risk of that magnitude and the implications of the capital raise for its corporate governance50.
Despite the controversy, neither SYETE nor PASOK questioned the desirability of the 
acquisition in principle. On the contrary they reaffirmed their support of NBG’s continued 
international expansion, in Turkey included. Indeed, SYETE’s request to the government to 
allow for participation of insurance and pension funds in the capital raise to be undertaken, for 
the purpose of acquiring Finansbank, while seemingly contradictory with its opposition to the 
acquisition, demonstrated the fealty of the union to the original conception of NBG: of the bank 
as a leading regional player under the control of Greek shareholders and ultimate supervision of 
the Greek government itself.
As we can see below the PASKE-PASOK affiliated ticket of DI.SI.E maintained its dominance 
at SYETE in the period leading up to and subsequent to the Finansbank acquisition51. It was this 
PASOK-affiliated leadership that in tandem with PASOK itself criticised the particulars but not 
the principle of the Finansbank acquisition. Strike action during that same period, which is also 
presented in the tables below, was focused primarily on sector-wide issues -  the withdrawal of 
the Association of Hellenic Banks (AHB) from collective bargaining which NBG’s management 
and the ND government endorsed -  and less so on firm-specific reasons. This was the case, 
according to a SYETE source (Interview 9), due to the need to focus on the collective bargaining 
issue as strikes on NBG-related issues, of which there were many at the time, would have 
exacted a heavy price on NBG employees, due to additional loss of income. Indicative of the 
resilience of the PASOK -  SYETE consensus on NBG’s international role was the statement
50SYETE, 2006. Where NBG is being led after the acquisition of the Turkish Finansbank, Announcement 126, 16 
May; SYETE, 2006., 14 Questions of SYETE for the acquisition of Finansbank, Announcement 127, 29 May.
51 Indicatively in 2009 the total population of NBG in Greece was 12,997, SYETE had 10,331 members, out of 
which 8,018 voted in the elections of that year (Source: SYETE).
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communicated to the author (Interview 3) by the then head of SYETE, and presently head of 
OTOE, that he would have been willing to retract his criticism of the Finansbank acquisition, 
acknowledging its strategic validity, had the CEO of NBG, Takis Arapoglou, in his capacity as 
President of AHB, conceded to engage in collective bargaining with OTOE.
SYETE Elections and 
Results
2006 2009
DI.SI.E 4,439 4,142
DAKE 2,451 1,534
DAKE ALLILEGII 142
DAS 1,041 931
ENOIEA 625 613
DIMOKRATIKIENOTITA 188
PROTASIPROOPTIKIS 111 172
AGONISTIKIPAREMVASI 106 126
INDEPENDENT 41
Source: SYETE
SYETE Elections and 
Management Board Seat 
Representation
2006 2009
DI.SI.E 26 28
DAKE 14 10
DAKE ALLILEGII -
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DAS 6 6
ENOIEA 4 4
DIMOKRATIKI ENOTITA
PROTASI PROOPTIKIS “ 2
AGONISTIKI PAREMVASI “
Source: SYETE
SYETE
Industrial
Action
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of 
Strikes
14 10 4 12 3
Source:SYE'i rE (only Greece-wide strikes included)
SYETE
Industrial
Action
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Days & Hours 
Lost
22 days 9 days and 4 
hours
3 days and 3 
hours
11 days and 
8 hours
3 days
Source: SYETE (only days and hours lost in Greece-wide strikes included)
As importantly, NBG’s chairman, forced to defend the acquisition, this time in Parliament as 
well as elsewhere, defended it in terms identical to the ones on which the NBG & Alpha merger
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was defended by his PASOK-appointed predecessor: (i) to secure NBG’s autonomous growth (ii) 
maintain its decision making centre in Greece and (iii) to create a powerful regional bank52.
As with the aborted Alpha merger, which led to the coinage of the ‘national champion’ term, so 
did the Finansbank acquisition compel NBG’s management to ground this major corporate action 
in nationalist terms. Both the chairman of NBG, in his parliamentary testimony, and subsequent 
commentary, defended the acquisition as an act of extroversion, the latter quality being integral 
to Hellenism’s distinguished past53. Likewise, NBG’s internationalisation, by extending to 
Turkey, signalled and validated Greece’s international position and role, to the wider public -  
indeed as has been the case in other previously peripheral countries, which we referred to above, 
the major corporations of which had undertaken acquisitions of similar scope. In a poll 
conducted in Greece after the announcement of the Finansbank acquisition, 73.4 % of those 
polled supported the acquisition while 68.2 % opposed the eventuality of a Turkish bank buying 
a Greek one: a demonstration of the nationalist content increasingly inhering in market actors 
and in the way they are seen by the general public (Kappa Research, 2006).
ND, by giving the green light to the management of NBG, to make the largest ever corporate 
acquisition in Turkey, challenged decades-long assumptions, held at the elite and mass level, 
shaping Greek-Turkish relations (exhibiting a proto-Realist attitude, many Greeks would justify 
refusing to travel to Turkey in order not to make a contribution, no matter how miniscule, to the 
economy of their antagonist).
As far as the opposition was concerned, PASOK saw value, through the Finansbank 
confrontation, to render even more explicit its perception of corporate internationalisation as 
having the status of a national interest, deserving of purposeful state action. It did so in its party 
platform of the elections of 2007 and in prior consultation with SYETE’s leadership (PASOK, 
2007; Interview 3). Since then, it is a position that it has reasserted by opposing the negotiations 
of the ND government with Deutsche Telecom as a strategic investor at OTE, the telecoms
52 Arapoglou, T., 2006. NBG’s Strategy, Testimony to the Parliamentary Committee of Economic Affairs, Athens, 
30 May.
53 Indicatively, Nikolaou, N., 2006. The jump into Turkey. Kathimerim, 4 April; Konstantaras N.,2006. Merchants 
and border guards. Kathimerini, April.
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operator, and in concessions conferred by DEI, the energy utility, to RWE, the German energy 
corporation54. Both with DEI and OTE, as with NBG, their perceived success in modernising, 
and in the case of OTE internationalising in the Balkans, under national control and 
management, have been marshalled by PASOK as sufficient evidence that their future both can, 
and indeed must be, a national one55.
PASOK’s continuous adherence to the national championship thesis has indeed enabled it to 
launch scathing attacks on ND’s Minister of Finance while maintaining a policy profile 
compatible with its privileged relationships with the trade union movement and the wider middle 
class constituency that is in favour of corporate restructuring and internationalisation. Thus 
PASOK’s reaffirmed adherence to the national championship thesis, spurred by the contestation 
that the Finansbank acquisition generated, has anchored PASOK, as an opposition party, to its 
previous allegiance as a government to an essentially benign perspective on the international 
order and the way it structures developments in the region.
3.The Finansbank Acquisition and Greek Institutions
A critic, within ND, of the Government’s decision to give the green light to the Finansbank 
acquisition, has argued that by doing so the government has accepted the risk of the acquisition 
going wrong, either due to a future economic crisis in Turkey, or due to the Turkish 
Government’s turning against Finansbank, in the event of a bilateral foreign policy crisis 
(Interview 8). In actual fact, both of these risks were underlined when, weeks after the 
announcement of the Finansbank acquisition, a speculative attack on the Turkish lira and 
subsequently a mid-air collision between a Greek and Turkish fighter jet, gave grounds to 
renewed criticism by PASOK and the opposition press, of ND’s acceding to the Finansbank 
acquisition56. The benefits, this critic has argued, to the Government, if the acquisition proves 
successful over time, are by comparison miniscule. He explains the decision, despite this 
imbalanced cost-benefit evaluation, to a generally lackadaisical attitude of the Government, in its
54 PASOK, 2008. The sale of OTE is a tremendous scandal, 15 April.
55 Indicatively Karakusis, A., 2008. Auctioneers and Creators, To Vima, 7 August; Papoulias, D.B., 2008. OTE, DEI 
and German Saviours, To Vima, 13 April.
56 Politis, G.,2006 Black Tuesday in the Aegean. TA NEA, 24 May 2006; Karakusis, A., 2006. The Aegean, the 
collision and National [NBG]. TA NEA, 24 May; Karakusis, A.,2006. At the mercy of the markets. TA NEA, 16 May.
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evaluation of its own political risks, in situations such as that of the Finansbank acquisition. 
These reservation notwithstanding, we have noted above, how the Finansbank acquisition fitted 
immediately with both the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs policy stance of (i) 
promoting the role of Greece, internationally, as the interface of an ever expanding region and 
(ii) identifying their Ministerial mission, and indeed their political persona and signature policy 
initiatives, particularly so in the case of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Greece’s 
commercial leadership.
According to a leading diplomat (Interview 6) NBG’s management was asked to confirm that the 
NBG investment in Turkey would neither put the bank in a position whereby it, and by extension 
the Greek government, could be blackmailed by Turkish authorities nor would it undermine the 
soundness of the bank. In actual fact NBG’s management, despite providing assurances on both 
these grounds, was not really in a position to do so. First, as a financial institution NBG’s 
international branches and subsidiaries ultimately exist on sufferance of the authorities, 
regulatory and administrative, of the domicile in which they operate. Second, considering the 
size of the Turkish market and that of Finansbank, the more successful NBG’s operations would 
be there, the more the overall soundness of the bank would be depended on developments in the 
Turkish economic and political life. This formulaic green-lighting of the Finansbank acquisition 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy makers further argues that this decision was grounded 
in the political calculus that we have analysed. These assurances only paid lip service to the 
twin risks of Turkey’s leverage over Greece being increased as opposed to being decreased and 
the possibility of NBG’s investment hurting the Greek economy: both legitimate concerns from 
the perspective of Greek national security and welfare. But the request and granting of such 
assurances at best did not generate the level of scrutiny that could put a stop at the acquisition. 
At worst they amounted to a feeble attempt, on the part of the political and policy making 
machinery, to shift the blame to NBG’s management, were the Finansbank acquisition to go 
wrong in the future. They make it possible for an ND minister to say in the future ‘well, NBG 
management assured us that everything would be ok!’.
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Foreign Policy Implications
l.Greek Corporate Internationalisation in Turkey
By acceding to the Finansbank acquisition the succeeding, to PASOK, ND government enhanced 
the credibility of the Turkish government which also accepted the transaction; made it possible 
for a shot of the arm to be given to the Turkish economy at a sensitive time; introduced into 
Greek foreign policy calculus the rising stakes of the Greek economy in the Turkish economy; 
tied itself, within Greece, to an optimistic view of the future evolution of the bilateral 
relationship.
That it found it politically acceptable and desirable to do so, speaks precisely of the saliency of 
corporate internationalisation, and its nationalist grounding as evinced by the polling that 
evaluated public reactions to the event, in Greece. The saliency and robustness of the 
internationalising coalition also made itself felt in PASOK’s, and its most relevant social partner 
SYETE, which accepted it in principle. At the same time the ferocity with which the 
Finansbank acquisition was contested by PASOK, on the narrower technical grounds of 
Finansbank’s valuation, as much as that of the merger of NBG with Alpha, is also powerful 
evidence of the political benefits that the opposition saw, in both cases, as we have described 
them, accruing to the ruling party which green-lighted them. Essentially the contestation 
attendant to both the aborted merger with Alpha, and the successful acquisition of Finansbank, 
bears testimony to Greece’s two major parties fighting over the same ground, one which is 
demarcated by corporate internationalisation, the only difference being that in the case of 
Finansbank this ground has been extended from the Balkans, to include commercial primacy in 
Turkey.
Furthermore, the alacrity with which the key Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs not only 
green-lighted the acquisition but also, as we noted previously, incorporated it in their projection 
of Greece as an interface between the international economy and ever enlarged region, illustrates 
how corporate internationalisation has become a key plank of the Greek government’s strategy. 
The greatest the reach of corporate internationalisation the more able have Greek policy makers 
been to (i) impress upon international constituencies the weight and influence of the country 
internationally (ii) attract investment inflows to the Greek economy in the context of a continued,
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fiscally driven privatisation effort. In turn these efforts have (i) cemented the link between the 
ruling party and leading politicians with Greece’s more dynamic socioeconomic elements and 
(ii) enhanced the prestige of the government, domestically, as a steward of Greece’s international 
role and influence, with which these elements identify themselves.
2.A Foreign Policy Decision
State-enabled FDI, in effect state-sponsored fraternisation, in a country which was up until very 
recently considered a military threat (and still is viewed as such by a significant segment of the 
Greek population as well as of its intellectual and administrative elites), and which justifies high 
levels of military expenditure and a large conscript army, is a foreign policy decision - or to 
reframe it, it is a decision that has substantial implications in terms of the priorities and 
assumptions of a foreign policy.
Strictly speaking, the Greek government merely allowed the structural power of a leading Greek 
corporate actor, and of the latter’s own compelling logic for further regional expansion, to 
express itself. NBG’s acquisition of Finansbank was made possible by a capital raise to which 
private entities, international portfolio investors in the main, contributed. It was also induced by 
the need of NBG’s management to seek further expansion in the region in an environment 
characterised by excess global liquidity and foreign portfolio investors pushing for, and 
rewarding, expansion-related risk taking. Low politics initiatives such as the singing of 
agreements on trade and tourism and the encouragement by the two governments of growing 
affiliations between non-state actors, initially undertaken in the late 1990’s, had either not 
registered, petered out or never really factored in the decision making of NBG’s management.
The political reality is, however, that by acceding to the acquisition the Greek Government, and 
the ruling ND party, shared into the risks and opportunities of a corporate actor, NBG. ND 
shared in the opportunities first of all because the acquisition of Finansbank lent credence to its 
own favoured formulation of an ‘extrovert Greece’. ND incorporated NBG’s investment in 
Turkey, not by asserting that nationality and the nation are no longer important - either generally 
speaking or, specifically, in terms of the largest, most historic Greek financial institution, 
completing the biggest ever acquisition, and single investment in Greek corporate history, in 
Turkey of all places. Rather it did so by asserting -  or rather reconfirming an assertion already
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made by PASOK - that nationality is paramount but a very particular type of nationality: an 
extrovert one which is capable of exercising its economic influence on a regional scale, 
incorporating even Turkey.
This nationalist claim was not weakened but rather strengthened by the global trends that 
determined the magnitude of the Finansbank acquisition. The ample global liquidity that enabled 
the acquisition has been of a size that diminishes even the largest of national economies and 
economic actors. The diverse destinations to which this liquidity has been channelled -  from US 
real estate to so-called frontier economies in Africa - speaks almost of the chilling impersonality 
of force majeure. Still, global liquidity courses, one way or another, through national space and 
ends up being mediated and filtered through national contexts.
After all, it was due to the magnitude of the acquisition that once it did take place, it reinforced 
Greece’s role and identity in the region, as a leader in its pacific transformation into an area of 
ever increasing economic opportunity. It has also raised, commensurably, the ‘audience’ costs57 
of a potential undermining of this role, through Greece’s own foreign and national security 
policy actions58. The higher you get, the harder you risk falling: Greece, precisely because it has 
consolidated its international identity as a responsible stakeholder in the region, were it to regress 
to a conduct reminiscent of the 1980’s, it would attract opprobrium and disappointment rather 
than the weary resignation that this previous period elicited.
The political risk and opportunities are also commensurate with the corporate ones. On the 
assets side of the political ledger, the size of the NBG acquisition -  5 billion euros, 7 % market 
share in one of the most dynamic markets of the world - send a very compelling signal 
domestically and abroad of Greece’s position in the region. On the potential liabilities side of 
this same ledger, it exposed Greece’s largest financial institution to the sentiments of the Turkish 
public as well as to Turkish regulatory and other state authorities; and tied the fate of Greece’s
57 Audience costs in that respect can be generated by distinct international and domestic constituencies which 
however can differentially affect each other, in their respective reactions, (see Lohmann, 2003)
58 The acquisition of Finans by NBG was lauded by international media. Indicatively, Economist, 2006. Delightful- 
An Unprecedented alliance between Greeks and Turks. 8 April; Editorial, 2006. Old Foes Eschew Nationalism in 
South-east European Banking Deal, Banker, 1 May; Hill A., 2006. A Greek Quest, Financial Times, 10 May.
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largest stock, and consequently market sentiment at the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), to the 
vagaries of a volatile Turkish economy and of an equally volatile bilateral relationship59.
Both risks, as we mentioned above, were underlined by a remarkable coincidence, during the 
acquisition of Finansbank by NBG, when the Turkish lira fell and a Greek fighter jet crashed in a 
mid-air collision with a Turkish fighter jet.
Minister of Finance Alogoskoufis did attempt, in responding to parliamentary critics of the 
Finansbank acquisition, to assert that NBG’s management is the only actor qualified to assess the 
risks and opportunities involved in its Turkish foray, and, by extension, ultimately responsible 
for its outcome60. But the intensity of the party-led contestation attendant to the acquisition, its 
significance for Greece’s leading bank and the fact that the chairman of NBG was both 
appointed by the government and considered to be, in the wider sense, a partisan player as much 
so as his PASOK appointed predecessor, belied this assertion61. As with NBG’s assurances to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this political attempt to ‘have your cake and eat it too’ would 
hardly be expected to survive a genuine crisis engulfing NBG in Turkey.
To paraphrase a saying ‘you enable it, you own it’. The ND government, and by extension the 
Greek state, by enabling the Finansbank acquisition, by enabling substantial economic 
interdependence with Turkey, it also came to ‘own it’.
3.Disregarding a Threat in Order to Pursue an Opportunity
NBG’s acquisition of Finansbank, reduced to its essentials speaks of the Greek government’s 
decision to pursue a foreign policy opportunity by disregarding a foreign policy threat.
The opportunity is comprised of the enhancement of national welfare and international prestige 
by the incorporation of Turkey into the core region where Greek corporations can achieve a 
leading position. The threat is constituted by the commensurate ability of Turkey to enhance is
59 NBG is the most important stock in the FT/ASE 20 Index so developments in Turkey, since the acquisition of 
Finans, have exhibited the ability to affect sentiment at ASE either negatively or positively (for NBG’s weight on 
the FT/ASE Index see Fillipas and Vagena, 2008).
60 Papakonstantinou, D.G., 2006. “We are not investment advisors”-Mr G.Alogoskoufis underlined that National’s 
[NBG] acquisition in Turkey was decided on business criteria. Kathimerini, 26 May.
61 Karakousis, A., 2006. Arapoglou’s misconceptions, TA NEA, 5 May.
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leverage over Greece, precisely due to this exposure of Greek corporate actors to Turkish state 
and regulatory action. Thus, Turkey, from denying, or constituting a threat to deny key national 
goals, became instrumental to fulfilling one of them.
This novel status of Turkey, as instrumental to Greek national goal-fulfilment, brought about by 
state-sponsored corporate internationalisation, is starkly illuminated by the reversal of what 
obtained in the early 1990’s in Greece’s interaction with the wider region. At that time, as we 
noted in our introductory chapter, Greek fears of Turkish encirclement had further 
‘contaminated’ the Balkans, consolidating the impression that, post-1989, the region had become 
a space of increasing instability and multiplying threats due to revived, and dangerously 
revisionist, as far as Greece was concerned, nationalisms which were perceived as being aligned 
with Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions. By contrast, approximately fifteen years later, the 
acquisition of Finansbank by NBG, was seen as a culminating point of Greece’s advantageous 
extension of its commercial leadership in the region.
In effect, the accumulated leadership position build over a ten year period by the Greek financial 
sector in the region, and by other FTSE/ASE corporations, not only facilitated the acquisition of 
Finansbank, as the limit of the possible was extended after each subsequent significant FDI 
transaction in the region, but also enabled the Finansbank acquisition to be incorporated in this 
larger narrative of the seemingly unstoppable reassertion of Greek commercial dominance in the 
region.
In that respect the lifting of operational hurdles, imposed by the limited experience of 
internationalisation and accessing of capital prior to internationalisation, has been coterminous 
with the lifting of conceptual hurdles as the redefinition of the Balkans as a marketplace 
eventually encompassed Turkey too. In the same vein, the long unfolding of the process of 
corporate internationalisation also embedded the Finansbank acquisition in the historisation of 
the process, rendering it even more legitimate and robust. Consequently, whereas Turkey had 
‘contaminated’ and ‘characterised’ the Balkans now the Balkans had facilitated, sufficiently 
enough to allow for economic interdependence, the ‘decontamination’ and ‘de-characterisation’ 
of Turkey.
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The Finansbank acquisition has also been commensurate, to goal attainment, to threat disregard, 
namely that of ‘Finlandisation’, of Greece being placed in a position of being blackmailed by 
Turkey into diluting its sovereign rights.
Prior to the acquisition, this ‘Finlandisation’ ability of Turkey was premised on its superior in 
number armed forces, the implicit threat of a military conflict in which Greece would emerge 
defeated being presumed as extracting, or threatening to extract, concessions from Greece. 
Subsequent to the acquisition, Turkey enhanced this ability by virtue of the size of its 
marketplace. It was the size of the Turkish market place which commanded an acquisition price 
of 5billion euros for Finansbank, equal to 50 % of all Greek FDI in the Balkans up until that 
point and 30 % subsequent to it. This ‘Finlandisation’ ability of Turkey must also be assumed to 
grow in a dynamic fashion both because over time NBG’s exposure to the Turkish market will 
grow, due to the further development of the operations of Finansbank in Turkey, and because the 
investment itself, as we will see below, acted as a powerful signal to other Greek SOE’s and non- 
SOE corporations to invest in Turkey.
Both the poll results that we referred to above and the public debate attendant to the Finansbank 
acquisition demonstrated that goal attainment -  regional commercial primacy consolidated and 
confirmed by NBG’s expansion of operations in Turkey -  overwhelmed reservations on this 
threat increase -  Greece’s leading financial sector corporation, and the Greek economy itself, 
being beholden to the intent of the Turkish state and the ups and downs of the bilateral 
relationship.
Conclusion
The market-led transformation of NBG and its attendant role in the consolidation and the 
internationalisation of the Greek financial sector re-energised the bank’s trade unions links with 
PASOK instead of attenuating them. The ability of NBG in this new role, as a profit-seeking 
corporation, to distribute resources to its personnel bought their loyalty, its market primacy 
restored their pride and its status as the leader of a resurgent Greek corporate sector assuaged 
their fears that the bank might one day become a subsidiary of an international financial 
institution. Furthermore, NBG‘s actions in the marketplace were integrated in PASOK’s own 
political strategy, premised on a successful capital market, the winning over of Greece’s new
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class of managers and capital holders and a redefined nationalism under which PASOK, through 
its benign guidance, would facilitate the coming of age of an aggressive internationalised Greek 
corporate sector.
The succeeding ND did not enjoy, nor was it realistic to try to replace PASOK’s privileged links 
with NBG’s trade unions, let alone use NBG as a template for such a relationship with other SCB 
and SOE trade unions. However, it found it useful to let NBG point the way in the ongoing 
internationalisation of Greece’s corporations by acceding to the Finansbank acquisition. In that 
respect ND shared the same material and prestige benefits that PASOK did as a steward of an 
internationalised corporate cohort, generously financed by ample global liquidity flows and in an 
international order which applauded such a mode of interaction between Greece and its 
neighbours. ND however, via its appointed management at NBG, was compelled to accept 
PASOK’s formulation of the latter’s nationally significantly role, underlined by the commitment 
that the bank would continue to be controlled by national stakeholders -  and indeed its ongoing 
internationalisation was an indispensable means to secure this goal. The confirmation of national 
control, in turn, underlined the acquisition of Finansbank as an event that is, and will continue to 
be, associated with Greek goals and a redefined Greek identity, premised on Greek commercial 
leadership in the region.
The driving forces leading to the Finansbank acquisition and the contestation attendant to it made 
Turkey instrumental to national goal attainment for Greece -  commercial leadership in the region 
-while also at the same time marginalising the threat that, in actual fact, it increased -  the ability 
of Turkey to blackmail Greece.
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CHAPTER 5
Introduction
In the first section of our concluding chapter we will first assess the impact of the Finansbank 
acquisition on Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey, and in particular from the viewpoint of the 
three key features, according to strategic rivalry literature, of goal attainment, mistrust and of 
domestic groups vested in a relationship of rivalry. Secondly, we will relate our findings, on the 
Finansbank acquisition, to the literature on the Greek strategic rivalry prior and subsequent to the 
Finansbank acquisition.
In our second section, we will relate our findings to the scholarly debates that have informed our 
interpretation of the Finansbank acquisition, principally that of NEN, and complementary those 
of corporate internationalisation from the periphery, coalition building in relation to foreign 
policy conduct and economic statecraft.
In our third section, we will examine how our NEN-informed hypothesis fares in relation to the 
competing schools of thought that we have identified, namely those of Liberal Institutionalism, 
Realism, and Europeanisation.
The Acquisition of Finansbank by NBG and Greece’s Strategic Rivalry with Turkey
l.The Finansbank Acquisition through the Strategic Rivalry Lenses
As a decisive step towards economic interdependence with a strategic rival in what terms, 
conformable with the strategic rivalry analysis, can we characterise the acquisition of Finansbank 
by NBG? We focus on three factors underlined by the strategic rivalry analysis (Colaresi, Rasler 
and Thompson, 2007, pp.23-28): national goal attainment, mistrust and cognitive rigidities, 
domestic groups and leaderships. Strategic rivalry analysis notes that the strategic rival is seen 
as a major obstacle to the attainment of key goals (or the negation of those goals already 
achieved) by a nation-state. This perception gains currency by a stream of conflictive events, 
between the rivals over time, which engenders mistrust among both publics and policy makers, 
towards the rival. This generalised mistrust, in turn, facilitates the escalatory potential that 
incidents of friction have between two rivals, as the cognition, through which the rival is 
perceived, becomes rigid and conflict-prone. The duration of the strategic rivalry also means
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that important domestic groups have anchored their interests and identities in the rivalry and that 
policy-makers are being selected, or compelled to conform, according to the conflict-prone 
templates established by the strategic rivalry.
The acquisition of Finansbank qualifies as the reverse of goal denial or goal compromise by a 
strategic rival. The acquisition of Finansbank qualifies as a cooperative act (after all it could 
not have taken place without the consent of the Turkish state and regulatory authorities) that 
facilitates, as opposed to denying, a key Greek national goal: the growing internationalisation of 
Greece’s major corporations in the region and the consolidation of Greek regional economic 
primacy, with all that it entails in terms of the country’s international prestige and welfare 
benefits.
As a financial sector investment the acquisition was -  and will continue to be as long as NBG 
maintains ownership of Finansbank -  extra sensitive to any act by the Turkish regulatory 
authorities that could undermine client confidence in Turkey in Finansbank itself, or investor 
confidence worldwide in the stock of NBG, were Finansbank to be destabilised by the Turkish 
government. The fact that such obvious considerations were overridden thus defines the event of 
the acquisition as a major act of trust. The signalling effect of the acquisition can also engender 
trust in key constituencies in a virtuous circle -  just as mistrust can be generated in a vicious one, 
of conflictive events -  by emboldening other Greek corporate actors to follow in NBG’s 
footsteps. Eurobank and Alpha Bank, two out of three of NBG’s major Greek competitors, 
subsequent to the Finansbank acquisition announced copycat acquisitions in Turkey, of Tekfen 
Bank and Altematif Bank, respectively62. OPAP, Greece’s lottery monopoly, has felt 
comfortable enough to bid to acquire the state-owned lottery Milly Piango63 in an auction staged
62 See, Kathimerini- English Edition, 2006. Eurobank's Turkish buy, 9 May; Kathimerini-English Edition,2007 Turk 
‘no’ to Alpha Bank deal, 9 August. The Turkish regulatory authorities blocked the Alpha acquisition, as the 
referenced article’s title suggests, few months before general elections were held in Turkey -  a sign of precisely the 
national content of corporate internationalisation, this time in the recipient country. Although Altematif Bank, 
Alpha’s acquisition target, is tiny compared to Finans, the symbolism of one Turkish bank after another being taken 
over by Greek banks was apparently too much to stomach for the Turkish government, particularly on the eve of 
electoral battle.
63The auction was eventually not concluded due to the Turkish state’s higher valuation expectations. However, the 
fact that both parties, OPAP and the Turkish government, seriously entertained the acquisition by the former of Milli
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by the Turkish Privatisation agency. These are all tangible signs of trust extension and 
entrenchment.
The acquisition also bears evidence of domestic groups and leaderships in Greece, and even the 
public, moving away from the strategic rivalry template to an explicitly cooperative mode of 
conduct. Implemented by a corporate leadership at the very pinnacle of Greece’s business 
community; accepted, in principle, by the trade union of one of Greece’s most important 
employers and by Greece’s main opposition party; approved by the Greek government’s 
leadership from the Prime Minister downwards; hailed by a significant majority of Greeks 
polled: all these facts bear evidence to the acquisition’s status as an event which alters if not all, 
at least several, of the key drivers that have sustained in the past Greece’s strategic rivalry with 
Turkey.
Putting the acquisition of Finansbank by NBG in the context of the overall trade and investment 
relationship of the two countries (see tables below) we can suggest the following: The
acquisition propelled Greece to top three position in terms of overrall FDI in Turkey, in the 
period 2005-2008, clearly a sign of the transaction’s significance not only in absolute terms but 
also relative to FDI patterns in Turkey. Greece’s recent crisis has also highlighted that 
interdependence is a two-way street, with argument raging on whether Greece’s neighbours, 
Turkey included, might suffer from a contagion effect, Greece’s regionalizing banks (in our case 
NBG) being a conduit of instability (indicatively, Keller, Ch., 2010, Deliveli, E., 2010) On the 
other hand, the acquisition has not seemed to have had a noticeable impact on a steadily growing 
trading relationship between the two countries which is still, however, not in the top five 
category, for either country and in either imports and exports. A particularly pronounced decline 
in Turkish exports to Greece, from 2008-2009, is in accordance with the pattern of Turkish 
exports declining in its surrounding region due to the economic crisis and its impact on the 
domestic demand of neighbouring markets (Anatolia News Agency, 2010). Finally, Turkish FDI 
in Greece has been negligible throughout the post-acquisition period. The establishment of 
state-controlled Ziraat Bank branches in Greece’s Western Thrace region, where there is a
Piango, which as a national lottery monopoly, with unique links to lower socioeconomic groups which would tend to 
acquire lottery tickets, possesses unsurpassed symbolic and brand power, is telling.
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significant Muslim minority, and in Athens, subsequent to the acquisition of Finansbank, was a 
very small investment, and took place, according to knowledgeable observers, in order to address 
Turkish amour propre and to test the Greek Government’s willingness to accept a reciprocal 
Turkish banking presence in Greece as a matter of principle (Interview 2).
Figures in mn USD 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009
llmonths
Greek Exports to 
Turkey
728 1,045 950 1,151 994
Turkish Exports to 
Greece
1,127 1,603 2,263 2,430 1,505
Source: EFG Istanbul Securities
Figures in mn USD 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Greek FDI in 
Turkey
38 11 2,791 2,360 775
Source: Central Bank of the Republic o f Turkey
Figures in mn EUR
France Germany UK
Belgium & 
Luxembourg
Italy
Top five -  in 
country of origin 
terms - in FDI in 
Greece in 2005- 
2007
3,787 3,432 2,011 1,145 839
Source: Invest in Greece
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Figures in mn USD Netherlands USA Greece Belgium France
Top five -  in country 
of origin terms - in 
FDI in Turkey in 
2005-2008
12,268 6,011 5,937 5,453 3,593
Source: Central Bank o f the Republic o f Turkey
Top Five Exporters to Greece (2005-2009) Top Five Importers of Greece (2005-2009)
1 .Germany 1. Germany
2. Italy 2. Italy
3. Russia 3. Bulgaria
4. France 4. Cyprus
5. Netherlands 5. UK
Source: National PK Brokerage Research
Top Five Exporters to Turkey (2005-2009) Top Five Importers of Turkey (2005-2009)
1.Russia 1. Germany
2. Germany 2. France
3. Italy 3. Italy
4. USA 4. UK
5. France 5. USA
Source. EFG Istanbul Securities
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2. Domestic Coalitions and Collective Beliefs
Subsequent accounts to the Finansbank acquisition by NBG (Anastasakis, 2007, pp. 14-15; 
Papadopoulos, 2008, pp.33-34) have stressed, accurately enough, that despite accelerating 
economic interdependence, most impressively highlighted by NBG’s expansion in Turkey, all 
major issues bedevilling bilateral relationships between Turkey and Greece remain outstanding: 
a solution to the Cyprus problem, the delimitation of the continental self of Greece’s islands, 
disputes over territorial waters and air space (generating periodically military incidents), 
treatment of respective minorities etc.
These accounts, however, fail to consider domestic coalitions, and the dominant beliefs that 
make them cohere, as factors behind the dynamic nature of strategic rivalries and whether these 
coalitions and their beliefs, at any given time, produce rivalry intensification or rivalry decline.
In particular, such static perspectives ascribe independent variable status to these classic ‘high 
politics’ disputes, without taking into consideration the extent to which they have come into 
existence, and have maintained their importance, not least because of the imperatives inhering in 
domestic groups vested in the rivalry. The literature on strategic rivalries is, however, sensitive 
to how such rivalries develop over time vested domestic interests in their continuation (Colaresi, 
Rasler and Thompson, 2007, p. 28). On this basis we argue that attention paid to evolving 
strengths and weaknesses of those domestic groups vested in the strategic rivalry, and those in 
overcoming it or at least attenuating, is relevant to the status of the strategic rivalry itself: is it 
intensifying over time or declining? The answer must be the latter, when we consider the array 
and prominence of domestic groups, policy makers and political parties which have committed 
themselves, through the acquisition of Finansbank, to interdependence with Turkey.
As we recall, from our introductory chapter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s a diverse array of groups, 
ranging from the Greek church and irredentist, right wing organisations to the Greek left, trade 
unions and student organisations, identified with an uncompromising policy on the Cyprus issue. 
Subsequently, in the 1980’s the co-management between the ruling PASOK party and its 
affiliated trade unions, in key SCB’s and SOE’s, was a major plank in PASOK’s notion of 
securing national sovereignty and social justice. This stance was legitimised by enmity towards
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the West and primarily the US, which was assumed to have favoured Turkey over Greece, and 
Hellenism at large, in relation to the Cyprus issue.
Consequently, the conversion of some of these same social actors in the cause of corporate 
internationalisation carries a highly significant ’Nixon in China’ weight, undercutting and 
marginalising continuous adherence to the precedent variant of nationalism, by other actors and 
forces which remain steadfast in their enmity towards Turkey. Indicative of the marginalisation 
of the latter, was the objection of the representative of the Greek Orthodox Church, one of 
NBG’s largest and oldest shareholders, at NBG’s Managing Board, to the Finansbank 
acquisition, when it was submitted for Board approval, who wished to the management of NBG 
that it fails to complete the acquisition, for the sake of the bank’s own future (Interview 2). 
What we thus see in the Finansbank case is the splintering of the anti-Turkish front. Importantly, 
the majority of the Church’s faithful flock, which originates from low socioeconomic origins, 
lacks institutionalised voice in Greek politics, in contrast to actors such as SYETE with its 
privileged relationship with PASOK.
The emergence of this coalition, in favour of economic interdependence with Turkey, was also 
facilitated by an alternative reading of Greek history which privileged Hellenism’s pre-World 
War I commercial dominance over several imperial spaces. The Finansbank acquisition did not 
create this alternative historisation that legitimised interdependence with Turkey but rather 
extended it to Turkey, as it had already been diffused by more than ten years of corporate 
internationalisation in the Balkans.
As we mentioned in our introduction, the competing historisation, incorporated the strong 
conviction that Turkish policy makers, as well as the Turkish public, will not tolerate Greek 
economic influence ever again materializing in Turkey. This understanding, which was a 
constitutive element in the accumulated distrust blocking Greek-Turkish cooperative behavior, 
also thoroughly exercised NBG’s management, prior to the acquisition of Finansbank64.
64 Both the PASOK and ND appointed management of NBG discussed thoroughly the political risk attendant to an 
investment in Turkey, the former focusing on operative discriminatory policies towards the remnants of the Greek 
Istanbul minority and the latter commissioning a poll and focus group research, conducted by TNS-Pinar, a Turkish 
market research organisation, to discover Turkish attitudes to such an eventuality (see NBG Istanbul Representative
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The re-entry of Greek capital in Turkish economic life, signalled by the Finansbank acquisition, 
was thus an event that went to the heart of the very collective experiences and beliefs that have 
driven the Greek-Turkish strategic rivalry. It challenged assumptions and attitudes, on Turkish 
intent with regard to patterns of cooperation and economic interdependence with Greece65 which 
have been constitutive of their strategic rivalry itself.
In effect, the Finansbank acquisition was first facilitated by the resonance of this earlier 
historical paradigm, and the collective experiences which rendered it plausible, on the presence 
of the Greek element in the region, premised on its ability to operate unhindered in non-national 
space. Once it took place it both extended and further entrenched this paradigm. By doing so it 
has contested the dominant historisation, which fuelled the strategic rivalry with Turkey, on the 
basis of which Turkey is an implacable rival best dealt with through impregnable, as opposed to 
permeable, national frontiers.
3. Political Leaderships and Ministries
The strategizing, that we examined, of powerful politicians sitting atop the Ministries of Finance 
and Foreign Affairs, in relation to corporate internationalisation in general and the Finansbank 
acquisition in particular highlights the reversal of what obtained from the 1950’s to the 1980’s: 
ambitious politicians would up the rivalry ante with Turkey in order to propel their careers and 
cement their links with those socioeconomic groups that similarly used the rivalry to accelerate 
their integration in Greece’s political system. Presently, equally prominent political figures, and 
certainly the Ministers at the helm of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the Ministry 
of Finance, have identified themselves with Greece’s economic interdependence on a regional 
scale, Turkey included, using this identification to establish themselves as privileged 
interlocutors with those dominant or aspirational socioeconomic groups that have prospered, or
Office, 2005. Specific Risk, Spring and TNS-Pinar, 2005. Market Survey of Attitudes Towards a Greek Acquisition 
in the Turkish Financial Sector, Summer).
65 These assumptions and attitudes were seemingly confirmed by the polling research, conducted by TNS -  Pinar, 
which found that a substantially higher percentage of Turks viewed the prospect of a Greek investment in the 
Turkish financial sector with disquiet compared to an investment by financial institutions by other EU member 
countries. In actual fact, however, subsequent to its acquisition by NBG, Finans has expanded its client base 
(Interview 2).
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believe that they can prosper, through the liberal economic dispensation and the economic 
interdependence that it has engendered.
We also mentioned in chapter 4 the audience costs, generated internationally, were there to be a 
substantial regression in the bilateral relationship with Turkey, subsequent to the Finansbank 
acquisition. Internally also, it would be a blow to the ND government’s domestic credibility, 
were such a deterioration to threaten the Greek economic stakes in Turkey, that governmental 
encouragement allowed to materialise in the first place, through the Finansbank acquisition. 
Naturally such internationally and domestically generated audience costs would be borne 
disproportionally by those leading political personalities that have identified themselves the most 
with corporate internationalisation. We refer to such audience costs because they render 
tangible how vested dominant political personalities have become to interdependence with 
Turkey and how commensurately motivated they are to maintain the relationship on an even 
keel.
Lack of institutionalisation, at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains a legitimate 
concern from a policy prescriptive point of view, as the Finansbank acquisition received 
perfunctory examination in terms of its wider implications for Greek national interests. Such 
weakness, as we see through our case study examination, does not so much bias foreign policy 
towards a particular direction (e.g. intransigence towards Turkey) but rather does not filter the 
decisions pursued by the political masters of the Ministry, either moderating their direction or 
improving their execution, with sophisticated analysis and expertise. In the case of Finansbank, 
Greece’s political leadership proved capable of executing a shift in favour of interdependence 
with Turkey in alignment both with the preferences of its international allies and interlocutors 
and with a critical component of its domestic coalition. Under-institutionalisation in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs proved a negligible factor either in hindering or accelerating that 
shift.
This could also be a critique adopted by those Greek Realists who are dubious of the prospect of 
a sustainably improved relationship between the two countries. They could argue that the Greek 
state, and political class, on this occasion as well, succumbed to pressure, this time from 
domestic Greek constituencies, without taking into account that Greek national interests would
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be undermined by growing economic interdependency with Turkey. These analysts would not 
concede that such interdependence can be a strategic goal of the Greek state, albeit one that 
needs to be pursued in a way that would cause minimal impact on national security concerns, let 
alone that this goal is one on which a redefined national identity should be anchored at.
From our perspective, however, just as precedent scholarship has established how state-society 
links in the post World War II era, and at least up until the late 1980’s, entrenched the Greek- 
Turkish strategic rivalry, our period under consideration suggests that the reverse is now the case 
in the domain of economic interdependence with Turkey -  with the Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs being rather marginal in terms of its influence on both trends.
4. Confusing Means with Ends
Last but not least, sceptics of the impact of the Finansbank acquisition on Greece’s strategic 
rivalry with Turkey have failed to notice the elision from low to high politics, that this event has 
created, the transition from means to ends. In that respect we find that the earlier accounts of the 
low politics initiatives that Greek foreign policy makers undertook in the late 1990’s, that we 
referred to in our introductory chapter, have conceptually limited the Greek analysts that have 
examined the Finansbank acquisition, from an International Relations, strategic rivalry 
perspective. A level of economic interdependence with Turkey which has a significant bearing 
on Greece’s material welfare, and has become constitutive of its international prestige (the 
audience costs mentioned above are, at the end, intrinsically commensurate to this prestige), can 
no longer be considered as merely a subordinate instrument, to some other foreign policy 
considerations, but rather as a key foreign policy goal on its own right, albeit of course not the 
only one. Indeed as we saw in our process tracing of the Finansbank acquisition it was an event 
that took place not because, or at least not only, due to foreign policy considerations, external to 
it. which willed it into being; rather it was an event that materialised largely because of its own 
intrinsic value: as a signifier of Greek commercial leadership, internally and externally, and as a 
not-to-be missed opportunity for Greece’s leading corporate actor.
This elision, from means to ends, also explains in our view the capacity of the paradigm 
established by the Greek corporate internationalisation in the Balkans to extend itself to Turkey 
and thus reverse the long standing order whereby it is Turkey that colours Greece’s relationship
with the Balkans and not the opposite. In our view the Balkans, by conferring a track record of 
regional commercial leadership, attested by the size of Greek FDI, and further validated by its 
historisation, constituted the process of corporate internationalisation as an end in and by itself 
and much less so as a means of improving bilateral relationships with neighbouring states. 
Precisely because of this status as a goal on its own right, it was made politically possible and 
desirable to extent corporate internationalisation to Turkey, the amelioration of the Greek- 
Turkish strategic rivalry being substantially a by-product as opposed to an end goal.
Our NEN Hypothesis and Complementary Explanations 
Our Research Question has been the following:
How does corporate internationalisation, undertaken from the economies of nation-states at the 
European and global periphery, ameliorate their long-standing strategic rivalries?
Our resulting hypothesis has posited, in the case of Greece, that:
For a state in the semi-periphery, the large-scale acquisition by a domestic firm of a foreign 
enterprise, reconfigures conceptions of economic nationalism. This is especially the case where 
the enterprise acquired is located in a state with which there is a long-term and significant 
foreign policy rivalry. The interests and strategies of key domestic socioeconomic actors are 
reconfigured within the new nationalism, with incentives to support and sustain such corporate 
internationalization.
l.NEN
We find that our Greek case broadly confirms key NEN findings. Commercial primacy in the 
region, engendered by liberal market reforms in Greece, is an example of the capacity of 
economic nationalism to be identified with, and underpin a range of economic transformations, 
including those associated with market opening and corporate internationalisation. Superior 
economic performance, whether in the aggregate as in Greek FDI totals in the region, or in the 
market leadership of a particular sector, and leading firms within it, in our case the Greek 
financial sector and NBG respectively, can define and establish notions of national superiority 
which are, by definition, relational, up to and including a nation’s strategic rival, in our case 
Turkey.
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Economic nationalism also illuminates the variety of the goals inhering in a nation, not all of 
which are compatible, something that is also confirmed by our case study. Growing 
interdependence with Turkey certainly complicates the management of this relationship, 
potentially even to the point of policy confusion and incoherence. Economic nationalism is 
certainly capable of introducing major new goals to the nation, which is not the same as saying 
that these new goals are now the only ones and are not conflicting with past objectives and 
priorities which have not been extinguished.
In terms of the directionality that past historical experience can set for the nation, as an economic 
entity, we would introduce a qualifier to AbdelaFs (2001) insight. A nation’s history is 
constituted by diverse collective experiences capable of justifying and embedding a variety of 
economic choices and interstate relationships. The resonance and plausibility of past historical 
experience in the present, together with the concurrent benefits accruing though the direction that 
a nation is called upon to pursue, can effect a change in a nation’s directionality. Greece’s 
regional commercial primacy, a centuries-long process which was terminated in the spate of less 
than forty years, from the 1920’s to the 1950’s, which is to say within living memory, certainly 
has been a factor in grounding Greek corporate internationalisation in Greek national identity 
and purpose in the period we have examined. However, alternative historical experiences which 
have not been vanquished, can still pull the national community in another, opposite direction. It 
is thus not only the nation’s foreign policy goals that can be conflicting but also the histories that 
render these goals prominent in political contestation and policy making. Abdelal admits of such 
diversity, in collective understandings of the past, but accounts for it through his analysis of 
regional and ethnic cleavages within a nation-state. In the small and rather homogeneous 
country that Greece is we would be better advised to look at socioeconomic indicators, in order 
to evaluate the saliency and power of each contesting and contestable historically informed 
understanding of the nation.
We also find, in our Greek case, that economic experience itself can produce a particular variant 
of nationalism even if that variant concurrently is historically informed and validated. For a 
generation of Greek managers, entrepreneurs and capital holders, their formative experience has 
been one of ever increasing primacy on a regional scale, facilitated by the accessing of financial
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resources of previously unimaginable magnitude. Inevitably, as historical beings, the members 
of this cohort will seek the past collective experiences that is most relevant to their own. But 
even were they to be a-historical, and if they would inhabit an a-historical community, still their 
experience would engender a collective feeling of intemationally-relevant strength and 
regionally applied superiority.
Finally, economic nationalism, and the goals that it projects, can be relevant to wider 
constituencies not necessarily directly involved or affected by the pursuit of these goals. The 
poll conducted, the fiery editorials launched, the demand of the Greek Parliament to ask for an 
explanation, this contestation of the Finansbank acquisition by NBG, of course speaks of the 
political calculus and coalitional dynamics as we have analysed them; but it also speaks of the 
demand of the national community, filtered to be sure by its political and intellectual 
representatives, to be consulted and have a say. By definition economic nationalism renders 
resonant a certain understanding of the nation with which a wide array of its constituent 
members can converse with. As scholars of NEN have argued, it can do so because the structure 
of economic life and its orientation is inextricably linked with collective perspectives of what the 
national community is or should become. It cannot thus has as its referents issues of deracinated 
and impenetrable technocratic concern which are relevant, in our case of NBG, only to a tiny 
minority of managers and capital holders, politicians and policy makers. The case of NBG 
proves that the nation will both claim and exercise its perceived right to root for the home team 
even it is not out there playing in the field or fails to grasp the ins and outs of the coach’s 
strategy. Inevitably, there will also be another group booing at the very fact that such a game is 
played at all. What is not an option, for those who consider themselves members of the national 
community, is ignorance or indifference to the event itself.
2.Corporate Internationalisation from the Periphery
NBG is a typical example of a corporation in the periphery, its role determined by the 
developmental mission of the Greek state from the 1950’s to the 1970’s, and subsequently by 
PASOK’s distributionist & statist policies. While these two phases are distinct, the first one has 
informed the other, by producing ongoing legitimisation to the Greek state -  and more 
specifically to a coalition between the bank’s trade union and the ruling PASOK party -  so that it
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could go on defining the bank’s role in the Greek economy. NBG, in other words, because it has 
served the national welfare in the past could serve it in the future.
This is so even if the concept of this national welfare has been redefined, to the extent that 
present intentions question the foundational assumptions of past performance and roles. In the 
case for NBG, and of the larger category to which it belongs, of Greek SOE’s and SCB’s, 
PASOK’s redefinition of the national welfare integrated the experience of trade union 
suppression in the preceding era with Greece’s alignment with the West and heavy handed 
intervention in Greek domestic politics by the US. Thus the relationship between PASOK and 
the trade unions of SCB’s and SOE’S, in Greece’s reconfigured political economy of the 1980’s, 
was consecrated by a vigorous anti-Western, anti-Turkish foreign policy. Managerial 
prerogatives, and the technocratic principles on which they were based, in NBG and elsewhere, 
were conflated with external imposition and national humiliation, and thus suffered 
correspondingly in terms of their legitimation and their exercise.
The Greek case, as we have presented it, amends Lipson’s (1985) scheme of property rights 
attached to FDI emanating from the countries of the Western core, which were undermined due 
to the peripheral state’s assumption of the mission of national development. Foreign owned 
utilities in Greece, in electricity and transport in the main, were expropriated and consolidated in 
the 1950’s, without causing any rupture in the country’s western alignment (Spanos and 
Papoulias, 2005, p .ll; Tsoukas and Papoulias, 2005, p.85) . These utilities also received 
extensive western assistance in terms of their internal organisation and technology inputs. The 
suppression of associational rights, however, together with the generalised collusion of Greece’s 
large privately owned corporations with the authoritarian right wing state, meant that as a whole, 
private and public enterprises were identified with the country’s Western, and later to be 
discredited due to the Greek dictatorship and military defeat in Cyprus, orientation. With the 
time lag of more than twenty years, in terms of state-driven developmentalism in the periphery, 
this identification was serviceable enough for PASOK to suborn these large corporations to its 
ditsributionist and clientelistic imperatives, albeit under the guise of a national strategy of 
domestic development premised on demand primping. As such, SOE’s and SCB’s like NBG, by 
forming one of key terrains in which national sovereignty and national development were
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supposed to be fulfilled, they became vehicles of social advancement for PASOK’s clients, 
providing in due course the party, through their trade unions, with leading cadres.
Market liberalisation and subsequent internationalisation, initiated under Greece’s EMU driven 
fiscal strategy transformed the status of these enterprises, restoring to a greater or lesser degree 
the managerial prerogative, listing them in the stock exchange if they were not already listed, and 
making them the leading stocks in a now active capital market capable of attracting investment 
flows both from domestic and international portfolio investors. This transformation in general, 
and particularly so in the case of NBG, fits well Lavelle’s (2004) analysis, as it entailed 
addressing both the requirements of new stakeholders, most prominently international portfolio 
shareholders, but also bringing along the already existing ones, namely trade unions with their 
privileged links with PASOK.
This alignment of new and old stakeholders was seen most clearly when, under the imperatives 
of consolidation and internationalisation, corporate decisions that had a bearing on NBG’s 
control, namely the merger with Alpha Bank, and the acquisition of Finansbank, first produced 
contestation and subsequently reaffirmed the bank’s ownership arrangements whereby the Greek 
state remained as its ultimate caring shareholder. This was achieved by linking these decisions 
with NBG’s continued mission of national import, in the market liberalisation era, the mission 
now being defined as NBG leading, in its capacity as the flagship of the Greek business 
community, the Greek economy towards commercial pre-eminence in the region. The twin 
reconfiguration and reaffirmation of NBG’s national mission has been endorsed by its trade 
union and PASOK, which is to say two actors that represent the hegemonic version of Greek 
nationalism that was established after the collapse of the Greek dictatorship in 1974. 
Furthermore, NBG’s status as a publicly listed corporation has meant that all of its major 
decisions, and certainly the two seminal ones that we have examined, have been presented and 
fought over in the public domain, through press conferences, extraordinary general meetings, 
analysts reports, public commentary etc.
Rather than the two-level game that Lavelle utilised to interpret the effort of peripheral 
governments to satisfy both external shareholders and domestic stakeholders, NBG represents a 
coincidence of purpose whereby internationalisation accords with both constituencies. In
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particular foreign portfolio shareholders could rest content, in a benign global liquidity 
environment and conversing with a credible NBG management, not too delve too deeply into the 
finer points of NBG’s corporate governance.
As we noted above NBG’s internationalisation, as well as that of OTE, the state controlled 
telecommunications monopoly, in the Balkans, fits well the sequentiality dynamic explored by 
Goldstein (2007) whereby a head-start in market liberalisation is leveraged through international 
expansion in other peripheral markets. Internationalisation as a process beneficial to the national 
economy and as a means of retaining national control on key corporate actors, a point made by 
other authors (Sally, 1994; Guillen, 2005), also accords with the NBG experience. NBG 
management has used, and defended publicly, internationalisation as a means for the bank to 
acquire such a size that would make it a predator as opposed to a prey in a consolidating 
European financial sector. On the other hand, maintaining national control through 
internationalisation, by definition involves other stakeholders such as political parties and trade 
unions, as they are the key constituent parts of this national control. The strategic decisions 
induced by internationalisation required political approval and generated political contestation 
while both approval and contestation activated the links between ruling and opposition parties 
and NBG’s trade union. Institutional and political links, activated by NBG’s strategy, in turn, 
engendered public discourse, on NBG’s strategic direction, and extended its duration and 
intensity. Thus the interaction of national control and internationalisation, linked the fortunes of 
a corporation like NBG with the wider discussion, and contestation, of national reach, so critical 
from a NEN perspective on national purpose and identity.
The very nature of the corporate internationalisation process also generated additional links with 
the Greek state, and in particular with the MF and the MFA that carried significant normative 
weight. MF responsibility over the strategic decisions that this process brought forward, as the 
representative of the Greek state which was the caring shareholder of NBG, created ownership 
and ownership meant that corporate internationalisation was integrated in the policy and political 
goals of the MF: such as the country’s international prestige, its ability to access international 
capital flows and the government’s domestic reputation as an effective steward of this process. 
If ownership was thrust upon the MF it was actively sought by the MFA, not least because its
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political leadership wanted to share in the reputational gains to be had, for the country and itself, 
by being seen as an exponent and facilitator of this process. Thus the set of policies 
implemented, under the rubric of economic diplomacy, which anchored the MFA and its 
Minister, in the goal of rising economic interdependence with the region, Turley included.
Both market rankings in the region and the use of global liquidity for international expansion 
made NBG a marker of Greek commercial superiority, vis a vis its neighbours, which also are its 
historical rivals, the most prominent one being Turkey. This marker became even more resonant 
due to its linkage with an earlier chapter in Greek history, before the collapse of Europe’s 
empires after World War I, when Hellenism enjoyed commercial primacy in South East Europe 
and parts of the Middle East, Egypt in particular. Equally, it was NBG’ status as such a marker 
that made it politically feasible for the bank to expand to Greece’s strategic rival Turkey, through 
the Finansbank acquisition, inducing in the process unprecedented economic interdependence 
between the two countries. This experience of NBG also accords with accounts of Spanish 
corporations expanding in Latin America where, although they did not involve strategic rivalries, 
they have enjoyed popular legitimacy due to their perceived benefits for the Spanish economy 
and their contribution to Spain’s international status. The latter was refracted, as with the case of 
Greek corporate internationalisation, through Spain’s historical experience: as the coloniser of 
South America and even the comeback of Spain as the hegemonic power in the southern 
hemisphere challenging the US’s leadership position.
3.NEN and the Internationalist Coalition
The SYETE and PASOK interaction, particularly as it culminated at the attempted but ultimately 
failed merger between Alpha Bank and NBG, substantiates the saliency of the analysis of New 
Economic Nationalism, in PASOK’s internationalist coalition of the 1990’s onwards. The 
national champion thesis, which sustained the links between PASOK and one of its key trade 
union allies, SYETE, in the case of NBG, bears evidence to the continuous need to ground major 
economic transformations - in this case the twin processes of the consolidation and 
internationalisation of the Greek financial sector - in a particular idea of the nation and of 
national interest. The national champion thesis both legitimated within PASOK Greece’s
136
transition to a more open and competitive market environment while legitimising, within this 
environment, continuous, albeit much more light-handed involvement of the state with NBG.
This conversion of socioeconomic and political actors, under nationalism, to market reform and 
liberalisation, carries particular weight and credibility precisely due to the past membership of 
these actors in a much more vociferous and aggressive variant of nationalism. Conversely, it 
anchors these leading social and political actors to the notion that national strength lies in 
economic interdependence with Greece’s neighbours, and in particular through its leading 
corporations assuming a leading role in the economies of the region. Importantly, for our 
purposes, it also aligns the strategies of governing parties and policy makers with the corporate 
strategies driven by the imperatives of consolidation and internationalisation as the latter confer 
material and ideational resources that can be distributed to constitutive, for the Greek political 
order, domestic and international stakeholders.
We thus find Narizny’s (2007) analysis too restrictive in its material focus, as he does not 
account for the resources, in terms of credibility and legitimacy, that particular social actors 
bring to bear to a coalition in favour of interdependence with strategic rival - and the way these 
resources can be applied to a national audience, under contestation, which is not itself directly 
engaged with this interdependence.
SYETE’s interaction, with PASOK, also introduces a qualifier to Solingen’s (1998) perspective 
on coalitional contest which must ultimately be integrated within the perspective of New 
Economic Nationalism. Solingen does underline the capacity of the internationalist coalition, as 
it expands the remit of its reforms, to enlarge its range of supporters, by distributing an 
increasing volume of benefits to an increasing number of constituencies. However, Solingen 
does not focus on how this process inherently incorporates members of the backlash coalition, 
thus converting them to the ranks of the internationalist coalition. We say inherently, because 
the corporations underpinning the backlash coalition, depending on the nature of their operations, 
can very well acquire an even more formidable distributive capacity under market liberalisation 
than under state protection. Material benefits accruing through market liberalisation and 
internationalisation (rising share prices and corporate profitability) can be distributed to the 
employees of a corporation regardless of rank, through stock options, salary raises, and cash
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injections in pension and health funds. This capacity also qualifies Ben Porat’s (2006) 
distinction between elite socioeconomic strata and less privileged ones for which a benign 
interaction in the international domain, underwritten by the promise of the benefits of 
interdependence, forms a dividing line rather than a point of agreement. As we can see in the 
case of SYETE and PASOK, NBG’s internationalisation, by re-grounding and thus re- 
legitimising NBG’s existing corporate governance arrangements (i.e., the preservation of 
effective control by Greek stakeholders and ultimately by the Greek state) it could provide 
security to employees, the vast majority of SYETE’s membership, who are neither skilled nor 
high ranking enough to be directly engaged in this process.
In turn, the conversion of members of the backlash coalition enhances the nationalist credentials 
of the internationalist coalition, as those ex-backlash constituents bring to the table their 
historically established credibility as fiery exponents of nationalism. What is thus under- 
determined in the above analyses of coalitional construction is the capacity of the internationalist 
coalition to appropriate for itself specific versions of national identity in its combat with the 
backlash coalition - indeed of the inevitability of doing so, from the perspective of scholars of 
New Economic Nationalism. From this perspective the resiliency and success of 
internationalising coalitions is both contingent and analytically graspable, only on the basis of 
the production of a rival version of nationalism and national identity; rival, that is, to the 
nationalism and national identity produced by the backlash coalition.
Similarly underexplored are these qualities of specific nationalisms and nations that might hinder 
or facilitate the identification of the internationalist coalition with nationalism itself, a major 
concern of scholars of NEN as we saw above. For instance, in Ben-Porat’s Israel the issue of 
how cleavages along religious and origin lines (i.e. observant versus reform Jews, Ashkenazi 
versus Mizrahi and new Russian-Jewish immigrants) from the perspective of their potential 
impact as impediments in the participation of these groups in Israel’s modem economy and their, 
by extension, capacity to affiliate even if only by plausible aspiration with the Israel posited by 
this experience of successful commercial interaction with the international economy, is 
substantially ignored. We also note that although Ben-Porat mentions the Zionist origins of the 
Israeli business personalities, and their constituencies, and their desire to renew their national
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leadership role under present day Israel, he leaves underexplored this aspect of their advocacy 
mission, as well as how the nature of their corporate success might have renewed their claims to 
national leadership.
We also believe that our analysis accords more fully with Polyani’s (2001) perspective which has 
informed Solingen and Ben Porat’s work. Polyani did not simply pose a binary position, an 
action-reaction dynamic between market and society. He also argued that the more the market 
becomes pervasive, the more it becomes embedded in society and becomes itself a societal 
priority: in the sense that its maintenance and evolution become central to a society’s capability 
to reproduce itself and to secure its distinctive, if evolving, cultural attributes and societal roles. 
We would argue that, from Polyani’s perspective, the fact that internationalising corporations in 
peripheral countries may anchor a redefined national identity and purpose, does not speak only, 
or even most importantly, of their unique influence, at this particular juncture -  rather it speaks 
of their inherent capacity, as organisations integrated in the larger social entity of the nation and 
nation-state, to be mutually constituted with them. This is the conclusion that we draw from 
NBG’s corporate restructuring and internationalisation, which was effected in such a way as to 
align its employees with the bank’s redefined role in Greece’s economy.
In terms of the level of specificity of the links between particular corporations and the state 
machinery that Tian (2006) has introduced to our work, we note our findings that the Greek 
MFA felt compelled to simulate -  if not capable of really emulating -  the MF’s relationship with 
internationalising corporations, an indication, in our Greek case, of the saliency achieved by the 
corporate internationalisation process. By doing so, the MFA had no choice but to endorse the 
penultimate event, in this process, NBG’s acquisition of Finansbank, ironically the corporate 
event that it was most qualified to take exception to, or at least actively partake in the 
deliberations that led to its green-lighting, due to its impact on the Greek-Turkish relationship. 
The Ministry of Defence, to our knowledge had no input and surely no influence in the decision 
taken. Were it to do so, it would need to question what had become one of the organising 
principles of the Greek nation’s economic life. Instead, in the period under consideration, the 
Defence Ministry has mostly stuck to its traditional policy position, to the effect that Turkey still 
represents Greece’s major security threat.
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From the prism of Tian’s analysis of Taiwan, we could say that Greece’s two contesting 
nationalist perspectives, the one premised on interdependence, the other on the strategic rivalry, 
did not meet head to head on this occasion. The links, between the government and SOE’s 
and SCB’s, have been as important in both Taiwan and Greece. This is an indication that the 
level of intensity of the rivalry is relevant to our hypothesis, as the hugely greater disparity in 
size, between China and Taiwan, and China’s stated goal of eventual reunification with Taiwan, 
are prima facie evidence of a substantially higher degree of intensity obtaining between the two 
rivalries. On the other hand, the claim that our research would make, to an analysis like Tian’s, 
is that it would be desirable to further investigate the nationalist content of the coalition fighting 
for unhindered interdependence with China and the way such content fares with the opposing 
version of nationalism which argues in favour of limited economic inter-linkages between the 
two countries.
4.Corporate Internationalisation from the Periphery and Economic Statecraft
By looking to the acquisition of Finansbank by NBG we do confirm Skalnes’ analysis (2000) 
that economic interdependence is not created only by social actors but can also be increased or 
decreased by states to serve wider purposes.
However, we differ with the part of the analysis that emphasizes solely the possibility that grand 
strategy, by attempting to enlist foreign economic policy tools to the pursuit of its overarching 
goals, it can always risk generating interdependencies which the state will not be able to control, 
i.e. whereby there will be state capture by essentially private interests. We, on the contrary, do 
not think that our examination demonstrates state capture: rather it represents conjoined action 
by a corporate actor and a government, underpinned by jointly constituted, and thus mutually 
constrained, interests. This is not to say that state capture cannot occur. It simply means that 
conjoined action between policy makers and corporate actors is a distinct and important in- 
between category, which represents neither state capture by corporate interest nor the state, at 
will, inducing economic interdependence through its direction or manipulation of corporate 
actors.
Sceptics of the effects of the Finansbank acquisition on the Greek-Turkish strategic rivalry also 
fail to consider how encouragement by the Greek government of economic interdependence with
140
Turkey can also act as a surrogate for politically more painful compromises on the Cyprus and 
Aegean-related disputes. ND has pursued a more risk-averse version of the rapprochement with 
Turkey that PASOK did, which has exposed to it to some criticism (see Kerr-Lindsay, 2007, 
p.243). By sharing the risks of amelioration, of the strategic rivalry with Turkey, with Greek 
corporate actors the ND government could manage to prove its goodwill to its international 
partners and parry international and domestic criticisms of passivity in the international domain. 
This has also been suggested by one of our interviewees (Interview 6 ) who has said that the 
government has given a green light for economic interdependence while consciously avoiding 
any major decisions on those issues that have traditionally defined the Greek-Turkish strategic 
rivalry. If this indeed the case, then the Finansbank acquisition falls well within the seminal 
analysis of economic statecraft by Baldwin according to which economic sanctions, whether 
positive or negative, should not be judged in their own right but also seen from the point of view 
of ancillary objectives, potentially even more important than the more obvious ones, that they 
can attain. In the case of NBG the status of the Finansbank acquisition as a signalling device, 
i.e. as means, it should be noted, is not incompatible bur rather it is also based on its status as a 
goal, in terms of generating national prestige. It has worked as a signal, and could be made to 
work as a signal, precisely because its positive connotations generated abroad and reflected back 
home, also produced national prestige.
The point made by students of economic statecraft to the effect that its measures, particularly in a 
democratic society, must be compatible with public sentiment or with the overall ideological 
posture of the governing party that implements them, has also been proven to be relevant to our 
analysis (Baldwin, 1985; Mastanduno, 1991; Skalnes, 2000).
Certainly, and even if ipso facto (we are not aware that the Greek government conducted any 
polls prior to the acquisition to test public reactions), the intense contestation that the acquisition 
generated attests to the fact that economic statecraft is not exercised in a vacuum, particularly so 
in democratic societies. We would only speculate that had the ND government reason to believe 
that the acquisition of Finansbank would be greeted by popular outrage in Greece (say, 70 % 
disapproving instead of the opposite that turned out be the case) it might well not have allowed 
NBG’s management to go ahead with it.
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In terms of the political parties involved, and their ideological baggage, both ND and PASOK 
have been in concert by identifying corporate internationalisation with national power and 
prestige. Where they have differed is in PASOK’s insistence, originating in its privileged 
relationship with trade unions at SOE’s and SCB’s, that this reason necessitates Greek control of 
major internationalising corporations, a position that was endorsed by NBG’s management, one 
assumes with the government’s consent, but which the government reversed when it sold a 
controlling stake of OTE to Deutsche Telecom.
This brings as to the last issue that we wanted to address, namely the observation that the 
integration of economic statecraft with other tools of foreign policy, in relation to a state which is 
considered to be a national security threat, is an indication of the heightened status of this threat. 
Absent such a heightened status, economic interdependence would let go to its merry way and be 
treated on its own -  economic -  merits. The Finansbank acquisition, in this sense, is evidence 
of the decline of the intensity of the rivalry prior to its occurrence -  which is not to say that, once 
it did take place, for the reasons we argued that it did, it did not further accelerate that decline. 
Equally, however, it could represent evidence that the integrity of Greek policy makers’ security 
assessment of Turkey has been compromised by the conjoined action between NBG and the 
Greek Government which we have described. In both cases, what we could say is that it is much 
easier for a security assessment of a strategic rival to be downgraded when the rivalry is 
relatively quiescent, for whatever reason, even if this quiescence is proven in retrospect to have 
been transitory.
Competing Explanations
l.The Liberal Institutionalist Explanation
Moving to the alternative to our hypothesis explanations, there is no doubt that there is 
significant overlap between the Liberal Institutionalist account and our own. By definition 
corporate internationalization, if it is not to be a process of marginal importance, it must generate 
substantial material benefits to those who undertake it and the sociopolitical forces that align 
themselves with it. Such benefits have been noted above and do have a very substantial bearing 
in generating the consensus formed behind economic interdependence, even with a strategic rival 
such as Turkey. Still as we have seen this interdependence has, every step of the way, being
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accosted by nationalism. In particular, it has been accosted by nationalism’s ability both to 
structure relationships of particular social and political actors, be they trade unions and political 
parties, and to align the general public with the idea that specific forms of interdependence can 
be integral to a reconfigured national role and identity.
Ironically, examining corporate internationalization at the firm level, in our case NBG, which is 
Milner’s (1998) perspective, underlines even more the saliency of NEN. Our case study 
demonstrates that an emblematic firm, such as NBG, can be a template of the relationship 
between the corporation and the nation which also has paradigmatic significance, for relations 
between trade unions and a leading party, PASOK, that structure Greece’s polity. NBG enabled 
PASOK to propose that leading Greek corporations, under the guidance and approval of the 
nation’s elected representatives, will become instruments of managing the market, as opposed to 
letting the market manage the nation, in order to achieve key national goals. PASOK had the 
narrow motive to do so in order to renew its relationships between SOE and SCB trade unions, 
instead of hurting these relationships, a distinct possibility in a period of fast paced and 
threatening corporate transformations. It had the broader motive, in the sense that such a 
proposal both reaffirmed, while updating, its own robust nationalism while also going with the 
grain of public sentiment in a country where the state has historically been pervasive. This twin 
appeal to a class of employees, and to the national community, through NBG’s emblematic 
status, subverts Milner’s (1998) analysis, as it demonstrates that the lower we bring down the 
level of analysis the more enlarged we must make the context on which the outcomes of this 
analysis are relevant. The fact that the renewal of the PASOK relationship with the trade 
unions, through corporate internationalization, relates to both (i) governance arrangements at the 
corporate level that have either nothing to do with the mutlinationality of the SOE’s and SCB’s 
involved or might constrain multinationality by inhibiting managerial prerogatives within 
Greece, which is the headquarter country of these corporations (ii) and to SOE’s with diverse or 
very limited capacities for multinationality, ranging from the energy utility DEH to Greek 
railways OSE, further underlines our point.
Going beyond these particular state-society interactions and looking at the acquisition from a 
materially disinterested perspective, the embracing of interdependence, through corporate
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internationalization, both at the elite and mass level, because it is perceived as conferring 
prestige to the nation and affirms superiority over a traditional rival, has itself no material value. 
In other words, the impact of corporate internationalization on strategic rivalries, while being 
contingent on material developments, it also enjoys a significant measure of autonomy from 
them.
We are driven to the conclusion that corporate internationalization also has an impact on 
strategic rivalries because it inevitably impinges on factors that are, strictly speaking, extraneous 
to its specific instantiations. Counterintuitive as it might be, it is because a strategic rivalry is 
driven by factors that go beyond specific corporate interests that corporate internationalization 
can affect it. To the extent that it redefines and strengthens national prestige, corporate 
internationalisation assists in a construction of a national identity that is ameliorative of the 
strategic rivalry. This identity is, further more, assumed by political forces and socioeconomic 
groupings involved only tangentially or not at all in corporate internationalisation. Corporate 
internationalization, consequently, from our strategic rivalry perspective, cannot be its own 
cause. Its very materiality, in that regard, by underpinning what is seen as the national ascend in 
the international hierarchy, legitimises a historicised interdependence with the strategic rival. 
Internationalising corporations can certainly make use of this fact to advance their own narrow 
interests but the process in which they are engaged in is such that, once initiated, is appropriated 
well beyond its own immediate boundaries.
In our case, the political contestation engendered by corporate internationalization, fuelled by 
coalitional strategizing and the animated involvement that the process itself generated to the 
national community, when it involved a country like Turkey, spread its influence further away 
from corporate intent itself. It is not coincidental, in this sense, that the initial attempt of NBG’s 
corporate leadership to define its choices in narrower corporate grounds, in the Alpha merger 
and subsequently Finansbank acquisition, were immediately overtaken by everyone else’s 
determination to define these choices in national terms. It is this boundary-escaping capacity that 
not only makes corporate internationalization possible but renders it with the national meaning 
that brings to bear its inevitable influence on Greece’s strategic rivalry with Turkey.
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Last but not least interdependence with a strategic rival is both made feasible due to nationalism 
and can be only be sustained through an inevitably national -  and ultimately nationalist as well - 
perspective. It was a nationalist perspective that rendered the Finansbank acquisition both 
legitimate and desirable politically in Greece. Nationalism, having thus facilitated 
interdependence with Turkey, also conferred to subsequent Greek investors in Turkey an 
improved perception of risk-taking, by proving that Greek economic stakes in Turkey are 
acceptable in both countries. This is to say that a Greek investor in Turkey -  whether an 
individual, small scale businessman or the management team of a publicly listed corporation -  
will always look at Turkey through Greek lenses (as well, of course, as through the lenses of the 
generic foreign investor). Consequently, it is the dominant variant of Greek nationalism, 
collaborative of conflictive, which will determine how the Greek investor would look at Turkey, 
as an inviting opportunity or as a forbidding risk, respectively. This is a particularly resonant 
factor, in the time frame under consideration, considering that Greek and Turkish nationalisms 
are historically informed by the manner and the reason through which the Greek minority in the 
Ottoman Empire was eliminated, shaping collective perceptions, in both nations, on the 
feasibility and desirability of economic interdependence between them.
2.The Realist Explanation
A formative influence, in terms of the capacity of Greek internationalization, particularly in the 
Greek financial sector, has been the EMU accession process. As Realists would have it, the 
EMU accession was undertaken not on the instigation of social and economic actors, but of a 
Greek government keen, through EMU, to renew Greece’s status as an EU member state: a goal 
which was of strategic significance as it was seen as counterbalancing Turkey’s privileged 
relationship with the US.
The fact that the magnitude of EMU-spurred corporate internationalization, up to and including 
its penultimate event ,the Finansbank acquisition by NBG, was the unintended consequence of 
state action does not mean that Realism cannot, at least partly, accommodate our account. The 
Finansbank acquisition by confirming Greek commercial preeminence in the region raised the 
international prestige of Greece. The permission of the Greek government to let it happen 
projected an image of conciliation towards Turkey, to the country’s international partners,
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putting in a more positive light its reluctance to take major political risks to advance solutions to 
high politics issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean. Facilitating corporate internationalization 
can also be said to be a long term investment in Greek welfare, and thus ultimately power, as the 
Greek economy is boosted by the returns of Greek capital invested in the region.
Having said that, the Finansbank acquisition has come about as the outcome of intense state- 
society interactions that escape the confines of the purposeful, substantially independent of 
society, Realist state. The acquisition came about by the need of a particular corporate actor, 
NBG, to expand its operations in order to secure its future growth and satisfy the high 
expectations of its shareholders. NBG’s strategy of international expansion has not only been 
approved by Greek policy makers during both PASOK and ND rule for reasons of state -  
national economic welfare, international prestige -  but also so for domestic reasons of 
maintaining a vibrant capital market and distributing, via this market, to domestic constituencies, 
international capital flows attracted by Greek corporate internationalization.
In tandem, the corporate and domestic imperative, throughout NBG’s internationalisation’s 
trajectory, have consolidated the legitimacy of both PASOK and ND rule, through a nationalism 
defined by Greece’s regional commercial dominance, at a period of globalization -  and have 
assisted them against domestic critics, whether intra-party or at the other opposition parties, 
which have represented the older-vintage variant of Greek nationalism and socio-economic 
groups which have been diminished by market liberalization and its offshoot, corporate 
internationalization. As the high point of Greek corporate internationalization, the Finansbank 
acquisition is driven by the need of particular social and political actors to reproduce themselves, 
and their dominance inside Greece, a dominance which is also premised in the projection of a 
particular international role and identity of Greece outside its borders.
The security assessment of the Greek state, of the state of the strategic rivalry with Turkey, might 
have been biased by all these actors but that does not speak of capture by corporate interests of 
the former; it speaks of a broader realignment encompassing societal and political actors and 
indeed the majority feeling in a nation in favor of interdependence, when this interdependence is 
seen as integral to national wealth, prestige and identity. In that respect much as a security
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assessment can be ramped up and exaggerate the threat posed by the strategic rival, for reasons 
not intrinsic to the threat itself, so it can be lowered down for equally extraneous factors.
3.The Europeanisation Explanation
Our starting point must be that Turkey’s accession process, itself made possible by the 
expectations of Greek foreign policy makers that it can confer leverage to Greece over Turkey, 
and normalize the bilateral relationship, must have had a major impact on the Finansbank 
acquisition. As one of the interviewees (Interview 8) has noted the Greek government, prior to 
the acquisition, certainly did not entertain a premonition “that we are in the year 1913” (i.e., that 
a belle dpoque, driven by peace and interdependence, is about to give its place to war and 
economic catastrophe). By 2006, the year the acquisition was completed, the EU enlargement 
process had become a fact not a hypothesis and Turkey could be seen, if not on its way to full 
membership, at least anchored in the EU dispensation, in a solidly constructed PAX 
EUROPEANA.
Having said that, we have seen how ample global liquidity propelled corporate 
internationalization globally, in Greece in particularly and in the case of NBG indispensably. 
The force of this liquidity has been such that well-grounded fears, particularly after the rejection 
of the European constitution, on the political viability of Turkey eventually becoming a member, 
had been either ignored or effectively discounted. A process, FDI in Turkey, initially articulated 
and defended in the context of convergence play dynamics attributable to Turkey’s EU accession 
status, had been, by 2006, completely overtaken by the search for returns of global capital 
through a combination of portfolio flows or the provision of strategic capital to corporations such 
as NBG. In other words, by 2006 a strategic investor contemplating a significant commitment in 
the Turkish market, could plausibly adopt either ‘the glass is half full’ perspective or its opposite, 
‘the glass is half empty’, in terms of the viability of Turkey’s EU accession process. Global 
liquidity, however, would definitely privilege the former answer.
This factor is particularly pertinent as the Greek government did not make use of Turkey’s 
accession process to resolve long standing disputes that would have ameliorated its rivalry with 
Turkey, by using long advocated arbitration mechanisms such as the International Court of 
Justice (Tzimitras, 2009). On top of this factor, Cyprus, as a new member state, emerged as
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one of the key stumbling blocks of Turkey’s accession process, threatening to disrupt it in at 
least three major occasions, in 2004, 2005 and 2206 (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). So, not only 
Europeanisation was a declining force, in the years leading to the Finansbank acquisition, but the 
deterioration of its influence on Turkey could be, partly, linked either to Greek inaction or to the 
foreign policy of another member state, namely Cyprus, the bilateral relations of which, with 
Turkey, are inextricably connected and indeed have demonstrated to have driven the strategic 
rivalry of Greece with Turkey. In sum, the Greek government because of the potential political 
costs involved in international arbitration, and Cyprus because of its hard-line stance, in some 
measure derivative of its insufficient Europeanisation as a new accession state (Kerr-Lindsay, 
2008), failed to employ ‘Europe’ as a catalyst for the elimination or reduction in the salience of 
all these disputes which frame and activate the Greek-Turkish strategic rivalry. Turkish scholars 
also provide a useful corrective to the perceived benefits of ‘Europe’ in the bilateral relationship, 
before and after the initiation of Turkey’s EU accession process, by arguing that Turkish policy 
makers both dreaded this newly-won Greek leverage and pointing out at its destabilizing, for the 
Greek-Turkish relationship, potential (Aydin, 2004, p. 37; Aybet, 2009). Greek corporate 
internationalization thus took place in environment where Turkey’s EU accession process itself 
had either failed to make any substantial dent on the most prominent elements constitutive of the 
Greek-Turkish strategic rivalry or, through Cyprus, threatened to drag Greece in the final 
derailment of Turkey’s European aspirations.
Concurrently, as we showed above, Greek corporate internationalization increasingly escaped the 
confines or Europeanisation-related positive sum calculations and acquired an increasingly 
nationalist hue premised on Greek commercial leadership in the region. This nationalist hue was 
incorporated in the policy instruments of economic diplomacy, was underlined by the global 
capital flows that conferred magnitude to corporate internationalisation and conceptualised in the 
notion of Greece as an interface with an ever growing region, all these three elements 
increasingly unmoored from the country’s European vocation. It was this hue, as we have 
argued, that coloured the contestation attendant to the Finansbank acquisition, legitimating it in 
the end and rendering it possible.
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